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Chapter 1
Introduction
The foremost policy challenges confronting our planet include (i) improving
educational outcomes for the 40% of the world’s population that are under the
age of 25 (402) and (ii) adapting to the impacts of climate change that threaten
to decrease global incomes by over 20% by 2100 (73). Both these issues are most
pressing in the developing world: almost 90% of the global population between
ages 10 and 24 live in low- and lower middle-income countries, where only 1
in 3 children complete secondary school and fewer than 1 in 5 primary school
children are proficient in math and reading (402); and, developing countries
will experience disproportionately higher temperatures as well as the strongest
increase in variability (43; 190) , where predominantly agrarian livelihoods are
hypothesized to be especially fragile in the face of weather shocks (111; 113; 315;
352; 406).
In “Essays on Human Capital, Environment, and Development”, I study
how government policies and natural environment, independently and inter-
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actively, influence education outcomes as well as if and how households or in-
dividuals adapt to fixed or changing features of the natural environment.
Education offers a wide range of benefits that extend beyond increases in la-
bor market productivity. Improvements in education can lower crime, improve
health, and increase voting and democratic participation (250). A complex de-
bate surrounds the magnitude of public investments directed towards different
levels of education. Investments in primary education are less politically con-
tentious, as primary education is perceived to be a broad public good with few
distributional issues, while public investments in higher education are often
decried as an income transfer to elite socioeconomic subpopulations, magnify-
ing income inequality (348). Such analyses ignore any potential developmental
’spillovers’ of higher education investments. If public investments in higher ed-
ucation increase lower levels of schooling, strengthening the entire education
system, policymakers should account for these benefits and reevaluate the so-
cial returns to investments in higher education. In the first substantive chapter
of this dissertation (Jagnani and Khanna 2019), I present the first estimates of
the effects of higher education investments on lower levels of schooling. Using
the roll-out of elite public colleges in India, we show that investments in higher
education increased educational attainment among school-age children. Private
schools entered districts with new elite public colleges, and students switched
from public to private schools. In addition, elite public colleges crowded in in-
vestments in electricity, roads, and water services. We find suggestive evidence
that public investments in infrastructure may have reduced setup costs for pri-
vate schools, and consequently, travel costs for school-going children. Our back-
of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the indirect benefits of elite public col-
leges due to transfers to private schools and returns to extra years of primary
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and secondary schooling, are at least half the size of the direct benefits accrued
through the training of undergraduate and graduate students.
Existing evidence, almost exclusively from affluent countries, suggests that
investment in higher education generates long-term local effects through di-
rect increases in the supply of human capital and greater innovation (225; 405).
However, such mechanisms may be less relevant for lower-income countries.
Higher education institutions in India are quite small in relation to the size
of the local population, as average enrollment is just over 700 students (178),
so benefits to the local economy from increases in human capital endowment
might not be substantial. In addition, research is not the primary mandate of
higher education institutions in India, and they lag significantly behind uni-
versities in high- and middle-income countries in terms of research output. We
show that higher education institutions facilitate educational attainment among
school-age children in India, indirectly increasing the supply of human capital.
In India, over 80 million children are out of school (90). Thus, optimally targeted
higher education investments may strengthen both the foundations of the edu-
cation system (i.e., primary and secondary school), as well as tertiary education,
since lower levels of schooling are critical as prerequisites for higher education.
In policy discussions aimed at improving educational outcomes, another ne-
glected influence is the time of day at which the sun sets, something that is
determined by discretionary time zone policies and can vary considerably both
across and within countries. Each evening the sun sets more than 90 minutes
later in west India than in the east. This is because the whole country follows
Indian Standard Time. Similarly, in China, all clocks are set to Beijing Time,
which means that the sun sets three hours later in the west than in the east. The
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sun sets at least an hour later in Madrid than in Munich because Franco’s Spain
switched clocks ahead one hour to be in sync with Nazi Germany in 1940, even
though Spain is geographically in line with Britain, which is in the time zone
one hour behind Germany. Similarly, for various historical reasons, clocks in
many places including Algeria, Argentina, France, Russia, Senegal, and South
Sudan are set ahead of their (solar) time and see the sun set later in the day.
My second chapter (Jagnani 2019) provides the first evidence that by gen-
erating large discrepancies in when the sun sets across locations, these arbi-
trary clock conventions help to determine the geographical distribution of edu-
cational attainment levels. Using data from India, China, and Indonesia, I show
school-age children in locations that experience later sunsets attain fewer years
of education due to the negative relationship between sunset time and sleep,
and the consequent productivity effects of sleep deprivation. When the sun sets
later, children go to bed later; by contrast, wake-up times are not regulated by
solar cues. Sleep-deprived children have lower productive effort; later sunset
reduces students’ time spent on homework or studying, while increasing time
spent on indoor leisure for all children. Later sunsets are also associated with
fewer hours of sleep and lower wages among adults.
The timing of natural light is determined by time zones and is therefore pre-
dictable across locations and seasons. If sleep is important for productivity, it
is surprising households that fail to adjust their sleep schedules in response to
later sunset. I show that the non-poor adjust their sleep schedules when the sun
sets later. Sunset-induced sleep deficits are most pronounced among the poor,
especially at times when households face severe financial constraints, consistent
with recent evidence that psychological consequences associated with poverty
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affect decision-making (259; 354). Because education is both a driver of eco-
nomic growth and a means to reduce income inequality (41), these results im-
ply that sunset time associated with geographical location may contribute to
persistent poverty and worsening inequality. Back of the envelope estimates
suggest that India would accrue annual human capital gains of over US$4.2 bil-
lion (0.2% of GDP) if it switches from the existing time zone policy to a two-time
zone policy: UTC+5 for western India and UTC+6 for eastern India. But there
may be benefits associated with the synchronization of daily schedules across
the country, and one must be cautious about proposing changes to the existing
time zone policy without a thorough cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, I also ex-
plore two other policy interventions that may mitigate the effects of later sunset
on children’s educational outcomes. One is later school start times; the other
is social protection programs. I find suggestive evidence that later school start
times allow children to compensate for later bedtimes by waking up later and
attenuate the effect of later sunset on schooling outcomes. Meanwhile, each
additional year of exposure to India’s conditional cash transfer program, The
Mahtama Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), mit-
igates the effect of later sunset on children’s educational outcomes.
I provide evidence that arbitrary government policies may interact with
fixed features of the natural environment to produce bad economic outcomes.
This paper contributes to a new literature that examine how discretionary clock
settings – by generating differences in the timing of natural light – affect eco-
nomic outcomes (136; 363). Two studies examine the relationship between day-
light savings time (DST) transitions and test scores but find contrasting results
(166; 197). In any case, if one were to compare short-run effects of sleep depriva-
tion from daylight savings time onset, to the long-run effects of sleep depriva-
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tion at issue in my paper, two differences have offsetting effects. First, the effects
of sleep deprivation on education production might accumulate. The DST tran-
sition may only affect sleep for a few days, while later sunset affects sleep every
day. Second, there may be adaptation to a permanent shift in sunset time. In
addition, within this literature, a small set of papers evaluate the implications
of the relationship between sunset time and sleep. (173) observe associated im-
pacts of later sunset on adult wages in the US, while (175) and (174) investigate
consequent effects on adult health outcomes in the US and China, respectively. I
provide the first evidence that arbitrary clock conventions – by generating long-
term differences in sleep – help determine the geographic distribution of ed-
ucational attainment levels. Because education is associated with increases in
labor productivity and improvement in health outcomes (107; 140), policies that
promote children’s sleep may also improve later-life well-being in locations ex-
posed to later sunsets. Lastly, several recent studies that examine the short-term
consequences of later school start times on students’ academic performance in
the US (86; 195). These effects (or lack thereof) are mediated through changes
in children’s time use, although these papers do not observe children’s sleep
or consequent trade-offs with other uses of time. My results provide the first
evidence on the long-run importance of child sleep for learning outcomes.
The changing features of the natural environment may independently affect
educational outcomes. The fact that the earth’s climate is warming has renewed
interest in the effects of weather on economic outcomes (119; 268). However,
a critical yet understudied question is the impact of temperature on human
capital production, particularly in developing countries, where predominantly
agrarian livelihoods are climate-exposed, and where individuals are unable to
consumption smooth over aggregate weather shocks (124; 334).
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In my third chapter (Garg, Jagnani, and Taraz 2019), using multiple data
sets from India, I show that higher temperatures reduce math and reading test
score among school-age children. Agricultural income is one mechanism driv-
ing this relationship. Hot days during the growing season reduce agricultural
yields and test scores with comparatively modest effects of hot days in the non-
growing season. Importantly, the roll-out of a workfare program, by providing
a safety net for the poor, substantially weakens the link between temperature
and test scores. Back of the envelope estimates indicate that by the end of the
century, over all 12 years of a child’s schooling, higher temperatures would re-
duce the effective years of schooling the child has received by 2 years. Our
results imply that absent social protection programs, higher temperatures will
have large negative impacts on human capital production of poor populations
in agrarian economies.
Within the literature that examines the relationship between weather and
economic outcomes, a small number of new papers have considered the rela-
tionship between temperature and human capital (98; 179; 306). These studies
have been set in developed countries, limiting them to a singular channel: the
physiological effect of day-of-test temperature on math, but not reading perfor-
mance. However, they fail to find evidence for the effects of temperature on
test scores over a time horizon longer than the day of the test. (98) does find
that longer-run exposure to heat stress during the summer months affects both
math and reading scores in South Korea, but the study is ambivalent about the
underlying mechanism. In this paper, we provide the first evidence for the day-
of-test physiological effects of heat stress, and more importantly, the effects of
longer-run temperature on human capital, in a developing country context. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to previous work, we find evidence that one mechanism
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underlying the effects of longer-run temperature on test scores is agricultural
income. Our work highlights the fact that a shared environmental issue – high
temperatures – may have vastly different mechanisms and impacts depending
on the country context, emphasizing the importance of examining environmen-
tal issues in developing countries (181). In addition, there exists a growing liter-
ature on the role of public programs in helping households and individuals cope
with environmental shocks (6; 126; 183). Our paper is the first to provide evi-
dence on the role of public programs in helping households in poor countries to
cope contemporaneously with extreme temperatures. As such, we demonstrate
that social protection programs such as MNREGA reduce the temperature sen-
sitivity of poor households, providing benefits that have previously received
little consideration (204). In doing so, we identify an important policy instru-
ment for adaptation, especially in developing countries where the rural poor
are often unable to smooth consumption over district-level aggregate weather
shocks.
Given the importance of agriculture in developing countries and with short-
run weather risk – e.g., due to extreme events like heat waves – widely projected
to grow in the years ahead due to climate change, it is crucial to know how
well and quickly farmers in low-income countries adjust to exogenous temper-
ature shocks to production. This question has interested development and agri-
cultural economists for decades, at least since Schultz (1964), Antle (1983) and
Fafchamps (1993) (21; 152; 350). More recently, environmental economists have
begun to explore this issue, recognizing that agricultural damages induced by
global warming may be especially problematic for farmers in low-income coun-
tries who rely on traditional methods for weather forecasting and may be unable
to detect a change in temperature or to respond promptly even to changes they
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notice, for example due to binding financial liquidity constraints. But if farm-
ers indeed detect and quickly adjust to warming temperatures on their own,
the resulting damages could be contained. Therefore, understanding how and
how fast farmers adapt to temperature shocks can usefully inform allocation of
scarce public resources to build resilience and avoid permanent damage.
In my fourth chapter (Jagnani, Barrett, Liu and You 2019), I use household-
level panel data from maize farmers in Kenya, and temperature data disag-
gregated across different stages of the crop growth cycle, to investigate if and
how farmers adjust agricultural inputs in response to within-season tempera-
ture variation. We show farmers expressly identify warmer temperatures as
a threat to maize productivity due to greater incidence of pests, weeds and
crop diseases. And they undertake defensive investments quickly in response
to short-run temperature shocks. They increase pesticide use in response to
heat-induced increased biotic stress from diseases and pests that are most ef-
fectively addressed soon after emergence, early in the season. And farmers in-
crease weeding effort throughout the season in response to higher temperatures
that promote weed growth. Meanwhile, farmers reduce inorganic fertilizer use
early in the growing season, contemporaneously with increased pesticide use.
That could be a response to increased yield risk or binding financial liquidity
constraints inducing trade-offs among input expenditures, or both. Overall, our
results are consistent with a model in which farmers make production decisions
sequentially, promptly adjusting to new information as it arrives within season,
subject to financial constraints. Back of the envelope estimate indicate within-
season adaptations undertaken by the average maize farmer in response to an
extra degree day over 8C protected roughly 75% of expected yield loss.
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Several papers have examined the extent of adaptation rather than how
farmers adjust to warming temperatures (71; 119; 127; 128; 268; 343; 345; 375).
However, among these only (375) examines agricultural adaptation in a devel-
oping country, India. Few studies have also examined how farmers adjust to
higher than normal temperatures in developing countries (236; 237; 238; 353).
These papers typically rely on cross-sectional variation to compare longer-run
outcomes such as irrigation and crop choice in hot versus cold areas. While
the cross-sectional approach approximates the ideal climate change experiment,
omitted variables concerns in this approach mean that the average climate could
be correlated with other fixed, unobserved factors. In this paper, we exploit
plausibly exogenous short-run variation in weather to examine within-season
adjustments in agricultural inputs. If farmers promptly adapt input appli-
cations within season in response to warmer temperature that differentially
affect crop growth across different stages in the agricultural cycle – both di-
rectly through plant physiological effects of temperature and indirectly through
temperature-induced changes in the supporting agroecology – then any anal-
yses based on seasonal or annual temperature variation may miss important
behavioral responses in the short-run. Moreover, if farmers can adjust in the
short run, it is more plausible that they will also be able to adjust in the long run
using methods unavailable to them in the short run (339) . Lastly, this literature
has also overlooked farmer defensive investments arising not due to heat stress
but rather due to biotic stresses arising from broader agroecological response to
warmer weather. To our knowledge, this is the first economics study to isolate
this mechanism behind farmer adaptation to temperature.
The share of the world’s population in extreme poverty living on less than
$1.90 a day has plummeted from 42 percent in 1981 to 10 percent in 2015 (402).
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And yet, for most poor countries there is >90% likelihood that per capita GDP
is lower today than if global warming had not occurred (133). In addition, fixed
features of the natural environment (e.g., latitude, distance from coast, eleva-
tion) have had considerable influence on the geographic distribution of eco-
nomic development (162; 291). Historically, human capital accumulation has
been the primary channel through which people escape poverty (115). Today,
800 million people live in extreme poverty and an additional 1.2 billion people
live on less than $3.10 a day (402). In such a context “Essays on Human Capital,
Environment, and Development” offers new empirical insights on the coupled
dynamics of environmental and human outcomes and identifies new policy op-
tions to improve educational outcomes in developing countries.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Elite Public Colleges
on Primary and Secondary
Schooling Markets in India
2.1 Introduction
While educational attainment has long been linked to economic development,
both as a driver of economic growth and a means to reduce income inequal-
ity (41), a complex debate surrounds the magnitude of public investments di-
rected towards different levels of education. Investments in primary education
are less politically contentious, as primary education is perceived to be a broad
public good with few distributional issues, while public investments in higher
education are decried as an income transfer to the elites, magnifying income in-
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equality (348). International donors have long argued that public investments
in universities and colleges bring in meager returns compared to investments
in primary or secondary schools (56; 321; 401). Such analyses, however, ig-
nore any potential developmental ‘spillovers’ of higher education investments.
More specifically, if public investments in higher education increase lower levels
of schooling, strengthening the entire education system, policymakers should
account for these benefits and reevaluate the social returns to investments in
higher education. To this end, in this paper we use the roll-out of elite public
colleges in India to present the first estimates of such spillover effects of pub-
lic investment in higher education on local markets for primary and secondary
education, study the various channels that determine these consequences, and
interpret our results through the lens of the literature on school entry and school
choice.
India has the world’s largest number of 5 to 24-year-olds, with roughly 500
million young people, and while primary and secondary school enrollment in
India is over 95% and 70% respectively, enrollment in higher education insti-
tutions is roughly 20% (90). It is perhaps unsurprising that public budgets for
higher education have been steadily increasing to fund the expansion of colleges
and universities, and maintain pace with increases in educational attainment at
the primary and secondary level: in 2016-17, almost two-thirds of the budget for
school education and literacy was allocated to higher education (69). However,
observers in the popular press have criticized these increases in higher edu-
cation investments as inordinate, and expenditures on colleges and universities
are perceived to come at the expense of schooling infrastructure.1 Such observa-
tions may seem simplistic if higher education investments in turn facilitate the
1See for instance: (284; 383; 397; 400)
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expansion of primary and secondary education. For instance, access to higher
education may increase the demand for lower levels of education by raising
parental aspirations. Simultaneously, higher education institutions may crowd-
in public expenditure on other services like power, roads and water, and in turn
facilitate private investment in primary and secondary education.2 However,
if higher education institutions are coupled with public investment in primary
and secondary schools, public schools may crowd-out private investment in ed-
ucation.3
To measure the causal effect of public investment in higher education on lo-
cal schooling markets we use the staggered rollout of elite public colleges in
India at the district level between 2004 and 2014 in an event study framework
(e.g., (28)).45 Our event-study framework allows us to make fewer assumptions
than a traditional difference-in-differences design. First, we do not compare
districts that received an elite public college to plausibly dissimilar districts that
did not receive these elite institutions. Instead, we restrict the sample to districts
that eventually received an elite public college between 2004 and 2014. Sec-
ond, unlike traditional difference-in-difference designs where the ‘treatment’ is
rolled out in one specific year, the staggered rollout of elite public colleges al-
2The public finance literature studies crowd-out (106). If public capital reduces the cost of
production for private capital, it is possible for public investments to crowd-in private capital
(23; 24).
3We use ‘school’ to denote institutions imparting primary or secondary education, while
‘colleges’ or ‘universities’ are used to denote higher education institutions.
4Districts are administrative units within a state, and are a second-level administrative divi-
sion (after states). India has 29 states and roughly 600 districts.
5In line with the larger trend of increased public spending on higher education, almost half
of all elite public colleges were established countrywide over the last decade. These elite insti-
tutions are established and funded by the federal government and specialize in offering under-
graduate or post-graduate education in one of the following fields of study: medicine (All India
Institute of Medical Sciences - AIIMS), information technology (Indian Institute of Information
Technology - IIIT), sciences (Indian Institute of Science Education and Research - IISER; National
Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research - NIPER), engineering (Indian Institute of
Technology - IIT; National Institute of Technology - NIT), architecture (School of Planning and
Architecture - SPA) or business (Indian Institute of Management - IIM).
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lows us to study the effects of elite college entry free of coincident changes in
one particular year. Moreover, we employ year fixed effects to control for year-
specific unobservables common across all districts, and district fixed effects to
control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that affect local education
markets. In sum, our event study design allows us to identify impacts of elite
public colleges by examining within-district changes in primary and secondary
schooling outcomes that correspond to the year of elite public college entry spe-
cific to that very district. Importantly, our set up allows us to test for preexisting
trends and the dynamic longer term effects after entry of elite public colleges.
We use three nationally representative education data sets: the National
Sample Survey (NSS), the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) and the
District Information System for Education (DISE). We use all available rounds
of the NSS data set over our period of analysis (these are 2004, 2007, 2010 and
2012), to examine the effects on educational attainment for primary- and sec-
ondary school-age children at the district level. We use annual data from ASER
and DISE to evaluate the effects of elite public colleges on public vs. private en-
rollment (2006-2014) as well as the impacts on the number of public vs. private
schools (2004-2014).
We present three key results. First, the establishment of a new elite public
college increased years of education by 0.3 years among school-age children at
the district level. Correspondingly, new elite public colleges led to significant in-
creases in educational attainment at the primary, middle, secondary and higher
secondary level.6 Second, elite public colleges increased the probability of pri-
6Primary school ranges from grade 1 to grade 5, middle or upper-primary school ranges
from grade 6 to grade 8, secondary school comprises of grade 9 and grade 10, higher secondary
school includes grade 11 and grade 12. Tertiary or higher education includes undergraduate
and post-graduate education or grade 13 and above.
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vate school enrollment by 15%, while decreasing the probability of enrollment
in public schools by 9%. Third, elite public colleges increased the number of
private schools at the district level by 20%, but had no impact on the number
of public schools. Moreover, we find that gains in educational attainment were
driven by children staying in school longer as elite public colleges decreased
dropouts in primary school. Overall, these findings suggest that private schools
entered districts with new elite public colleges, students switched from public
to private schools, and stayed in school longer.
There exist two key challenges for our identification strategy. First, public in-
vestment in higher education may anticipate changes in local schooling markets
rather than causing it. Second, the precise timing of entry in each particular lo-
cation of these elite colleges may be correlated with unobserved determinants of
primary and secondary markets for education that are changing, concurrently
driving both the location of elite public colleges as well as changes in the local
education sector (for instance, industrialization). However, such changes hap-
pen gradually, and the existence of these confounding effects will be evident in
the form of preexisting trends. If elite public colleges were introduced in places
where children are staying in school longer, or if industrialization was the driv-
ing force, we would expect to see evidence of a positive pre-trend. Instead, the
following pattern is visible across all our results: no pre-trends in our outcome
variables followed by a sharp and statistically significant change in the year of
elite public college entry. Moreover, a key feature of elite public colleges is that
student admissions into these institutions are determined by extremely compet-
itive nationwide entrance exams, and students enroll from all over the country.
Therefore, there is little reason to believe that the precise timing of entry of these
colleges is driven by coincident changes in local schooling markets.
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Our results are also immune to other robustness and falsification tests sup-
porting the validity of our baseline empirical specification. For instance, we run
falsification tests by randomly re-assigning the year of entry of elite colleges
among districts that ever received an elite public college and re-estimating our
event study specification. Inspection of the resulting distribution of point esti-
mates indicate that less than 5% of these estimates are larger in magnitude than
the actual coefficient. Together, the only remaining threat to a causal interpre-
tation of our estimates is if the specific year of entry of elite public college for
each district systematically coincides with the timing of unrelated shocks, that
have no observable pre-trends, but are correlated with the education market for
that district. We believe that plausible omitted variables are unlikely to have all
these properties and therefore propose that our baseline estimates are unbiased.
Our analysis of potential mechanisms that may be driving these effects of
elite public colleges are informed by reports in the popular press that indicate
that elite public colleges can transform a district into an educational hub, and
crowd in public investments in other infrastructure services like roads, electric-
ity and water. Indeed, we find compelling evidence that elite public colleges
led to focal investments in infrastructure services at the village level, and may
be one mechanism driving our results.7 We use the precise latitude-longitude
coordinates of elite public colleges, and Census Village Directories from 1991,
2001 and 2011, to show that even within-districts the decrease in distance to the
closest elite public college, due to the entry of new elite public colleges across
the country between 2001 and 2011, led to a significant increase in access to elec-
tricity, roads and water services at the village level. Moreover, these effects were
larger for villages brought closest to a new elite public college. This is precisely
7Villages are the lowest level of subdivision in India after blocks, which are followed by
districts and states, respectively.
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what one would expect if elite public colleges led to focal investments in other
public infrastructure services for villages closest to the new elite public college.
As a falsification test, we estimate the effects of changes in distance to elite pub-
lic college between 2001 and 2011 on the change in access to roads, water and
electricity between 1991 and 2001. As expected, we find that future changes in
distance to the elite college do not predict current infrastructure investments.
We further corroborate these effects using annual, satellite-measured night-
time lights data between 2004 and 2012 as a proxy for electrification, and show
that an increase in proximity to elite public colleges led to corresponding in-
creases in village level nighttime lights intensity. We include both village and
year fixed effects, and examine the year-by-year change in distance between
a village and nearest college in a semi-parametric manner. Similar to the re-
sults observed using Census Village Directories, we find that the effects of elite
public colleges on changes in nighttime light intensity decreased with an in-
crease in the changed distance to the nearest elite public college. It is plausi-
ble that conditional on the availability of higher education institutions, such in-
vestments in public infrastructure reduced setup costs for private schools, and
consequently, the entry of private schools decreased travel costs for marginal
students, enabling them to get additional years of education. Using the 2004
and 2011 rounds of Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), we find that
elite colleges decreased the distance traveled to the nearest private school at the
household level.
Our findings are consistent with previous evidence that shows that private
schools in India are more likely to be present in villages with access to pub-
lic infrastructure (235; 302), and the literature on school choice in developing
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countries that indicates that distance to school is a central determinant to school
choice in low income countries (84). Indeed, (13) find that lowering distance
increased enrollment in private schools in Pakistan, partly by transfers from
public schools.
We explore various additional mechanisms that might be driving the effects
of elite public colleges on schooling markets. For instance, it is plausible that col-
leges increase local populations due to an influx of children of faculty. Similarly,
colleges may create new employment and increase local incomes, raise parental
aspirations, help overcome the lack of information, or increase actual or per-
ceived returns to education. Although we fail to find evidence that increases in
local population or income are driving these effects, we can not completely rule
out these channels. Similarly, we can not completely rule out demand externali-
ties such as changes in parental aspirations, or effects on actual or perceived re-
turns to education, as possible explanations for our finding, and consider them
to be plausible complementary channels.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide a
brief literature review. Section 2.3 gives background information on elite public
colleges in India. In Section 2.4 we provide a theoretical model of school choice
and private school entry to understand the underlying possible mechanisms.
Section 2.5 describes the data. In Section 2.6 we investigate the impacts of elite
public colleges on educational attainment, enrollment in both public and private
schools, and the number of primary and secondary schools. We discuss poten-
tial mechanisms behind these empirical patterns in Section 2.7, and Section 2.8
concludes.
8As we observe immediate effects on local schooling markets, it is likely that such demand
externalities are partly responsible for our results.
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2.2 Contributions to the Literature
If higher education institutions are a policy tool for economic development,
knowledge about the precise channels through which universities bring about
development impacts will help identify optimal locations for higher educa-
tion investments. Existing evidence, almost exclusively from affluent coun-
tries, suggests that investment in higher education generates long-term local
effects through direct increases in the supply of human capital and greater in-
novation.9 However, such mechanisms may be less relevant for lower-income
countries.10 We show that higher education institutions facilitate educational
attainment among school-age children in India, indirectly increasing the supply
of human capital. In India, over 80 million children are out of school (90). Thus,
optimally targeted higher education investments may strengthen both the foun-
dations of the education system (i.e., primary and secondary school), as well as
tertiary education, since lower levels of schooling are critical as prerequisites for
higher education.
We also contribute to the literature on place-based policies that target in-
frastructure investment towards underdeveloped regions.11 A small number of
papers within this literature have studied place-based programs in developing
countries (305; 322; 359). Here we present the first estimates of the developmen-
tal impacts of college infrastructure in a lower-income country. Our findings
9See for instance: (2; 3; 18; 19; 50; 81; 193; 218; 219; 225; 405; 409).
10For instance, higher education institutions in India are quite small in relation to the size of
the local population, as average enrollment is just over 700 students (178), so benefits to the local
economy from increases in human capital endowment might not be substantial. Also, research
is not the primary mandate of higher education institutions in India, and they lag significantly
behind universities in high- and middle-income countries in terms of research output. See:
(212; 382; 399).
11See (288) for a review on the literature examining the economic effects of place-based poli-
cies.
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suggest that place-based policies that involve the construction of elite public
colleges in India may have larger effects on provision of public goods than cer-
tain last-mile programs that target specific infrastructure services. We find that
elite public colleges increased nighttime brightness by 0.5 units at the village
level. In comparison, a rural electrification program in India that provided elec-
tricity access to hitherto unconnected villages increased nighttime brightness by
only 0.15 units (75). Our estimates are comparable to a policy that targeted mas-
sive improvements in public infrastructure, a generous investment subsidy and
a complete exemption from corporate and excise taxes for a newly formed state
in India (359).12 In India, access to public goods like electricity, roads, water and
education is a matter of who can extract them from the political system (33). For
instance, even Special Economic Zones in India have failed to crowd-in public
expenditure on services like power, roads and water (14). In such a context,
not only do elite public colleges lead to significant investments in other public
goods, but also crowd-in private investment in education.
2.3 Elite Public Colleges
As of 2011, India’s Universities Grant Commission lists 42 central universities,
275 state universities, 130 deemed universities, 90 private universities, and 93
Institutes of National Importance (hereinafter referred to as elite public col-
leges). The federal government establishes and funds all elite public colleges.
12A possible interpretation of our results could be that a suite of focal infrastructure invest-
ments may have larger development impacts than certain last mile programs that target specific
infrastructure services. For instance, (75) find that a rural electrification program in India had
no effects on educational attainment, while (8) find that a rural road construction program in In-
dia increased middle school completion by 7%. In comparison, we find that elite public colleges
increased middle school completion by 14%.
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These elite colleges specialize in both undergraduate and post-graduate edu-
cation in technical fields like medicine, information technology, sciences, engi-
neering, architecture or business – most famously the Indian Institutes of Tech-
nology (IITs) and Management (IIMs). Importantly, they share certain unique
features that are useful in investigating the causal effects of higher education
investments on lower levels of schooling and understanding the underlying
mechanisms.
First, student admission into these institutions are determined by extremely
competitive nationwide entrance tests. For instance, any student who wants to
gain admission into any elite medical college–AIIMS–is required to appear for
a common, nationwide AIIMS entrance exam. Importantly, this means that all
elite public colleges in a particular field of study are drawing applicants from
the same national pool.13 Thus, the market for students at elite public colleges
are national.14 Second, the location of newer elite colleges is a function of ad-
dressing regional imbalance caused by location of older such institutions.15 For
instance, a state is unlikely to get a new elite public college in medicine if an elite
medical college already exists within the state boundaries.16 However, within
a state, the location of elite public colleges is often determined through discus-
13Except for the National Institutes of Technology or NITs, which reserve 50% seats for state
students, other elite public institutions have no such reservation policy for local state students.
Our results are robust to dropping these elite public colleges from the sample. However, every
higher education institution in India has to reserve 15%, 7.5% and 28% seats for candidates from
the ‘Scheduled Caste’, ‘Scheduled Tribe’ and ‘Other Backward Classes’, respectively.
14For instance, students residing in roughly half of all PIN codes in India appeared for
the 2009 entrance exam for admission into 15 Indian Institute of Technology - IITs. See:
(393; 394; 395) for media reports. Similarly, students across the country appear for national
entrance exams that determine admission into elite public colleges in other fields of study. The
market for faculty at elite public colleges are national as well. In fact, new elite public colleges
have successfully attracted young faculty educated in top institutions in India and abroad (See:
(381)).
15See: (110; 384; 386).
16We examine if states with an elite public college in a certain field of study, before 2004,
received a new elite college in the same field of study, between 2004 and 2014. We find no such
instance (Figure A.1).
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sions between the federal and state government. While this means that such
colleges are not placed randomly, since admissions are determined by compet-
itive countrywide exams, the year of entry at a certain district is unlikely to be
driven by anticipated changes in local schooling markets. We restrict our anal-
ysis to districts that received an elite public college between 2004 and 2014, en-
suring that we are not comparing dissimilar districts, and include district fixed
effects to adjust for level differences across districts. Thus, we identify impacts
of elite public colleges by examining within-district changes in primary and sec-
ondary schooling outcomes that correspond to the year of elite public college
entry specific to that district.
Lastly, discussions between administrators, covered extensively by the pop-
ular press, help inform our analysis of the potential mechanisms through which
elite public colleges effect primary and secondary schooling markets. For in-
stance, local administrators believe that elite public colleges can transform a
district into an educational hub and encourage economic activity. Thus, while
the federal government has pushed for districts with good transportation and
other infrastructure services as it is easier to attract faculty and students to eco-
nomically developed districts, state administrators often lobby the federal gov-
ernment to procure these elite institutions for underdeveloped districts.17 In-
deed, anecdotal evidence suggests that newer elite public colleges have indeed
been established in underdeveloped districts, unlike their older counterparts. In
such districts it is therefore plausible that these institutions lead to focal public
investments in infrastructure services like roads, electricity and water, if both
the federal and state government want to safeguard returns from such higher
education investments.
17See: (159; 389; 391; 396; 398).
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Quotes from the foundation stone laying ceremony of an elite business
school in an underdeveloped state of India, Jharkhand, are a case in point.18
Some capture the sentiment of locals: “A nondescript village devoid of proper elec-
tricity and drinking water supply, Cheri (village) has one single kutcha (temporary)
road that links it to Ring Road that leads to Ranchi (capital of Jharkhand). However,
with today’s high-profile installation, its residents hoped of good tidings in the future.”
Others, capture the expectations of the Minister for Rural Development: “Such
institutions in backward regions like Jharkhand are beneficial.”
Table 2.1 provides year-on-year changes in the number of districts with elite
public colleges between 2004-2014, and Figure A.2 shows districts where elite
public colleges were setup between 2004-2014, and used in our analysis. We
leverage 26 (treatment) districts, spread across 22 states, that did not have an
elite public college prior to 2004, and only received one between 2004-2014, to
identify the effects of public investment in higher education on lower levels of
schooling.19
2.4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a conceptual framework of household school choice
and private-school entry and determine the equilibrium in local markets for pri-
mary and secondary education. To help guide our empirical analyses, we allow
elite public colleges to disrupt this equilibrium and highlight the mechanisms
through which elite public colleges may affect primary and secondary school-
18See: (388; 390).
19In robustness checks we rule out the possibility that a single treatment district or single
treatment year is driving our results, and cluster-bootstrap standard errors following (80).
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ing. Details are in Appendix A.1.
2.4.1 Setting: Market for Primary and Secondary Schooling
The supply of public schools is determined exogenously by district administra-
tors. The supply of private schools, however, is market determined; they enter if
they can earn positive profits.20 Private schools are profit maximizers, have het-
erogeneous costs/efficiency (235), and are price takers in a competitive market,
charging p.21
Total educational output (in student-years) of school j with inputs X j, is
Q j = θX j, and the school’s cost function Z(X j) = z1 jX j + 12z2X
2
j is quadratic.
22
θ is the average education level in the district and captures demand externali-
ties driven by aspirations and peer effects (55; 61) that may be associated with
proximity to elite public colleges. z1 j reflects the heterogeneity in costs across
schools and districts, drawn from a distribution that varies across districts given
their infrastructure. The total number of potential private schools is N, and only
schools that make a positive profit enter the district. In Appendix A.1, we show
profit maximization implies the total supply of private schooling is:
QS y =
N1∑
j=1
Q j =
N1∑
j=1
θ
pθ − z1 j
z2
=
pθ
2
N
z2
(pθ − z1) (2.1)
20For notational convenience we drop the district sub-script from our equations, even though
quantities vary across districts.
21(281), find that children enrolled in private schools do not perform better than their peers
in public schools on subjects taught in both schools, although private schools are more cost-
effective. Our specification reflects these points – private schools have the same output as public
schools (an assumption easily relaxed without a change in comparative statics), although the
operating costs are different.
22It is easy to hire the first few teachers, it is more costly to hire the next as the pool dwindles.
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Demand for schooling depends on the costs of going to school and the re-
turns to schooling. Costs ci j vary across individuals based on tuition p, travel
costs to the nearest school(s) Ti j, ability ∆i and wealth Wi: ci j = αp+βTi j−γln(Wi)−
∆i.
Children will attend school if the returns to education, r, are greater than the
costs. In Appendix A.1 we show, for N0 number of public schools, and a student
population the size of M, the aggregate demand for private schools is:
Qd = MN1F(φ − αp)[1 − F(φ)]N0[1 − F(φ − αp)]N1−1 , (2.2)
where φ is a function of the returns to education, travel costs, wealth, and ability,
and the idiosyncratic components of the cost function are drawn iid from F(.).
2.4.2 Comparative Statics: Entry of Elite Public College
This set up allows us to deduce the equilibrium, and examine the effects of elite
public colleges on the supply QS y and demand Qd for private schooling at the
district level.23
Effects of Infrastructure Upgrades: If elite public colleges lead to invest-
ments in water, roads and electricity, it may reduce entry costs, and cause an
outward shift in the supply of private schools (dQS y/dz1|p < 0; dQS y/dz2|p < 0).
Increases in the supply of private schools lowers the equilibrium tuition charged
at a private school (dp/dz1 > 0; dp/dz2 > 0) and the distance to the nearest pri-
vate school (lower Ti j). Lower distances, in turn, will increase the demand for
23Detailed derivations are in Appendix A.1.
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private schooling (dQd/dTi j < 0). If elite public colleges increase the number of
private schools by lowering setup costs, it may increase private schooling, and
educational attainment.
Effects of Changes in Income, Population, and Aspirations: Increases in
income (dp/dln(w) > 0; dN1/dln(w) > 0), population (dp/dM > 0; dN1/dM > 0),
a rightward shift in student’s ability distribution (dp/dδ > 0; dN1/dδ > 0), in-
creases in actual or perceived returns to education (dp/dr > 0; dN1/dr > 0) or
increases in educational aspirations (dp/dθ > 0; dN1/dθ > 0) will increase the
demand for all schooling (both public and private), as well increase the equilib-
rium tuition and the number of private schools. New elite public colleges, may
therefore, increase the demand for all schooling through any of these mecha-
nisms. Our theoretical framework, therefore, generates the likely candidates for
the mechanisms that we explore in our empirical exercise.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 National Sample Survey
The National Sample Survey (NSS) is a nationally representative survey consist-
ing of yearly small sample rounds (‘thin’ rounds), and five yearly large sample
rounds (‘thick’ rounds). These surveys ask detailed questions about different
levels of education and contain extensive information on schooling outcomes
including years of education and educational attainment. The probability-
weighted sample is constructed using a two-staged stratified sampling proce-
dure with the first stage comprising of villages and block, and the second stage
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consisting of households. Households are selected systematically with equal
probability, with a random start. We use four different rounds of the NSS data,
between 2004 and 2012. The 2004 and 2010 ‘thick’ rounds are the large sam-
ple rounds. The 2007 and 2012 are small sample ‘thin’ rounds. Using these
four NSS rounds, we evaluate the impact of elite public colleges on years of
schooling and educational attainment. We present summary statistics on years
of schooling and educational attainment in Table A.1.
2.5.2 Annual Status of Education Report
The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) is an yearly education survey
for school-age children in India. The sample is a representative repeated cross
section at the district level.24 The survey contains information on enrollment
status, current grade and school type for every child in the sampled household.
Children are also tested in math and reading ability. The ASER is useful for
our analysis for multiple reasons. First, ASER provides national coverage and
a large sample size for each district. Second, unlike schools-based data, it is
not administered in schools and therefore covers children both in and out of
school. Third, it is administered each year on 2 to 3 weekends from the end
of September to the end of November limiting considerations of spatially sys-
tematic seasonality in data collection, and endogenous sampling as in school
children are likely not available on weekdays. We use nine rounds of the ASER
data between 2006 and 2014 to examine the effects of elite public colleges on
private vs. public school enrollment. We present summary statistics on private
24In each district, 30 villages are sampled from the Census 2001 village list. In each village, 20
households are randomly sampled. This gives a total of 600 sampled households in each rural
district, or about 300,000 households at the all India level.
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and public enrollment in Tables A.2 and A.3.
2.5.3 District Information System for Education
District Information System for Education (DISE) is an administrative dataset
on primary schools in India. Data collection involves a census of all schools in
India, is coordinated at the district level, and then aggregated by states. An-
nual district level statistics across the country are made publicly available in
the form of ‘District Report Cards’. These data are designed to reflect statis-
tics as of September 30 of the school year, which starts in July. We use eleven
rounds of DISE data between 2004 and 2014 to examine the effects of elite col-
leges on the number of private and public schools. Although, DISE data only
provide statistics on primary schools, these include primary schools offering
post-primary education. We present summary statistics on number of private
and public schools in Tables A.4 and A.5.
2.6 Effects on Lower Levels of Schooling
2.6.1 Years of Schooling and Educational Attainment
Using NSS data for individuals between 6 and 20 years of age, we estimate
Equation 2.3 to evaluate the impact of elite public colleges on years of schooling
and educational attainment. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in the
timing of establishment of elite public colleges in districts that received an elite
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public college between 2005 and 2011 in an event study framework (e.g., (28)).
We estimate the following model:
yi jt =
−2∑
τ=−p
βτ1(t − T ∗j = τ) +
m∑
τ=0
βτ1(t − T ∗j = τ) + µ j + χt + i jt (2.3)
where yi jt is the outcome of interest for child i in district j in year t.25 Estimates
characterizing the effects of elite colleges are the coefficients on the event year
dummies, 1(t − T ∗j = τ), which are equal to 1 when the year of observation is τ
rounds away from T ∗j , the year when the elite college was established in district
j (τ = −1 is omitted). These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public
colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established, τ =
−1.26 For instance, if an elite public college was established in 2008 in a district
j, the 2004 and 2007 rounds capture the pre-period τ < 0, whereas the 2010
and 2012 rounds capture the post-treatment period τ ≥ 0. µ j indicate district
level fixed effects, while χt stands for survey-round indicators. We restrict our
sample to districts that ever received an elite college so that we do not compare
estimates to dissimilar districts. By adding district fixed effects µ j, we control
for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that affect local education markets
and may also be correlated with the presence of elite public colleges. Round
indicators control for round-specific unobservables common across all districts.
25Since the NSS data is collected with time gaps, τ denotes number of survey rounds for
the NSS data, where t = 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012. Therefore, as a robustness check we report
estimates separately by event year (Figures A.3 and A.4). It is reassuring that these results
are quantitatively similar to our baseline estimates. However, because we observe 4 NSS survey
rounds between 2004-2012, each event year only includes a few treatment districts. For instance,
τ = 0 only includes districts where an elite public college was introduced in 2007 and 2010.
Therefore, we prefer our baseline specification. Note that for the ASER and DISE data sets,
which are collected annually, τ denotes number of years.
26We expect to observe effects of elite public colleges somewhat concurrently. That is, the
causal impact of elite public colleges is identified from the change in our outcomes of interest
in the first observable round of data after entry of these institutions (τ = 0). Thus, τ = −1 is the
natural baseline to capture these effects.
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Thus, we identify impacts of elite public colleges by examining within-district
changes in primary and secondary schooling outcomes that correspond to the
year of elite public college entry specific to that district. This approach allows us
to make fewer assumptions than a traditional difference-in-differences design as
we do not include any districts that never receive a college (which are likely to
be rather different), and there is no longer just one particular year that affects all
treated districts (which may be correlated with other year-specific shocks).
Two challenges remain for our identification strategy. First, the location and
precise timing of entry of elite public colleges may be correlated with unob-
served determinants of the primary, middle and secondary markets for edu-
cation that are changing continuously, and concurrently driving entry of elite
public colleges. Second, public investment in tertiary education may antici-
pate changes in local schooling markets rather than causing it. Since student
admissions to elite colleges are determined by highly competitive nation-wide
entrance exams, and students enroll from all over the country, there is no reason
to believe that the establishment of these colleges is driven by anticipated future
changes in local schooling markets. The more relevant concern is whether the
timing of public college entry is correlated with preexisting trends in education
markets. As most changes are gradual, the existence of confounding effects, if
present, will be evident in the form of preexisting trends.
Using Equation 2.3, we investigate impacts on years of schooling, as well
as completing primary school (Grades 1-5), middle or upper-primary school
(Grades 6-8), secondary school (Grades 9-10) and higher secondary school
(Grades 11-12). Figure 2.1 presents the estimates for years of schooling. We
find that the coefficients for the treatment rounds are positive and statistically
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significant. Elite public colleges increased schooling by over 0.3 years in the
short-run (τ = 0), and by 0.8 years in the longer-run (τ = 1).27
Next, we examine the effects on educational attainment. We find that elite
public colleges increased educational attainment at each schooling level (Fig-
ure 2.2). Colleges increased primary and middle school attainment by 5 per-
centage points (8% and 14%, respectively) in the short-run, and 10 percentage
points (17% and 30%, respectively) in the longer-run . Secondary and higher
secondary attainment increased by roughly 2 percentage points (13% and 40%,
respectively) in the short-run, and 5 percentage points (30% and 100%, respec-
tively) in the longer-run.
We find no evidence of preexisting trends, and instead detect a statistically
significant change in the years of education that coincides with the first round
following the establishment of the college, τ = 0. If elite public colleges were
introduced in places where children are staying in school longer, or if rapid
industrialization was driving the timing of elite public college entry as well as
changes in the local schooling market, we would expect to see evidence of a
positive pre-trend. Now, the only remaining threat to a causal interpretation
of our estimates is if the specific year of entry of elite public college for each
district systematically coincides with the timing of unrelated shocks, that have
no observable pre-trends, but are correlated with the education market for that
district. We believe that plausible omitted variables are unlikely to have all these
properties and therefore conclude that our baseline estimates are unbiased.
In other robustness checks, we estimate the effects of elite public colleges on
children’s enrollment status (Figure A.5). As one might expect, we find sug-
27Here, τ = 1 denotes 3 to 4 years after the entry of elite public college.
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gestive evidence entry of elite public colleges increases school enrollment. We
estimate the effects on years of schooling and educational attainment for in-
dividuals that were too old to change their education decisions – individuals
between 21 and 65 years of age – as a falsification test (Figures A.6 and A.7).
Next, we control for children’s age, and find that our estimates remain unaf-
fected (Figures A.8 and A.9). We show that the effects on years of schooling
are robust to restricting the sample to older children (Table A.10), and that the
attainment results are robust to restricting estimation for each tier of educa-
tion – primary, middle, secondary and higher secondary – to the corresponding
age-appropriate sample (Figure A.11). We also show that the effects on years
of schooling and educational attainment are robust to restricting the sample to
younger children (Tables A.12 and A.13). Since our sample consists of only dis-
tricts that ever received a college, it is possible that a single outlier may drive
our results. Therefore, we drop each district, one at a time, estimating Equation
2.3 each time (Figures A.14 and A.15). In addition, we drop all districts where
elite public colleges were introduced in a single year, one year at a time (Figures
A.16 and A.17). We find that these estimates are not driven by a single district or
treatment year. Lastly, we cluster-bootstrap our standard errors following (80)
(Table A.6). Our estimates remain precisely estimated.
2.6.2 Private vs. Public Enrollment
Next, we investigate the effects of elite colleges on private vs. public enrollment
for children in Grades 1-10 (5-16 year olds). We employ an event study frame-
work, estimating Equation 2.3, but now use the annual ASER data set. Here too,
we restrict our sample to districts that ever received an elite college so that we
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do not compare dissimilar districts.
In Figure 2.3 we report the impact of elite public colleges on private and pub-
lic school enrollment. For public school enrollment, the coefficient in the year of
treatment (τ = 0), the year when elite public colleges were established, is -0.05,
which means that public colleges led to a 5 percentage point (8%) decrease in the
probability of public school enrollment. These effects get larger in the longer-
run or 4 years after the entry of an elite public colleges (τ = 4). In contrast, elite
public colleges are associated with an increase of 5 percentage points (20%) in
the probability of private school enrollment in the year of treatment, and of over
10 percentage points (40%) by τ = 4. We find no evidence of a preexisting trends
in any of our estimates. Indeed, the trend break in the left-hand side variable at
τ = 0 is apparent, as well as economically and statistically significant for both
public and private enrollment. The estimates of the pre-treatment periods are
small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In robustness checks we control for district-specific trends, age, and gen-
der; our estimates remain relatively unchanged (Figure A.18). Next, we drop
each treatment district, one at a time, estimating Equation 2.3 every time (Fig-
ure A.19). In addition, we drop all districts where elite public colleges were
introduced in a single year, one year at a time (Figure A.20). We find that these
estimates are not driven by a single district or treatment year. We also conduct
a placebo test where we run 200 iterations of Equation 2.3, by randomly assign-
ing the year of treatment among treated districts for each iteration. Inspections
of the resulting distribution of point estimates can help test the appropriate-
ness of our statistical model and the likelihood that our results are an artifact
of chance or of a systematic structure in the data. Indeed, the distribution of
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point estimates at τ = 0 indicates that less than 5% of these estimates are larger
in magnitude than the actual coefficient (Figures A.21 and A.22). Lastly, we
cluster-bootstrap our standard errors following (80) (Table A.7). Our estimates
remain precisely estimated.
The ASER data set also helps us investigate the pattern of gains in educa-
tional attainment observed using the NSS data set. In ASER, the proportion of
children who never attended school at the baseline (τ = −1) was less than 2
percent. It is plausible then, that gains in educational attainment were driven
by children staying in school longer. Indeed, we find that the grade students
dropped out of school increased by 0.5 at τ = 0, and by almost 0.8 in the longer-
run (τ = 4). We also examine the effects of elite public colleges on dropouts in
primary school (Grade 8). We find that elite public colleges decreased the prob-
ability of dropouts in primary school by 8 percentage points in the short-run
(τ = 0) and by over 20 percentage points in the longer-run among children who
eventually dropped out of school (Figures A.23 and A.24).
2.6.3 Private Schools
Next, using the annual, district level DISE data set, we estimate Equation 2.3 and
examine the impact of elite public colleges on the number of private schools.
Here y jt is the log of number of private schools in district j in year t ∈ [2004, 2014]
In Figure 2.4 we show the effects of elite public colleges on the number of
private and public schools. Entry of elite public colleges led to a 20 percent
increase in the number of private schools at τ = 0 and a 30 percent increase by
the fourth year (τ = 4). Importantly, we find that elite colleges have no impact
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on the number of government schools, suggesting that the colleges did not lead
to broader increases in public expenditure on education in treatment districts. In
robustness checks we show that our results remain unaffected by the addition of
district-specific linear trends (Figure A.25). Next, we drop each treated district,
one at a time, estimating Equation 2.3 every time (Figures A.26). And drop all
districts where elite public colleges were introduced in a single year, one year
at a time (Figure A.27). Our estimates are not driven by a single district or
treatment year. We also conduct a placebo test where we run 200 iterations of
Equation 2.3, randomly assigning year of treatment among treated districts for
each iteration. The magnitude of the effect presented in Figure 2.4, at τ = 0, is
observed in less than 5% iterations (Figure A.28). Lastly, we cluster-bootstrap
our standard errors following (80) (Table A.8).28
2.7 Mechanisms
We find strong evidence that one mechanism responsible for the effects of elite
public colleges on lower levels of schooling is infrastructure upgrades. We find
that elite public colleges increased access to paved roads, electricity and tap
water, and the intensity of these effects was largest among villages closest to the
elite public college. While we find insufficient evidence in support of alternative
channels, we can not rule them out.
28The DISE data also includes information of enrollment in primary and secondary school at
the district level. Therefore, as a robustness check, we use DISE to corroborate the effects of elite
public colleges on private vs. public school enrollment observed in the ASER data (Figure A.29).
We find that the estimates are qualitatively similar. However, we prefer using the ASER data to
estimate the effects on public vs. private school enrollment as questions have been raised about
the veracity and trustworthiness of enrollment data from DISE (Page 15, (232)).
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To fix ideas, consider a simple explanation. Elite public colleges led to in-
frastructure investments lowering the setup costs for private schools. New pri-
vate schools enter the market and students who live closer to the private school
transfer from public to private schools, staying enrolled in school for longer.
2.7.1 Public Infrastructure Investments
Comparative statistics from our model suggest that a decrease in entry costs for
private schools shifts the supply curve out (dQS y/dz1|p < 0; dQS y/dz2|p < 0). If
elite colleges increase access to infrastructure, then this would lead to the entry
of new private schools.
Census Village Directories
To find evidence for this prediction, we link infrastructure indicators from the
2001 and 2011 Census Village Directories to latitude-longitude coordinates of
each village, as well as each elite public college.29 Then, for each year we calcu-
late the distance of every village in India to the closest elite college. We exploit
the variation in distance to elite colleges at the village level, due to the entry
of new colleges, and capture the difference in effect sizes for villages at vary-
ing distances from the new college. If elite colleges led to focal investments in
public infrastructure, we should observe larger effects for villages where a new
public college was established, but smaller effects for villages that were farther
away. Thus, we use the change in distance of each village to the closest public
29We describe the data from Village Census Directories and Village Night Lights in Appendix
A.3.1.
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college between 2001 and 2011, due the entry of new elite colleges, and estimate
the following semi-parametric model:
yi jt =
z∑
τ=1
ατ1(DistancetoCollege ∈ [m,m + 20])i j + β Postt
+
z∑
τ=1
γτ1(DistancetoCollege ∈ [m,m + 20])i j × Postt + µ j + i jt (2.4)
where m = 0, 20, ..., 60 kms. yi jt is the outcome of interest for village i in district j
in year t. Estimates characterizing the effects of elite public colleges are captured
by the vector of coefficients γτ. The variable 1(DistancetoCollege ∈ [m,m+20])i j =
1 if the distance of village i in district j has ever been between 0-20 kms, 20-
40 kms, 40-60 kms, or 60-80 kms away from the closest elite public college, 0
otherwise. Variable Postt is a post-treatment year for being in Census year 2011.
1(80 <= DistancetoCollege)i j is the omitted distance category. µ j are district-level
fixed effects.
We present these results in Figure 2.5. We find that elite public colleges
increased access to infrastructure, and the effects on electricity (6 percentage
points), water (8 percentage points) and roads (4 percentage points) were larger
for villages closer to elite colleges than for villages farther away. As a placebo
test, we examine the effects of future changes in distance to colleges on current
changes in infrastructure. We estimate Equation 2.4 to evaluate the effects of
changes in distance to colleges between 2001 and 2011 on changes in access to
roads, water and electricity between 1991 and 2001. If villages closest to the
colleges were targeted for investments in public infrastructure services and col-
leges were a consequence and not a cause of such a program, we would expect
to see an association between future changes in distance and current infrastruc-
ture investments. However, Figure 2.5 indicates that future changes in distance
(between 2001 and 2011) do not predict current infrastructure investments (be-
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tween 1991 and 2001).30
Village Night Lights
Next, we estimate the effects of elite public colleges on village-level nighttime
lights, as a proxy for rural electrification. Here too, we use latitude-longitude
coordinates for each village and elite public college in India and calculate the
distance of every village to the nearest elite college between 2004-2012. We
estimate Equation 2.4 where yi jt is now log mean nighttime lights in village i,
district j, year t. Since we have 9 years of night lights data, we include village
fixed effects (µi) and identify the effects from year-on-year changes in distance
to elite public college on electrification at the village level. Furthermore, we es-
timate an even more flexible version of Equation 2.4, where we use 10km bins
between 0 and 150kms, with 1(150 <= DistancetoCollege)i jt being the omitted
category. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on village and year
fixed effects, changes in the distance of villages to the closest elite college are
not correlated with unobservable village specific, time-varying attributes that
also affect changes in night time lights by distance bins.
Figure 2.6 presents the effects of elite public colleges on village night lights.
The coefficient for 1(DistancetoCollege ∈ [0, 10]km)i jt is 0.15, implying that vil-
lages within 10kms from the new college saw a 15 percent increase in mean
30In addition, there were at least two independent public infrastructure initiatives launched
in the 2000s across India, Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) and Prad-
han Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY). PMGSY was launched in 2000 while RGGVY was
launched in 2005. Both programs were targeted to villages above a certain population cut-off,
1000 for PMGSY (8) and 300 for RGGVY (75). We examine if villages nearest to elite public
colleges were more likely to meet the village level population cut off required to be eligible for
these programs (Figure A.30). We fail to find evidence for a positive association between dis-
tance to the nearest elite college in 2011 and village-level population in 2001, suggesting that the
location of elite public colleges and the increase in public infrastructure investments in nearby
villages were not associated with these rural infrastructure initiatives.
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night light intensity. Importantly, the effects of elite public colleges on changes
in nighttime light intensity decreased with an increase in the changed distance
to the nearest college.3132
Public Infrastructure Investments and Private Schooling
In Section 2.6.3, we showed that elite public colleges increase the entry of private
schools at the district level. Combined with our estimates on infrastructure indi-
cators, we conclude that the entry of private schools is driven by infrastructure
upgrades. Such a claim is backed by existing evidence: (235) and (302) find that
private schools in India are more likely to be present in villages with access to
public infrastructure. However, public schools are less likely to respond to such
investments as governments may prioritize under-served regions (140; 235).
If infrastructure upgrades are driving the entry of private schools, effects on
private school entry should be largest in villages closest to the elite public col-
lege, as the magnitude of the effects on public infrastructure are highest among
villages closest to the elite public college. Using the 2011 Census Village Direc-
tory, we estimate Equation 2.4 to examine the correlation between the presence
of elite public colleges and private schools in a cross-section with district fixed
effects. Indeed, we find strong evidence that private schools are more likely to
be present in villages closest to elite public colleges (Figure 2.7).
Last, we examine the effects of elite public colleges on the distance to pri-
31These effects are robust to the inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects where we control for
all year-specific unobservables that vary by state as opposed to just year fixed effects that only
control for year-specific unobservables common across India (Figure A.31).
32As a robustness check, in Figure A.32 we estimate equation 2.3 and show entry of elite
public colleges led to a sharp and statistically significant increase in night lights intensity in
villages within 10 kms from the new college.
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vate schools. Distance is a central determinant of school choice in low income
countries (84). For instance, (13) showed that lowering distance increased en-
rollment in private schools in Pakistan, partly by transfers from public schools.
Using 2004-05 and 2011-12 rounds of the Indian Human Development Survey
(IHDS), we evaluate the effect of elite public colleges on distance to school for
children attending private school in treatment vs. control districts in a triple
difference framework.33 We find suggestive evidence that elite public colleges
led to a decrease in distance to private schools (Table 2.2). More specifically, we
find that the entry of elite public colleges between 2005 and 2011 increased the
likelihood that private-school going children were attending schools less than 1
km away from home in treatment districts by 13 percentage points, compared to
private-school going children in districts that did not receive an elite college be-
tween 2005 and 2011. The entry of private schools may have potentially solved
a (travel) cost constraint for marginal students, enabling them to get additional
years of education as they transfer from public to private schools.
2.7.2 Alternative Explanations
There exist other channels that could potentially explain the observed relation-
ship between elite public colleges and lower levels of schooling. Specifically,
we consider five alternative explanations: (1) population, (2) income, (3) aspi-
rations or returns to education, (4) access to higher education and (5) powerful
politicians. Using existing data sets, we find insufficient evidence for these al-
ternative mechanisms, but can not conclusively rule them out.
33In Appendix A.3.3, we briefly describe the data set.
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Population: dp/dM > 0 ; dN1/dM > 0
Demand for all schooling (both public and private) increases with population,
in turn increasing equilibrium tuition, and the number of private schools. If
elite public colleges increase local population by creating employment opportu-
nities within the college, or newly created jobs in existing or new firms, it could
increase the demand for all schooling and facilitate entry of private schools.
However, we fail to find strong evidence for increases in population as an un-
derlying mechanism.
First, if elite public colleges increase demand for schooling through the pop-
ulation channel, we would also see an increase in enrollment in public schools.
However, we find a significant decline in public school enrollment. Second, us-
ing district level population data we examine the effects of elite public colleges
on both total population and population by age group. We fail to find evidence
for an increase in population of school-age children in districts that received an
elite public college (Figure A.33).
Children of Faculty and Staff: dp/dδ > 0 ; dN1/dδ > 0 Next, we explore
if children of faculty and staff alone can explain our results. A right-ward shift
in the distribution of ability will increase the demand for all schooling, raise
market price (tuition) and induce more private schools to enter the market. If
children of faculty at these elite public colleges are more able, then elite public
colleges will lead to an increase in the number of private schools. However, it is
unlikely that the addition of these children alone can explain the magnitude of
the increase in number of private schools. Based on our calculations, increases
in the ability of the local student population due to influx of faculty would at
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most explain 1 percent of the increase in number of private schools.34
Supply of School Teachers: If students graduating from elite public col-
leges were opening up new private schools in the district and working as school
teachers, it could also potentially explain our results. For instance, (20), show
that private schools in Pakistan are three times more likely to emerge in villages
with government girls’ schools due to an increase in the supply of teachers.
We do not find evidence for such an explanation. First, the first batch of stu-
dents in these colleges would only graduate after 2-4 years, if an increase in the
supply of teachers due to students graduating from elite public colleges was
driving our results, we would not see an immediate increase in the number of
private schools, and the corresponding increase in private school enrollment.
The mechanism presented in (20), is inherently long-run: their paper looks at
data 17 years apart. Second, it is important to note that students graduating
from these highly-competitive elite public colleges are employed by technol-
ogy or management firms in major Indian cities (420), making such supply-side
channels less relevant in our context.
Income: dp/dln(w) > 0 ; dN1/dln(w) > 0
Higher education institutions may have large economic impacts on the local
economy through direct increases in the supply of human capital and greater
innovation, thereby increasing local incomes. These mechanisms are inherently
34We find an increase of 20 percentage points in the number of private schools in the year of
treatment, or about 70 new schools. Each private school enrolls 200 students each, on average.
Information obtained from these colleges indicate that on average these colleges have around
150 faculty members, so increases in the ability of the local student population due to influx of
faculty would at most explain 1 percent of the increase in number of private schools.
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long-run. Nevertheless, there exists another channel through which elite public
colleges could increase family resources in the short-run: direct expenditures
by faculty and students at elite public colleges. Better access to electricity, roads
and water services due to elite public colleges may also increase local incomes.
Such income increases may in turn increase the demand for all schooling, raising
the equilibrium tuition, as well as the number of private schools.
In addition to being useful as a proxy for electrification, night lights have
been used by economists as an indicator for economic activity (95; 196). It is
possible that the observed impacts on night light intensity, are in fact, income
effects. However, we find insufficient evidence for such an hypothesis. First,
in line with our results, (75) find that a rural electrification program in India
had insignificant effects on local incomes, despite causing a increase in night
light intensity. Thus, electrification is not necessarily accompanied by income
effects. Second, we fail to find evidence for an increase in population. It is
likely that if elite public colleges increased local incomes, treatment districts
would observe an increase in migration from neighboring districts. Third, we
find a significant decrease in enrollment at public schools. An increase in local
incomes would increase demand for all schooling. Lastly, we estimate Equation
2.3 using NSS data to examine the effects of public colleges on earnings. We fail
to find evidence for an increase in wages (Figure A.34).
Aspirations: dp/dθ > 0 ; dN1/dθ > 0 or Increased Perceived Returns to Educa-
tion: dp/dr > 0 ; dN1/dr > 0
Close proximity to elite public colleges may increase the salience of higher ed-
ucation, raising parental aspirations. Furthermore, the entry of elite public col-
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leges might also alter local perceptions about returns to education due to infor-
mation spillovers, and since human capital investment decisions are linked to
perceived economic returns to education (e.g., (222; 260; 289)), it could increase
demand for education.
If elite public colleges raised parental aspirations or altered their perceptions
about returns to education, we would expect an increase in both public and pri-
vate school enrollment. However, we observe a significant decrease in public
school enrollment. It is unlikely that elite public colleges only affected parents’
perception of returns to private schooling, or that parents who now have higher
aspirations for their children perceive that private schools alone offer an easier
pathway to tertiary education. We are unable to test these hypotheses directly,
since we do not have an indicator for perceived returns to education or aspira-
tions. But, insofar as an increase in perceived returns to education or aspiration
translated into an increase in human capital investment, we may find an in-
crease in children’s test scores. We estimate Equation 2.3 to examine the effects
of colleges on both math and reading scores in the ASER data. We fail to find
evidence for an increase in test scores (Figure A.35).35
However, we can’t rule out this explanation completely. In fact, since we ob-
serve large and immediate effects on local schooling markets, it is quite plausi-
ble that elite public colleges raised parental aspirations for children’s education
or increased actual or perceived returns to education because of access to public
infrastructure or information diffusion.36
35As we find an increase in educational attainment, but no corresponding effect on test scores,
it suggests that marginal (academically weaker) students, are being induced to stay in school
longer. In many cases, interventions that improve attainment do not improve student test scores
((49; 229; 271)).
36For instance, (300) find that in India, IT centers increased school enrollment within few
kilometers of their location, due to limited information diffusion, and that the effect is driven
by changes in returns to schooling.
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Access to Higher Education
Returns to education are convex, higher at the secondary and tertiary than at the
primary level ((100; 349)). Correspondingly, studies have shown that parents
believe that the first few years of schooling have lower returns than later years
((31; 34)). Thus, better access to higher education institutions or colleges could
represent a reduction in the cost of future schooling, increasing the possibility
of continuation into higher levels of schooling.
Admission into elite public colleges in India is determined by an extremely
competitive nation-wide entrance exam. The Indian Institutes of Technology
(IITs) has an acceptance rate of 2 percent from a pool of roughly 500,000 stu-
dents. Access to elite public colleges is not a likely explanation for our results.
However, if elite public colleges, like private schools, also incentivize entry of
private colleges due to infrastructure upgrades, it could increase a demand for
all schooling, and explain observed gains in years of schooling.
Using village level indicators for private and public college presence in the
2011 Census Village Directory, we estimate Equation 2.4 to examine effects of
elite public colleges on the presence of private colleges. Private colleges are
more likely to exist in villages nearest to elite public colleges (Figure A.36). The
entry of private colleges could increase demand for all schooling, but given that
we find a significant decrease in public school enrollment, the entry of private
colleges could only explain our results if parents perceive that private schools
offer an easier pathway to private colleges. Unfortunately, we can not test this
hypothesis. However, it is unlikely that infrastructure upgrades increase access
to private colleges but not private schools, and that private schools enter exclu-
sively because of an increase in demand for private schooling, driven by better
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access to these private colleges.
Powerful Politicians
In a developing country like India, it is possible that powerful local politi-
cians successfully lobby the federal government for both elite public colleges
and public expenditure on infrastructure in their constituency or district. This
would mean that changes to infrastructure and colleges are driven by powerful
politicians, and not directly by elite public colleges. Although, such an expla-
nation is compatible with supply-side factors discussed earlier, we do not find
evidence for such an hypothesis. First, unless these ‘powerful politicians’ pre-
cisely align the timing of infrastructure upgrades with the entry of elite public
colleges, we would find evidence for it in the form of pre-existing trends in our
outcome variables. Second, we do not find evidence for an increase in public
spending in school infrastructure: we fail to find an increase in the number of
public schools. Third, out of the 42 districts that received an elite college be-
tween the period 2004-2014, almost 50 percent were represented by members
from the opposition and not the ruling national coalition. Moreover, out of the
districts represented by members from the ruling coalition, more than 40 per-
cent were first time Members of Parliament (MPs). It is reasonable to assume
that experienced MPs from the ruling coalition enjoy the most influence; how-
ever, since only 14 districts had MPs from the ruling coalition serving a second
term or higher, political clout doesn’t seems to play a significant role in the lo-
cation of these elite colleges. Fourth, and most importantly, the effects of elite
colleges on infrastructure are not only robust to dropping all districts governed
by MPs from the ruling coalition, but marginally larger (Figure A.37).
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2.8 Conclusion
In a country plagued by low literacy and school completion rates, questions are
raised when public expenditure is directed towards higher rather than lower
levels of education. This skepticism, however, misses the fact that higher edu-
cation institutions may have ‘spillover’ effects on primary and secondary edu-
cation markets in low-income countries like India.
In this paper, we find that elite public colleges encouraged the entry of pri-
vate schools and increased private school enrollment as students switched from
public to private schools. In the era of shrinking public budgets, investment in
higher education facilitated the expansion of primary and secondary education
with private capital. Overall, this translates into gains in educational attainment
(0.3 to 0.8 years) as children stayed enrolled in school longer. In fact, our back-
of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the indirect benefits of elite public col-
leges due to transfers to private schools,37 and returns to extra years of primary
and secondary schooling, are at least half the size of the direct benefits accrued
through the training of undergraduate and graduate students (Appendix A.2).
Next, we find that elite public colleges crowded in focal investments in elec-
tricity, water and road services. That is, the increase in access to public infras-
tructure services was largest for villages closest to new elite public colleges. Im-
portantly, we find suggestive evidence that public investment in infrastructure
reduced setup costs for private schools, and the entry of private schools solved
a (travel) cost constraint for marginal students, as they stayed in school longer.
We explore various alternative mechanisms that might be driving the effects of
37(281) show that although there exists little difference in output, private schools are more
costs effective than public schools.
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elite public colleges on primary and secondary schooling markets. While we
fail to find evidence for changes in population or income as potential explana-
tions for these effects, we can’t completely rule out demand externalities such as
changes in parental aspirations, or effects on actual or perceived returns to ed-
ucation. Indeed, as we observe large and immediate effects on local schooling
markets, it is plausible that elite public colleges raised parental aspirations for
children’s education or increased actual or perceived returns to education due
to improved information flows.
Another limitation of our analyses relates to the interpretation of these ef-
fects as spillovers from public investment in higher education. We are unable
to distinguish between two nuanced interpretations: the first is that non-college
public infrastructure (electricity, road, and water services) is crowded in by elite
public colleges, and the second is that these investments were conceived as a
“big push” policy that includes both infrastructure and higher-education com-
ponents. The data appears most consistent with the former interpretation: re-
ports in the popular press suggest that elite public colleges crowd in non-college
public infrastructure. We also fail to find evidence for coordination between
large public infrastructure initiatives launched in the 2000s and locations of new
elite public colleges.
It is important to note that the magnitude of the effects on educational out-
comes reflect district-level average treatment effects on districts where elite pub-
lic colleges entered between 2004-2012. Therefore, the estimated β captures all
location-level spillover effects of elite public colleges via private schools as well
as the effects of roads, water, and electricity services documented in the litera-
ture. For instance, well-identified studies of the impact of school construction
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programs find large effects on educational attainment (140). Duflo (2001) finds
that each primary school constructed per 1000 children led to an average in-
crease of roughly 0.2 years of education in Indonesia. Distance to school is a
central determinant to school choice in lower income countries (13; 84). (13)
find that households are willing to pay 50% more for a reduction of 0.5 kilome-
ters in the distance to a private school. (84) show that increasing the distance
to school by 0.5 kilometers decreases the likelihood of choosing that school by
roughly 5 percentage points. (243) finds that the elasticity of the probability of
ever attending primary school with respect to the distance to middle school is
0.30 in Ghana. Lastly, studies have shown that access to public infrastructure
services like roads, electricity, and water have large effects on education out-
comes. (248) find that hydro-power plants in Brazil increased electricity access
by 22 percentage points, and consequently, years of schooling by two years. (8)
find that a rural road construction program in India increased middle school
completion by 7%.
In conclusion, we would like to urge caution regarding the external validity
of our findings. First, our results relate to certain elite public colleges in India.
These colleges have been set-up since India’s formative years as an indepen-
dent nation and are considered extremely prestigious. Thus, new elite public
colleges have been able to piggy-back off the reputation of their older counter-
parts and capture popular attention, even in the short run. Second, we find that
elite public colleges successfully crowd-in large investments in public infras-
tructure services, and may be one mechanism driving our result. It is unlikely
that other (‘second-tier’) public colleges would be able to facilitate a similar in-
crease in access to public infrastructure. Although these concerns may constrain
the broader implications of our results, elite public colleges are not unique to In-
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dia.38 More importantly, India’s higher education system is the third largest in
the world, next to the United States and China, and successive recent govern-
ments have pushed for a drastic and immediate increase in the number of elite
public colleges in the country. In 2016-17, almost half of the budget for higher
education was dedicated to elite public colleges (69). Since 2014, 25 new elite
public colleges have been established across the country. To formulate an effec-
tive higher education policy in India, it is important to include any ‘spillover’
effects of elite public colleges in the calculation of the social returns to higher
education investments.
38In 1998, China launched a higher education modernization process, Project 985, that intends
to establish elite or ‘world-class’ universities across the country.
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2.9 Tables and Figures
2.9.1 Figures
Figure 2.1: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of Schooling (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite
public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite
public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college
in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence
interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level. Since the
NSS data is collected with time gaps, τ denotes number of survey rounds for
the NSS data, where t = 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012. As a robustness check we report
estimates separately by event year (Figure A.3).
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Figure 2.2: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Educational Attainment (Age 6-
20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are
average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to
the round before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if
the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level. Since the NSS data is collected
with time gaps, τ denotes number of survey rounds for the NSS data, where t =
2004, 2007, 2010, 2012. As a robustness check we report estimates separately by
event year (Figure A.4).
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Figure 2.3: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private vs. Public Enrollment (Age
5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on private school (0/1) vs. public school (0/1) enrollment status. τ = 0
is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment
effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges were
established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite
public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1,
τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private vs. Public Schools
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite
public colleges on number of private and public schools (natural logarithm).
τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average
treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public
colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received
a new elite public college in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1,
τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation
2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 2.5: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Access to Electricity, Tap Water
and Roads
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 489,576 villages across 3 Census
Village Directories (1991, 2001 and 2011). The figure presents the difference-
in-difference estimates of the effects of change in village-specific distance to the
nearest elite public college, due to the entry of new elite public colleges between
2001 and 2011, on the change in access to village level infrastructure (electric-
ity (0/1), tap water (0/1), and paved roads (0/1)) between 2001 and 2011. In
addition, the figure also presents placebo estimates of the effects of the change
in village-specific distance to the nearest elite public college, due to the entry
of new elite public colleges between 2001 and 2011, on the change in access
to village level infrastructure between 1991 and 2001. The regression, equation
2.4, includes district and year (round) fixed effects, as well as indicator variables
that denote if the village is less than 20, 40, 60 and 80 kms away from the nearest
elite public college in 2011, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure 2.6: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Village Level Night Light Intensity
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 453,921 villages across 9 years
of nighttime lights data (2004-2012). The figure presents the difference-in-
difference estimates of the effects of year-by-year changes in village-specific
distance to the nearest elite public college, due to the entry of new elite public
colleges between 2004 and 2012, on year-by-year changes in village level night
lights (natural logarithm), a proxy for rural electrification. The regression, equa-
tion 2.4, includes village and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals
are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 2.7: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private School Presence
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 489,576 villages from the 2011 Cen-
sus Village Directories. The figure presents the estimates of the relationship
between village-specific distance to the nearest elite public college and presence
of private schools (0/1) in 2011. The regression includes district fixed effects.
95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust.
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2.9.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Treatment Districts or Districts with Elite Public Colleges (2004-2014)
Period # of Districts with Elite College
Pre-2004 40
2004-2014 35
Balanced Panel
Year # of Districts with new Elite College # of new Districts with Elite College
2004 0 0
2005 1 1
2006 2 2
2007 4 2
2008 9 6
2009 2 1
2010 13 11
2011 3 2
2012 1 1
2013 0 0
2014 0 0
Total 35 26
Notes: This table lists all elite colleges established between 2004-2014. A total of 42
elite public colleges were established in this period. Out of 42, 13 were established in
6 districts. Therefore, 35 districts received new elite colleges during this period. Out
of these 35 districts, 9 districts already had an elite public college in 2003. Thus, in our
analysis we only use 26 districts who that never had an elite public college and only
received one between 2004-2014. Moreover, because we only use a balanced sample in
our analysis, the number of districts (out of these 26) will depend on the data set used.
Therefore, in NSS we use 25 treatment districts; ASER, 14; and DISE, 23.
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Table 2.2: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Distance to Private School
(1) (2)
Distance <=1 km (0/1) Distance <=1 km (0/1)
Full Sample Rural Sample
β / SE β / SE
Private*2011*Public College 0.131** 0.129*
(0.056) (0.067)
Mean 0.73 0.72
Observations 76659 54215
R2 0.118 0.144
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of children between 5 and 16
years of age from a nationally representative household level panel across 2
rounds of Indian Human Development Survey (2004-05 and 2011-12). The ta-
ble presents the triple difference estimates of the effects of entry of elite pub-
lic colleges at the district level between 2005 and 2011 on the change in dis-
tance to private school (1 if private school is less than or equal to 1 km away
from home, 0 otherwise) for children attending private school in treatment dis-
tricts (or districts that received an elite public college between 2005 and 2011),
Private ∗ 2011 ∗ PublicCollege. Regressions includes district fixed effects as well
as an indicator variable for whether the child is attending a private school, in-
dicator for treatment districts, indicator for survey round, and the interactions
between these variables. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by dis-
trict.
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Chapter 3
Poor Sleep: Sunset Time and
Human Capital Production
3.1 Introduction
Do arbitrary clock conventions help determine the geographic distribution of
educational attainment levels? Proposed in the late 19th century, a system of
world-wide standard time zones was intended to accumulate smaller differ-
ences in geographical longitude, so that nearby places can share a common stan-
dard for timekeeping, but still allow local time to be approximate with mean
solar time. However, many countries set their own time to assert national iden-
tity, to make political connections, or to keep one time zone within their bor-
ders, even if that may take parts of their countries far out of the designated
zone. India and China cover a vast east-west range, but both countries follow
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a standard time zone across their territorial boundaries. Clocks in large parts
of the planet – e.g., France, Spain, Algeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Russia, and
Argentina – are set to be ahead of their (solar) time.1 One consequence of these
discretionary clock settings are large discrepancies in when the sun sets both
within and across countries.
In this paper, I show that children in locations that experience later sun-
sets have worse educational outcomes due to the negative relationship between
sunset time and sleep, and the consequent productivity impacts of sleep depri-
vation. Sunset-induced sleep deficits are most pronounced among the poor, es-
pecially in periods when households face severe financial constraints. Because
education is both a driver of economic growth and a means to reduce income
inequality (41), these results imply sunset time associated with geographic loca-
tion may contribute to persistent poverty and worsening inequality.
As the sun sets and the sky grows darker, the human brain releases mela-
tonin, a hormone that facilitates sleep (325). Yet social norms or uniform policy
choices at the federal or state level – for example, start times for school and
work – may dictate wake-up times that do not co-vary with sunset time (185).
As a result, children may sleep less in locations exposed to later sunsets. If sleep
is productivity-enhancing, later sunset may directly, adversely, affect children’s
learning.
However, the consequent effect of later sunsets on educational attainment is
ambiguous; how children trade-off sleep with other time uses may have mul-
tiplicative or compensatory effects on education production. If sleep makes
study effort more productive, later sunset may not only reduce sleep but also
1For instance, Spain switched clocks ahead one hour to be in sync with Germany in 1940,
even though Spain is geographically in line with Britain, not Germany.
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make studying less effective, decreasing study time. Conversely, later sunset
(more daylight after school) might make it easier for children to self-study in
the evening, especially in lower income countries where electricity access is in-
termittent. Moreover, child labor is common in lower income countries. There-
fore, any complementarities between sleep and study effort may also depend
on the marginal increase in children’s labor productivity with respect to sleep.
As an additional channel, later sunset may similarly affect adults’ sleep, and
consequently household earnings and investment in children’s education.
The timing of natural light is determined by time zones and is therefore
predictable across locations and seasons. If sleep is important for productiv-
ity, households may adjust their sleep schedules in response to later sunset, or
simply get on a consistent sleep schedule regardless of sunset time, minimizing
the resulting human capital impacts. Yet, financial or behavioral considerations
may impede adjusted or consistent sleep. More importantly, poverty may exac-
erbate these considerations.2 Therefore, if the non-poor are better able to adjust
their sleep schedules when the sun sets later, later sunsets may contribute to a
sleep disparity in the population.
In the first part of the paper, I use the 1998-99 Indian Time Use Survey (ITUS)
to evaluate the effect of later sunset on children’s time use. ITUS provides 24-
hour time use data, collected with less than a 24-hour recall lapse, allowing me
2While urban environments, inaccurate self-perceptions of fatigue (411), or time inconsis-
tency (67) may constrain adjustment regardless of socioeconomic status, sleep environments
among low-income households in particular are associated with noise, heat, mosquitoes, over-
crowding, and overall uncomfortable physical conditions (180; 310). The poor, however, may
lack the financial resources to invest in sleep-inducing goods (e.g., window shades, separate
rooms, indoor beds, food) and adjust their sleep schedules on later sunset days. In addition,
poverty may have particular psychological consequences (e.g., stress, negative affective states,
increase in cognitive load) that can affect decision-making (191; 259; 342). Thus, cognitive con-
siderations associated with poverty may make it harder to assess one’s own sleep-productivity
relationship and optimize sleep schedules when the sun sets later.
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to assign each observation a district-date sunset time. My baseline econometric
specification exploits seasonal variation in daily sunset time at the district level
after controlling for fixed district-specific characteristics as well as seasonal con-
founders common across all districts in the sample.
I show that an hour (approximately two standard deviations) delay in sunset
time reduces children’s sleep by roughly 30 minutes: when the sun sets later,
children go to bed later; by contrast, wake-up times are not regulated by solar
cues. Sleep-deprived children decrease productive effort: later sunset reduces
students’ time spent on homework or studying, as well as child laborers’ time
spent on formal and informal work, while increasing time spent on sedentary
and compensatory leisure for all children. This result is consistent with a model
where sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of
study effort for students and work effort for child laborers.
The second part of the paper examines the consequent ‘lifetime’ or long-run
impacts of later sunset on stock indicators of children’s academic outcomes. I
use nationally-representative data from the 2015 India Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) to estimate how children’s education outcomes co-vary with an-
nual average sunset time across eastern and western locations within a district.3 I
find that an hour (approximately two standard deviations) delay in annual aver-
age sunset time reduces years of education by 0.8 years. School-age children in
geographic locations that experience later sunsets are less likely to complete pri-
mary and middle school, are less likely to be enrolled in school, and have lower
test scores. In addition, using an individual level longitudinal panel, wherein
the same child is administered comprehensive math tests at different dates ev-
3A one hour difference in annual average sunset time between two locations indicates that
on average the sun sets an hour later everyday in one location compared to the other location.
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ery survey round, I leverage seasonal variation in sunset time at the district-test-
date level across survey rounds to document the deleterious short-run effects of
sunset-induced sleep deficits on children’s test scores.
To argue that these results are generalizable, I use data from China and In-
donesia. Unlike ITUS, the 2004-2009 China Health and Nutrition Survey collects
data on children’s time use for a ‘typical’ day of the year, and not for a partic-
ular date. I use cross-sectional variation in annual average sunset time across
districts within a state. In line with my India estimates, an hour delay in annual
average sunset time reduces children’s sleep by roughly 30 minutes. To corrob-
orate the effects of later sunset on children’s academic outcomes, I use the 2003
Indonesia DHS, employing a sharp regression discontinuity design that exploits
time zone boundaries in Kalimantan, Indonesia. I find that an hour delay in an-
nual average sunset time reduces years of schooling by 0.7 years, quite similar
to my India estimate.
The third part of the paper shows that parental education investment may
be an additional channel through which later sunset affects human capital pro-
duction. Using ITUS, I find that an hour delay in sunset time reduces adults’
sleep by 30 minutes. Later sunset also reduces adults’ earnings in India.
In the fourth part of the paper, I investigate if poverty helps explain why
families fail to adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later. Initially, I
examine heterogeneous impacts of later sunset on sleep by correlates of poverty
(e.g., education, average monthly expenditure) in India. The negative effect
of later sunset on sleep is at least 25% larger among low socioeconomic status
(SES) households compared to high SES households. To evaluate whether this
heterogeneity truly reflects the influence of poverty, I restrict the ITUS sample
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to crop cultivator households, and exploit quasi-experimental variation in in-
come around the harvest period, comparing the effect of later sunset on sleep in
the month before harvest, when crop cultivator households are poorer and typi-
cally liquidity constrained, with the month after harvest, when richer and more
financially liquid. Because harvest calendars vary across seasons and locations,
I also control for all fixed differences between time periods and districts. Indeed,
sunset-induced sleep deficits are significantly larger before harvest compared to
after harvest. I show this effect is not driven by possible changes in work effort
on later sunset days. Overall, financial and psychological considerations asso-
ciated with poverty help explains 25-100% of the effect of later sunset on sleep.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we provide a
brief literature review. Section 3.3 provides a conceptual framework to under-
stand how children trade-off sleep with other time uses. Section 3.4 describes
the data. Section 3.5 investigates the effects of later sunset on children’s time
use, while Section 3.6 examines the consequent effects on children’s education
outcomes. Section 3.7 evaluates the effects of later sunset on adults’ time use
and wages. Section 3.8 examines poverty as one potential explanation for why
individuals fail to adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later. Sec-
tion 3.9 provides a back-of-the-envelope estimate for the human capital costs
associated with existing policy regulating time zone boundaries in India, while
Section 3.10 concludes.
4Like previous studies (89; 259; 367), this result speaks to the effects of sharp, anticipated but
short-lived variations in financial resources around the ‘payday’ (harvest) period. It is this par-
ticular impoverishment that I allude to when I refer to “poverty.” Although the heterogeneous
effects on sleep by socioeconomic status suggest similar effects for a permanent shift in perma-
nent income, the interpretation of these estimates may be confounded by omitted variables that
are correlated with socioeconomic status.
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3.2 Contributions to the Literature
Recent evidence suggests that both natural environment and institutions are im-
portant for economic development: Fixed features of the natural environment
(e.g., latitude, distance from coast, elevation) have considerable influence on
contemporaneous economic outcomes ((17; 59; 270; 295; 297)); and, political and
economic institutions are important determinants of long-run economic growth
((4; 292; 293; 324)). However, these relationships are often studied in isolation.
I provide evidence that arbitrary human institutions may interact with fixed
features of the natural environment to produce bad economic outcomes.
I contribute to a new literature that examines how arbitrary clock settings –
by generating differences in the timing of natural light – affect economic out-
comes.5 Within this literature, a small set of papers evaluate the implications
of the relationship between sunset time and sleep. (173) observe associated im-
pacts of later sunset on adult wages in the US, while (175) and (174) investigate
consequent effects on adult health outcomes in the US and China, respectively.
I provide the first evidence that differences in when the sun sets across locations
– by generating long-term differences in sleep – help determine the geographic
5A few papers exploit variation in the timing of natural light due to daylight savings time
(DST) in the US to investigate short-run effects on a number of economic outcomes: (136)
(crime), (421) (outdoor leisure), (224) (health) and (363) (automobile accidents). Two studies
also examine the relationship between daylight savings time transitions and test scores but find
contrasting results: using the variation in DST regimes among counties in Indiana, (166) show
that SAT scores are significantly worse in counties that advance and set back their clocks each
year as compared to counties sticking to standard time permanently; (197) use international
assessment data from six European countries and fail to find evidence that the transition into
daylight saving time affects elementary students’ performance in low-stakes tests in the week
after the time change. In any case, if one were to compare short-run effects of sleep deprivation
from daylight savings time onset, to the long-run effects of sleep deprivation at issue in this
paper, two differences have offsetting effects. First, effects of sleep deprivation on education
production could accumulate; the DST transition may only affect sleep for a few days, while
later sunset affects sleep every day. Second, there may be adaptation to a permanent shift in
sunset time.
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distribution of educational attainment levels. A growing body of work suggests
that education offers a wide-range of benefits that extend beyond increases in
labor market productivity: improvements in education can lower crime, im-
prove health, and increase voting and democratic participation (250). Therefore,
policies that promote children’s sleep may also improve later-life well-being in
locations exposed to later sunsets.
This paper also relates to several recent studies that examine the short-term
consequences of later school start times on students’ academic performance in
the US (86; 147; 195; 198; 414). (198) studies a policy change in public school
start times in Minneapolis but fails to find evidence that ringing the school bell
later increases student performance on a high school achievement test. (195)
show that moving school start times one hour later relative to sunrise increases
test scores for adolescents in Florida. (86) exploit random assignment of school
schedules at the United States Air Force Academy and find that later school
start times improve test scores among freshmen cadets. These effects (or lack
thereof) are mediated through changes in children’s time use, although the
above-mentioned papers do not observe children’s sleep or consequent trade-
offs with other uses of time. My results provide the first evidence on the long-
run importance of child sleep for learning outcomes.
Furthermore, I estimate how children trade off sunset-induced sleep deficits
with time allocated to studying or homework (study effort) and formal or infor-
mal work (work effort), in a context where child labor is prevalent. (54) model
sleep as a choice variable that affects productivity, although they did not fo-
cus on this relationship in their empirical analysis. (173) investigate how sleep
deprivation induces trade-offs between sleep and productive effort. However,
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their findings relate only to adults. Unlike the American Time Use Survey, ITUS
collects time use data for children. My results suggest that sleep is productivity-
enhancing, increasing the marginal returns of self-investment in study effort for
students, and the marginal product of work effort for child laborers. Because
sleep is the largest use of non-market time, these results also relate to seminal
papers of (276) and (45), as well as recent work by (10), that emphasize that
labor supply is influenced by how time is allocated outside of market work.
Lastly, this study contributes to a large literature in the broader social sci-
ences that explores the relationship between poverty and counterproductive
behavior. The poor use less preventive health care (227), fail to adhere to drug
regimens (135), are tardier and less likely to keep appointments (226; 286), are
less attentive parents (266), and worse managers of their finances (37; 57; 146).
There is also some descriptive evidence from the US that suggests sleep depri-
vation is higher among the poor (180; 310). I provide the first evidence for a
plausibly causal relationship between poverty and sleep.6
3.3 A Conceptual Framework of Children’s Time
Use
Sleep deprivation impairs learning and cognition (47; 230; 246; 247; 318; 337; 351;
413), and the impacts increase with the cumulative extent of sleep deprivation
6Because families get less sleep on days the sun sets later in periods when liquidity con-
straints bind tightly compared to later sunset days in periods when households are more fi-
nancial liquid, this paper also contributes to studies that show liquidity constraints impede
‘adoption’ of welfare improving technologies (e.g., piped water, migration, cookstove, bednets)
in developing countries (44; 68; 131; 277; 378).
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(42; 411). Thus, if later sunset reduces the time allocated to sleep, children that
observe later sunsets may have non-trivial sleep deficits with real human capital
impacts.
However, the consequent impact of later sunset on schooling outcomes is
ambiguous; how children trade-off sleep with other time uses may have mul-
tiplicative or compensatory effects on education production. If sleep were not
productive, then it would be a substitute for other time uses, including produc-
tive effort. For example, later sunset (more daylight after school) might make
it easier for children to self-study, especially in lower income countries where
electricity access is intermittent. On the other hand, if sleep is productivity-
enhancing and increases the marginal returns of an extra hour of productive
effort, sleep deficient children may decrease self-investment in study effort.78
Moreover, in a context where child labor is pervasive, complementarities be-
tween sleep and study effort may also depend on the marginal increase in wages
with respect to sleep.9
To formally examine how children trade-off sunset-induced reduction in
sleep with other time uses, I extend the productive sleep model from (173) –
an extension of the time use model of (182) – to children. The child’s problem is
to maximize a utility function u(x, L) where x are consumables, and L is leisure
time. u is weakly increasing in each argument and is quasi-concave. I assume
that parents induce children’s investment in schooling through parental trans-
7Several studies document a positive relationship between children’s self-investment in
study effort and learning outcomes (12; 62; 137; 149; 372; 373).
8Instead, children may allocate more time to indoor leisure. Multiple studies have shown
that sleep deprivation increases daytime sleepiness and sedentary leisure activities (87; 88; 153;
217; 256; 301; 338). The effects of leisure, specifically, exposure to media, on children’s cognitive
outcomes has been mixed (157; 168; 258).
9Even today India has roughly 9 million child laborers (90). Also, the average Indian child
allocates considerably more time to labor activities than the average child in an advanced econ-
omy like the UK (Figure B.1).
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fers (46).10 Thus, the child’s consumables depend on earnings through own
labor, xO, earned by working for parents, and reward, r, set by parents for edu-
cational achievement.
Work time is denoted as N, thus the child can gain output, xO = NW(S ),
where W(S ), is wage received from parents, and is a function of children’s
sleep, S . Price is normalized to 1. Similarly, the child can also gain goods,
xH = rh(H, S ), where reward, r, can be thought of as a parent’s present dis-
counted value of the returns to child’s achievement in the current period, and
h(H, S ) is the education production function, with inputs H, denoting time spent
on schooling, including self investment in study effort. Thus, total consum-
ables are given by x = xO + xH. I assume that the parent has full information
and can fully commit to this contract. I model sleep as productivity-enhancing,
more sleep will, ceteris paribus, increase labor productivity (∂W(S )
∂S > 0) and edu-
cational achievement (∂h(H,S )
∂S > 0). However, the total effect of sleep on earnings
and achievement, and hence parental transfers, also depends on how children
trade-off sleep with work (∂N
∂S ), study time (
∂H
∂S ), and leisure time (
∂L
∂S ).
Putting all time uses together, the total time constraint is T = L + H + N +
S . Substituting the time budget into the goods budget, the combined budget
constraint is
xH = rh(T − L − S − N, S ) (3.1)
and the optimization problem is
max
L,N,S
(3.2)
u(NW(S ) + xH, L) + λ1(rh(T − L − S − N, S ) − xH) + λ2N + λ3S
10Alternatively, I can assume that children’s allocation of time is driven by their own prefer-
ences. Households behave like an internal market in which children select their optimal time
allocation bundle, and are rewarded accordingly (233).
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Consider a child who is a student, but also works at home or in the market.
Also, assume sleep is positive, so N > 0, S > 0, and λ2 = λ3 = 0, by complemen-
tary slackness. Further, h′1 > 0, h
′
2 > 0, h
′′
11 < 0, and h
′′
22 < 0. First order conditions
can be written as
u′2
u′1
= rh′1 (3.3)
W(S ) = rh′1 (3.4)
NW ′(S ) + rh′2 = rh
′
1 (3.5)
Taking the total derivative of Equation 3.4, I get
dH
dS
=
W ′(S ) − rh′′12(H∗, S ∗)
h′′11(H
∗, S ∗)
(3.6)
Thus, dHdS > 0 if W
′(S ) < rh′′12(H
∗, S ∗); sleep will induce study effort if marginal
increase in school productivity with respect to sleep is larger than the marginal
increase in wages (labor productivity) with respect to sleep. However, if the op-
posite condition holds, W ′(S ) > rh′′12(H
∗, S ∗), then increase in sleep will reduce
self-investment in study effort dHdS < 0. Assume that for any student i or child
whose primary activity is education, sleep will be more achievement-enhancing
than work-productivity enhancing (W ′(S ) < rh′′12(H
∗, S ∗)), while for any child la-
borer j, sleep will be more work productivity-enhancing than achievement en-
hancing. That is, child i or j will have no incentive to switch his or her primary
activity due to the productivity impacts of sleep.
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Taking the total derivative of Equation 3.5,
dN
dS
=
[rh′′11(H
∗, S ∗) − rh′′21(H∗, S ∗)] dHdS + rh′′12(H∗, S ∗) − rh′′22(H∗, S ∗) − NW ′′(S )
W ′(S )
(3.7)
Assume W ′′(S ) ≤ 0, and sleep is productive: h′′21(H∗, S ∗) > 0 and W ′(S ) > 0, if
dH
dS < 0, then
dN
dS > 0.
11 So, sleep can either be work productivity enhancing or
achievement-enhancing.12
To summarize, the model predicts that sleep increases study effort if sleep
is more achievement-enhancing than work-productivity enhancing. The in-
crease in achievement will be large enough to lead to an overall increase in the
amount of study time. But if sleep is more work-productivity enhancing than
achievement-enhancing, then sleep will increase work time.
If, however, sleep is not productivity-enhancing, reducing sleep will cause a
pure income effect for the child, and depending on the utility function, study,
work and leisure time may increase. Sleep will be a substitute for all other time
uses.
3.4 Data
I use detailed time use and education data from India to analyze the negative re-
lationship between sunset time, sleep, and education production. I corroborate
key results using time use data from China and education data from Indonesia.
The features of the core data sets that are most relevant for my analysis are de-
scribed below. Appendix B.1 describes supplementary data; it also includes a
11Medical studies often find a nonlinear relationship between sleep and health that suggests
W ′′(S ) < 0 (82). (411) find that cognition declines linearly with sleep deprivation.
12An increase in duration of productive sleep induces an increase in ‘wages’, so income and
substitution effects make the sign of the net effect on leisure time ambiguous.
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short discussion on daily sunset time and annual average sunset time, gener-
ated using the solar mechanics algorithms from (267).
3.4.1 India Time Use Survey (ITUS)
ITUS is the first time use survey of its size and coverage amongst developing
countries. Over 18,000 households were surveyed in 52 districts across 6 states
between July, 1998 and June, 1999. States were selected to give geographical
representation to each region of the country. Within each state, households were
randomly selected based on a sampling procedure designed to ensure a repre-
sentative sample at the state level. The survey was spread over one year to
account for seasonal variation in activity patterns.
Time use data were collected for all household members over five years of
age. Thus, ITUS collects time use data for children, which is rare amongst such
surveys.13 For each household, time use data were collected for three types of
days: normal (usually weekdays), weekly variant (usually Sundays), and ab-
normal (festivals or holidays). Initially, an investigator collected information
for these three types of days within the week from different members of the se-
lected households. Then, the investigator revisited households accordingly and
interviewed individuals about their time allocation decisions for those partic-
ular days. Using the interview date and district identifiers, I determine sunset
time for each individual corresponding to the date for which the time use data
13For instance, the American Time Use Survey only collects data for individuals over fourteen
years of age.
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were collected.1415
To examine the effects of later sunset on children’s time use, I restrict the
sample to school-age children less than 17 years of age. 55% of children in the
sample are male, and 70% reside in rural areas. Importantly, the primary activ-
ity is schooling for only 8 out of 10 children; 19% of the sample of school-age
children primarily engages in some form of child labor. On average, 6 out of 7
days in a week are normal days, while only 1 day is a weekly variant suggest-
ing 6-day work/study weeks. Correspondingly, time use data for only 4% of
the normal day sample were collected for a Sunday, while time use data for 66%
of the weekly variant sample were collected on a Sunday.16 Thus, I will refer
to the normal day sample as the ‘weekday’ sample, while the weekly variant
sample as the ‘weekend’ sample.
In the survey, daily activities were classified in roughly 150 activities across
9 broad categories: 1) primary production, 2) secondary production, 3) trade,
business and services, 4) household maintenance, management and shopping
for own households, 5) care for children, sick and elderly, 6) community services
14For instance, if the normal date for an individual was a Monday, the investigator visited the
individual on Tuesday of the same week to collect time use data for that prior Monday. That
is, interviews were conducted such that time use data could be collected with less than a 24-
hour recall lapse. See (303), for a detailed overview of the sampling strategy and data collection
methods. Self-reported time use data may be prone to measurement error. For example, self-
reported sleep tends to overestimate objective measures of sleep duration (242). However, it
is unlikely that any measurement error is systematically correlated with the sunset time. In
addition, it is reassuring that I obtain similar results from time use surveys in both India and
China.
15Table B.1 presents the monthly distribution of interview dates by state. Figure B.2 maps
of districts in ITUS. Figure B.3(a) shows variation in daily sunset time for all 52 ITUS districts,
while Figure B.3(b) shows variation in daily sunset time for dates for which time use data was
collected in the sampled districts. The amplitude of the wave is determined by the latitude of
the location, and the vertical translations are due to longitude or east-west variation in sunset
time across India. There is no reason to believe that the date of time use data would be correlated
with sunset times. However, I examine this assumption explicitly, and fail to find evidence for
any such relationship (Table B.2).
16Table B.3 presents summary statistics for both the normal day and the weekly variant sam-
ple.
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and help to other households, 7) learning, 8) social and cultural activities, mass
media etc., and 9) personal care and self-maintenance. Appendix B.1 includes a
complete list of all activities as classified in ITUS. I further grouped these cate-
gories into five brackets: sleep, study, school, leisure, and work. ‘Work’ includes
categories 1 to 6,17 while ‘leisure’ all items from categories 8 and 9 except sleep.
Category 9 includes ‘sleep and related activities’, or all sleep during the course
of a 24-hour period. I include nighttime sleep or any sleep that starts and ends
between 6 pm and 12 pm in the variable ‘sleep’ and not ‘leisure’. Naps, how-
ever, are included in ‘leisure’.18 ‘Study’ includes time spent on homework, tu-
ition, and course review, while ‘school’ includes time spent in an educational
institution like a school or university.
On weekdays, school-age children spent on average 9 hours/day on sleep,
7.5 hours/day on leisure activities, and almost 4 hours/day in school. School-
age children spent over 2 hours/day on average on work, but less than 1.5
hours/day on educational activities outside of school. On weekends, children
don’t have school, so they allocate more time to sleeping at night, studying, and
on leisure activities.
School-age children tend to go to bed after 7 pm, and wake up by 7 am on
weekdays. They also tend to self-study (e.g., homework) early in the morning,
before school, and then after school, later in the afternoon. Time allocation to
17Both market work and home production are included in ‘work’ for convenience as female
child laborers tend to work at home while male child laborers typically perform outdoor tasks.
18Like (173), I exclude naps or daytime sleep from ‘sleep’. I define daytime sleep or naps as
sleep that starts and ends during afternoon hours (between 12 pm and 6 pm). I include naps in
‘leisure’, but napping may be an adaptation to later sunset, undertaken for the compensatory
effects rather than because it is pleasurable. Thus, I examine the nighttime to daytime sleep
trade-offs. Indeed, I show that later sunset increases nap time by roughly 15 minutes. However,
as discussed in Appendix B.2, naps may momentarily increase basic concentration under con-
ditions of sleep deprivation, but cannot salvage more complex functions of the brain, including
learning.
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recreational activities is spread throughout the day. Work schedules are similar
to school schedules but not as intensive, on average.19
Compared to developed countries, children in India spend less time on sleep
and leisure, but more time studying outside of school, and on work-related ac-
tivities. Given such prevalence of child labor, I also examine time allocations by
primary activity: ‘student’ or ‘worker’, which is indicated in ITUS. Students or
children attending school spent less than 1 hour/day on work, while spending
5 hours/day in school and 2 hours/day studying outside of school.20 However,
child workers allocated almost 6 hours/day on average to work. Finally, chil-
dren engaged in child labor allocated more time to leisure than those who were
primarily students.21
19Figure B.4 presents the average time spent by children on sleep, study, school, leisure and
work, respectively. Figure B.5 describes sleep patterns on a weekday among children. I also di-
rectly examine the average bed- and wake-up times for children for both weekdays and week-
ends in Figure B.6. I find no differences in bedtimes, and only a small increase in wake-up
times during weekends. Figure B.7 examines time allocation patterns for other activities within
a weekday. In Table B.4 I show the average number of individuals who sleep above certain
thresholds of sleep (7, 8, 9, 10 or 11 hours) by age group; 70% (44%) children between 6 and
13 years (14 and 16 years) of age sleep at least 9 hours. Recently, a NSF assembled multidisci-
plinary expert panel recommended that children between 6 and 13 years of age sleep 9 to 11
hours while those between 14 and 16 years of age were recommended to sleep at 8 to 10 hours
(199).
20Figures B.8 and B.9 describe how students and child laborers spend their time on weekdays
and weekends.
21Figures B.10 and B.11 present correlations between sunset time and children’s time use us-
ing the raw data. Within each district, I disaggregate children into two groups: children inter-
viewed when seasonal sunsets were below 25th percentile (early sunset), and those interviewed
when seasonal sunsets were above 75th percentile (late sunset). Compared to days with early
sunset, on late sunset days children start sleep later, but wake-up times remained unaffected.
Furthermore, children spend less time studying, and more time on leisure. Importantly, while
effects on sleep patterns are similar for both students and workers (Figure B.12), late sunset re-
duces study time for students, but work time for workers, with comparatively modest effects
on work time for students and study time for workers (Figure B.13).
77
3.4.2 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
The DHS are nationally-representative demographic surveys collected for US-
AID in collaboration with governments of the countries where the surveys are
fielded. These data represent the widely-accepted gold standard for demo-
graphic and health data in the developing world. The DHS collects basic ed-
ucation data for every member in the sample household. In addition, DHS
data also contain a variety of household-level survey data related to assets and
household physical infrastructure. Importantly, DHS data includes geolocation
information allowing me to generate annual average sunset time at the primary
sampling unit (PSU) level. PSUs correspond to a village in rural areas and city
blocks in urban areas. Because my core time use data are from India, I primarily
draw on the 2015 India DHS. I use the 2003 Indonesia DHS to argue that my
results are generalizable and because it allows me to leverage a different source
of variation in sunset time.
Using the 2015 Indian DHS, I exploit cross-sectional variation in annual av-
erage sunset time across eastern and western PSUs within small administrative
divisions. Next, I use the 2003 Indonesian DHS. Kalimantan is the Indonesian
portion of the island of Borneo with two time zones: UTC+7 and UTC+8. I
leverage a sharp discontinuity in annual average sunset time at the time zone
boundary to corroborate the effects of later annual average sunset on children’s
academic outcomes.22
I restrict the sample to household members between 6 and 16 years of age
across both countries.23 In the 2015 Indian DHS, the average school-age child
22Although Indonesia has multiple islands on different time zones, Kalimantan is the only
contiguous Indonesian island with an internal time zone border.
23Table B.5 presents summary statistics for outcomes of interest. In India (Indonesia), the
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has roughly 4.5 years of schooling; 48% have completed primary school and
21% completed middle school. In the 2003 Indonesian DHS, the average school-
age child has completed roughly 4 years of schooling. 34% have completed
primary school and 10% have completed middle school.
3.5 Effects of Later Sunset on Children’s Time Use
In this section, I use detailed time use data from India to examine how daily
sunset time co-vary with children’s time use, in particular, sleep and study ef-
fort, at the district level. To corroborate these effects, I use time use data from
China, exploiting cross-sectional variation in annual average sunset time.
3.5.1 Empirical Model
To formally examine the relationship between sunset time and children’s time
allocation, I use ITUS and estimate the following econometric model:
yidwt = βS unsetdwt + µw + µd + idwt (3.8)
To identify the average effect of an hour increase in sunset time (β), time al-
located to sleep, study, leisure or work (yidwt), by child i, in district d, on date t,
levels of the education system are as follows: primary school ranges from grade 1 (1) to grade 5
(6) and middle school ranges from grade 6 (7) to grade 8 (9). Figure B.14 presents the location
of PSUs across India, while Figure B.15 shows the distribution of annual average sunset time
across these PSUs.
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during week-of-year w, is regressed on sunset time observed in district d on date
t (S unsetdwt). µw are week-of-year fixed effects, and µd are district fixed effects.
Thus, I control for attributes that vary by week-of-year, that is seasonal trends
common across districts in the sample (e.g., national festivals), as well as fixed
district-specific characteristics (e.g., electricity access), that affect children’s time
allocation decisions. My parameter of interest that relates sunset to time alloca-
tion are identified from intra-annual or seasonal variation in daily sunset time
at the district level after controlling for seasonal variation common across all
districts in the sample. Put another way, the estimates are identified from the
comparison of districts that observed a late sunset day with ones that observed
an early sunset day within the same week-of-year, after absorbing fixed district-
specific unobservables.24 I cluster standard errors by district-week for three rea-
sons: to allow for arbitrary spatial correlation across children within a district,
to allow for autocorrelation in time allocation within a week, and to account
for the fact that the same sunset time can be assigned to multiple children. I
demonstrate below that results are insensitive to numerous robustness checks,
supporting the validity of my baseline model.
3.5.2 Results
First, I investigate the effect of late sunset on children’s bedtime and wake-up
time. Consistent with the above-mentioned medical literature on human cir-
cadian rhythm, later sunset delays bedtimes. A one hour (approximately two
24The identification of daily sunset time effects relies on variation in the timing of time use
dates. The ITUS was not designed to be representative at the daily level, so I demonstrate
balance by examining the relationship between sunset time and socioeconomic factors at the
individual level (e.g., wealth, sex, age) as well as interview date characteristics (e.g., day-of-
week). I fail to find evidence for a statistically significant relationship between sunset time and
individual or household-level observables (Tables B.9 - B.11).
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standard deviation) delay in sunset delays bedtime by an estimated 0.36 hours
(Table 3.1). Children fail to compensate by waking up later as wake-up times
do not co-vary with sunset times.
Next, I evaluate the effects of sunset time on sleep, study, leisure and work.
In line with the previous result, Table 3.2 shows that a one hour delay in sunset
reduces sleep by 0.47 hours or roughly 30 minutes. Furthermore, later sunset
significantly reduces self-investment in study effort, but increases time spent on
leisure. An hour delay in sunset reduces study time by 0.67 hours, increasing
leisure by 1.65 hours. Indeed, sleep complements study effort and substitutes
with leisure.2526
These aggregate results mask substantial heterogeneity by children’s pri-
mary activity. While effects on sleep are qualitatively similar for both students
and child workers,27 late sunset reduces study time for students and work time
for workers, with comparatively modest effects on work time for students and
on study time for workers (Table 3.3).28 These effects suggest that sleep in-
creases the marginal gains of an extra hour of study effort for students with
comparatively modest marginal gains for labor productivity. Conversely, for
child laborers the increase in marginal product of labor from an extra hour of
25A large fraction of observations have values of zero for the time spent on study and work
effort. Thus, Table B.12 also presents the Tobit estimates and find that these results are in line
with the OLS estimates, although the point estimate for ‘Study’ is significantly larger. However,
(371) notes that zeros in time use data may arise from a mismatch between the reference pe-
riod of the data (the interview date) and the period of interest, which is typically much longer.
He finds that in such a context the marginal effects from Tobit are biased and that only OLS
generates unbiased estimates.
26I find that the relationship between sunset time and sleep is roughly linear (Figure B.20).
27The interaction term is negative and significant, perhaps suggestive of the influence of
poverty on sleep as discussed in Section 3.8 as ‘child laborer households’ tend to be poorer
than ‘student households’.
28In terms of magnitude, an hour delay in sunset time reduces study time by roughly 40
minutes. This is a large effect. I show that later sunset negatively affects study effort on the
extensive margin, presumably because tired students are less likely to study at all (Table B.13).
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sleep is larger than the increase in marginal product of an extra hour of study
effort. In the analytical model, a child chooses to study if the marginal increase
in parental rewards from an extra hour of study time is larger than the wage
rate (r ∂h(H,S )
∂H > W(S )). These results suggest that labor productivity gains from
more sleep are not large enough to induce a student to work. Lastly, a decrease
in time allocated to sleep may induce lethargy and increase time allocated to
sedentary and compensatory leisure activities. Overall, these results imply that
sleep is productivity-enhancing, increasing the marginal returns to study and
work effort, for students and child laborers, respectively.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
The identification assumption underlying this research design is that there ex-
ist no district-specific seasonal characteristics that co-vary with time use and
intra-annual variation in sunset time at the district level. This may be a strong
assumption, one that could plausibly be violated for several reasons, for ex-
ample, local weather, provincial school calendar, or local festivals. I use three
approaches to evaluate the validity of this identification assumption.
First, I control for seasonal observables (e.g., weather) at the district level.
There exists considerable seasonal variation in weather patterns across India.
Thus, later sunset might be correlated with higher temperatures and precipita-
tion for specific districts. For example, it is plausible that my baseline estimates
are confounded by the effects of extreme temperatures on sleep, especially in
a context where air conditioning is uncommon. Or if the agricultural calendar
(and relatedly the monsoon season) coincides with later sunset for particular
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districts my estimates could be biased. Table B.14 controls for daily precipita-
tion and temperature at the district level and shows that my estimates remain
unaffected.2930
Second, I evaluate effects of later sunset on children’s time use for non-school
days: weekends. If my estimates were driven by district-specific school calen-
dars, I may not find similar effects for weekends. However, the magnitudes are
not significantly different for children’s time use over weekends, bolstering the
robustness of my findings (Table B.16). This result also suggests that there may
be factors that affect children’s sleep schedules in addition to school start times.
Third, I control flexibly for district-specific seasonal unobservables by in-
cluding a suite of interacted fixed effects: state-by-season, latitude-by-week-of-
year and district-by-season.3132 Separately, these control for seasonal attributes
specific to each state, latitudinal zone, and district, respectively. For instance,
local festivals that coincide with summer months may increase children’s time
allocation to leisure and in turn decrease the time allocated to sleep, study effort
and work effort. However, Tables B.17, B.18 and B.19 show that although the
estimates are noisier, the magnitudes remain relatively unaffected by the inclu-
sion of these fixed effects. Thus, any omitted variables must operate within a
season for specific districts.33
29I use the ERA-Interim daily temperature and precipitation data on a 1 x 1 degree latitude-
longitude grid. These data are matched with ITUS at the district-date level.
30In addition, controlling for socioeconomic factors at the individual level (e.g., wealth, sex,
age) and interview date characteristics (e.g., day-of-week) explains meaningful variation in the
outcomes of interest, but my point estimates remain relatively unaffected (Table B.15).
31To generate latitude-by-week-of-year fixed effects I divide the country into two arbitrary
latitudinal zones using the median latitude and interact indicator variables for each zone with
indicator variables for each week-of-year.
32The Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) designates four climatological seasons for the
country: Winter (December-March), Summer (April-June), Monsoon (July-September), Autumn
(October to November).
33School summer vacations in India are between April and June. In Table B.20 I drop these
months to ensure that my results are not just driven by children’s time use during summer
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Relatedly, any district-specific seasonal confounders correlated with fixed
socioeconomic- or date-related attributes like age, sex, day-of-week, urban
status or wealth should be picked up when I include district-by-age-by-
season, district-by-sex-by-season, district-by-day-of-week-by-season, district-
by-urban-by-season, or district-by-wealth-by-season fixed effects, respectively.
For example, if boys are more likely to be engaged in agricultural labor during
the monsoon for certain districts, district-by-sex-by-season fixed effects should
control for such patterns. These interacted fixed effects fail to meaningfully af-
fect my coefficients of interest (Tables B.24 - B.28).34
In sum, these three tests imply that any omitted variable that generates bias
in the baseline estimates must i) operate within a season for specific districts,
ii) be orthogonal to seasonal observables at the district level, iii) be uncorre-
lated with district-specific seasonal unobservables that co-vary with fixed ob-
servables at the individual or interview date level and iv) persist during both
weekdays and weekends. Plausible omitted variables are unlikely to have all of
these properties, and therefore my baseline estimates are likely unbiased.35
vacations. I find that the coefficients are similar to my baseline estimates apart from the neg-
ative effect on ‘Work’, which is now large and statistically significant. In Table B.21, B.22, and
B.23, I drop Winter, Monsoon, and Autumn months, respectively. The point estimates remain
unaffected.
34In Table B.29 I adjust standard errors to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in (103), and
implemented by (202). I allow errors to be spatially auto-correlated within a distance of 500 km.
The point estimates remain precisely estimated. Similarly, in Table B.30 I cluster standard errors
at the district level to allow errors to be temporally correlated across weeks within a district.
The coefficients remain precisely estimated.
35If children are more likely to nap on late sunset days than early sunset days due to factors
unrelated to the effect of later sunset on (nighttime) sleep, the effects on sleep could be driven
by daytime naps and not the other way around. However, in Table B.31 I show that the effects
of later sunset on children’s time use are robust to dropping ‘nappers’ from the sample. In Table
B.32 I estimate the effects of later sunset using non-linear metrics for sleep duration based on
recommendations made by experts in the areas of medicine, physiology and science. I show that
an hour delay in sunset significantly reduces the likelihood that children get the recommended
amount of sleep (9-11 hours). In Appendix B.2, I show that the effect of later sunset on leisure is
driven by indoor and not outdoor leisure.
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China Time Use Results
Next, I use the 2004-2009 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to exam-
ine the effects of later sunset on children’s time use in China. Unlike ITUS,
CHNS includes information on children’s time allocation for a ‘typical’ or
‘usual’ day of the year, and not for a particular date. And, although CHNS only
provides data on sleep, leisure and homework time, it allows me to investigate
the effect of annual average sunset time on children’s time allocation.36 In this
setting, I abstract away from seasonal variation in sunset time, only exploiting
cross-sectional variation in annual average sunset time.
I estimate the following econometric model:
yidst = βS unsetds + µt + µs + idst (3.9)
Time allocated to sleep, leisure or homework (y), by child i, in district (or
county) d, in state (or province) s, in year t, is regressed on annual average sun-
set time observed in district d in state s to estimate the average effect of an hour’s
increase in annual average sunset time (β). µt are year fixed effects, and µs are
state fixed effects. Thus, I exploit district-level variation (east to west) in an-
nual average sunset time within a state. Therefore, I control for across province
time invariant attributes that are correlated with children’s time allocation and
annual average sunset time.
An hour delay in annual average sunset time reduces sleep by 0.43 hours
(Table B.33). This estimate is remarkably similar to the effect of late sunset on
sleep in India, where I exploit intra-annual variation in daily sunset time at the
36There exist substantial differences in the definition of leisure between ITUS and CHNS.
Furthermore, as a measure of self-investment in study effort, CHNS only provides homework
time. These differences are discussed in Appendix B.1.
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district level. Furthermore, in line with the ITUS results, I find large positive
effects on leisure and negative effects on time spent on homework, although
these estimates are noisier.
Because I only exploit cross-sectional variation in sunset time within a state,
county level attributes that are correlated with annual average sunset time as
well as the outcomes of interest could potentially bias my estimates. For in-
stance, if compared to eastern districts (early sunset), western districts (late sun-
set) are warmer, then the coefficients might be upwardly biased. In Table B.34,
I control for weather and other observables like income, urban status, house-
hold size and nutritional intake, that may co-vary with children’s time allo-
cation across the east-west gradient within a province, like sunset times. My
estimates remain largely unaffected. Indeed, under the strong assumption that
these observables are strongly correlated with unobservable confounders, these
results indicate that the estimates are unbiased (15; 299).37
3.6 Effects of Later Sunset on Academic Outcomes
Using nationally-representative DHS data from 45 countries across the develop-
ing world, Figure 3.1 documents a strong negative correlation between annual
average sunset time associated with a geographic location and years of school-
ing among school-age children.38
37In Table B.35, I show that the effect of later sunset on leisure is driven by indoor and not
outdoor leisure.
38In successive specifications I control for potential omitted variables – demographics, lat-
itude, elevation, and rural-urban status (Table B.45). I find that the association is robust to
controlling for these observables.
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However, simple cross-country comparison of children’s academic out-
comes may be confounded by systematic differences in salient features that co-
vary with annual average sunset time and children’s education. To overcome
this identification problem, and because my core time use data are from India,
I use the geocoded 2015 India DHS to investigate the ‘lifetime’ or long-run ef-
fects of later sunset on educational outcomes for school-age children, exploit-
ing cross-sectional variation in annual average sunset time across eastern and
western locations within small administrative divisions, districts. I improve ex-
ternal validity and assess robustness of these results using education data from
Indonesia, exploiting a sharp discontinuity in annual average sunset time at
the time zone boundary in Kalimantan, Indonesia. Lastly, using an individual
level longitudinal panel from Andhra Pradesh, India, wherein the same child is
administered comprehensive (low-stakes) tests in math at different dates every
survey round, I leverage variation in sunset time at the district-test-date level
across survey rounds to evaluate the short-run effects of sunset-induced sleep
deficits on children’s test scores.
3.6.1 Empirical Model
Using the 2015 India DHS, I estimate the following econometric model:
yiavd = βS unsetvd + µd + µa + iavd (3.10)
where yiavd is the outcome of interest for child i of age a in sampling unit v
in district d. Outcomes of interest include years of schooling, primary school
completion, middle school completion, and enrollment status. Both primary
and middle school completion are binary variables that take the value ‘1’ if the
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child has completed primary and middle school, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, enrollment status is a binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ if the
child is enrolled in school, and 0 otherwise. µd are district fixed effects, while
µa are age fixed effects. District fixed effects control for plausible time invariant
omitted variables at the district level. I include age fixed effects to control for
differences in grade progression between children of different age groups. Here,
I compare the outcomes of children of the same age residing in sampling units
with different annual average sunset times within a district. β is the average
effect of an hour delay in annual average sunset time, i.e., β is the lifetime effect
of an hour delay in sunset time.
The identification assumption underlying this research design is that there
exist no omitted variables within a district that co-vary with both annual aver-
age sunset times and children’s educational outcomes.39 Lastly, I cluster stan-
dard errors at the geocoded sampling unit level as variation in annual average
sunset time is at the sampling unit and not at the household level (1).
3.6.2 Results
I find that an hour (approximately two standard deviation) delay in annual av-
erage sunset time reduces schooling by about 0.8 years (Table 3.4). A two hour
difference in annual average sunset spans the entire width of the country, so
another interpretation of the effect size is that a one standard deviation or 25
39Residential sorting on sunset time could bias my estimates if such sorting was correlated
with annual average sunset and characteristics that affect children’s education outcomes. This
is relatively unlikely as internal migration is very low in India, both in absolute terms as well
as relative to other countries of comparable size and level or economic development (280). In
addition, I fail to find evidence for out-migration (in-migration) in locations that observe later
(earlier) sunsets (Appendix B.3).
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minute delay in annual average sunset time reduces schooling by 0.4 years.
This result translates into lower educational attainment at primary and middle
school level. That is, a one standard deviation delay in annual average sunset
time decreases primary school completion by 5 percentage points, and middle
school completion by 4 percentage points. Lastly, an hour delay in annual aver-
age sunset time decreases enrollment rates by roughly 11%.40 These effect sizes
are comparable to impacts of larger policy interventions designed to increase
schooling in developing countries. For example, in Mexico, childhood expo-
sure to conditional cash transfers through PROGRESA increases schooling by
1.5 years (308). A meta-analysis of 94 studies from 47 conditional cash transfer
programs in low- and middle-income countries worldwide finds that the aver-
age conditional cash transfer program increases school enrollment by roughly
7% (163).
These estimates are identified by exploiting small variation (up to 10 min-
utes) in annual average sunset time across the east-west gradient within a dis-
trict.41 The underlying assumption when extrapolating the identifying varia-
40These point estimates are robust to the inclusion of other observables like elevation, lati-
tude and socioeconomic indicators (Table B.46). The attainment results are also robust to re-
stricting estimation for each tier of education – primary and middle – to the corresponding
age-appropriate sample (Table B.47). In Table B.48 I show my results are robust to the use of an
alternative indicator for educational attainment: if a child is in primary (secondary) school or
has completed primary (secondary) school. I find that an hour delay in annual average sunset
reduces the likelihood that school-age children are in primary (secondary) school or have com-
pleted primary (secondary) school by roughly 11% (25%). In Table B.49 I show my results are
robust to dropping the widest districts in the sample. In Table B.50 I show my results are ro-
bust to restricting the sample to include only the widest Indian districts. In Table B.51, I cluster
standard errors at the district level to allow errors to be spatially correlated across PSUs within
a district. Although the standard errors increase, the point estimates, for the most part, remain
precisely estimated. In Tables B.52 and B.53, I show the negative association is present under
a less demanding, state fixed effects specification, where I exploit cross-sectional variation in
annual average sunset time within a state. Lastly, if younger children (with less completed
schooling) are sampled in locations with later annual average sunset, my estimates for years of
schooling and educational attainment may be biased. However, I fail to find evidence for such
a hypothesis (Table B.54).
41Figure B.22 plots the relationship between residualized annual average sunset time and
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tion to calculate the effect of an hour delay in sunset time is that the relation-
ship between annual average sunset time and academic outcomes is linear. I
find support for such an assumption. First, as mentioned earlier, I find that
the effect of sunset time on sleep is roughly linear. Second, results from the
longest laboratory-controlled study on the relationship between sleep and cog-
nitive performance indicate that cognition declines linearly with sleep depri-
vation (411). Third, in Section 3.6.3, I exploit a sharp, one-hour discontinuity
in average annual sunset time across locations on either side of the time zone
boundary on Kalimantan, Indonesia. I find that the regression discontinuity
estimate of the effect of an hour delay in annual average sunset on years of
schooling is similar to the India estimate obtained by scaling smaller variation
in annual average sunset time.
These are large effects. Therefore, it is important to add context to help inter-
pret these magnitudes. First, it is important to note that these estimates capture
the ‘lifetime’ impacts of later annual average sunset on educational outcomes
or the long-term effects of chronic sunset-induced sleep deficits on learning and
cognition. Furthermore, my results imply sleep is productivity-enhancing: an
hour delay in sunset also reduces time allocated to homework or studying by
40 minutes. (372) estimate an elasticity of academic performance with respect
to study time of approximately 0.4.
Second, a series of laboratory experiments that assess the causal effects of
residualized academic outcomes; I show the relationship is roughly linear. Figure B.23 shows
the distribution of the difference in annual average sunset time between the easternmost and
westernmost locations within a district. We sleep in 90-minute cycles that contain both NREM
and REM (rapid eye movement) sleep. First half of the night is dominated by NREM sleep: light
NREM (stage 2) sleep is important for memory refreshment while deep NREM (stages 3 and 4)
sleep is important for memory consolidation. The second half of the night is dominated by REM
(stage 5) sleep, which is important for problem-solving and creativity. Within each cycle, each
stage lasts anywhere between 5-15 minutes. Sleep research has shown that just 3 minutes of
stage 2 or light NREM sleep improves task performance (194).
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short-term sleep loss on cognition find very large effects. The typical elasticity
of task performance with respect to sleep duration is approximately four (see
(173), for a brief review of short-term causal studies). In Section 3.5, I find that
an hour delay in sunset time reduces children’s sleep by roughly 30 minutes. If
one were to extrapolate, my results suggest that 30 minutes decrease in sleep
(one hour delay in annual average sunset time) everyday decreases years of
schooling by approximately 0.8 years. Expressed as an elasticity, this estimate is
3.5.
Third, these estimates capture all location-level general equilibrium effects;
every child and parent in a location experiences the same, permanent annual
average sunset time. Thus, the estimated β includes any spillovers and peer
effects from decreasing the mean sleep in a location. (85) estimate an elasticity
of academic achievement with respect to peer quality of roughly 0.9. In Sec-
tion 3.7, I show that later annual average sunset reduces adults sleep as well
as earnings. (187) estimates income elasticity of academic achievement of 0.04.
(109) estimate an elasticity of family income with respect to child achievement
of approximately 2.42
Fourth, similarly large effects are observed in two studies that evaluate the
consequences of the relationship between sunset time and sleep on adult wages
and health outcomes in the US. (173) find a one-hour delay in daily sunset re-
duces sleep by roughly 20 minutes per week and decreases weekly (short-run)
earnings by a statistically significant 0.44%. They also show a one-hour delay in
annual average sunset reduces weekly sleep by roughly one hour and decreases
42Because I estimate the effect of a quasi-random change in mean sleep in a location, I am
unable to identify whose sleep is most important for children’s education outcomes: child’s
own sleep, peers’ sleep, or parents’ sleep. Prior evidence, discussed above, suggests child’s
own sleep may have the largest effects on learning outcomes. Moreover, in Section 3.6.3 I show
evidence for the short-run importance for child’s sleep for learning outcomes.
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long-run earnings by 4%. Expressed as an elasticity with respect to sleep dura-
tion, their long-run earnings estimate is 2.6. (175) find an hour delay in annual
average sunset decreases sleep by roughly 20 minutes per day and increases the
likelihood that individuals are obese by 21%.
In Appendix B.3, I use the 2006 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey
(REDS), a nationally representative rural sample of Indian households, to con-
trol for a rich set of observables (e.g., migration, electricity access, access to
roads) in estimating the relationship between annual average sunset and chil-
dren’s education outcomes. I also show household and village level observ-
ables do not co-vary with annual average sunset across villages within a dis-
trict. Moreover, as a complement to the effects on educational outcomes and a
robustness check on the underlying conceptual framework, I document a sta-
tistically significant negative relationship between annual average sunset time
and children’s daily wage rate.43
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
Indonesia: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Next, I use the 2003 Indonesian DHS I exploit time zone boundaries in Kaliman-
tan to generate plausibly exogenous variation in annual average sunset time
and examine the effects on schooling outcomes for children between 6 and 16
years of age. Kalimantan is the Indonesian portion of the island of Borneo with
two time zones: UTC+7 and UTC+8 (Figure B.24). In PSUs lying on the eastern
(right) side of the time zone boundary, sunset time occurs an hour later than in
43Appendix B.1 describes the REDS data.
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nearby PSUs on the western (left) side of the time zone boundary. Thus, school-
age children on the later sunset side of the border are more likely to be sleep
deprived and have worse educational outcomes.
The first stage is presented in Figure B.25. By construction, I observe a clear
discontinuity in annual average sunset time at the border. To estimate the effects
on schooling I include age fixed effects to control for differences in grade pro-
gression between children of different age groups. My identification strategy
rests on the assumption that there are no discontinuities in observable or unob-
servable variables potentially correlated with outcomes of children of the same
age. Indeed, I find that school-age children living in PSUs on the later sunset
side are less likely to be enrolled in school, have fewer years of schooling, and
relatedly, are less likely to complete primary and middle school. Figure B.26
presents these discontinuities graphically, while Table B.55 presents the formal
results. Specifically, school-age children living close to the time zone boundary
but on the later sunset side have years of education by 0.72 years fewer years
of schooling. This point estimate is remarkably similar to the effects of annual
average sunset time on years of schooling for school-age children in India.
I test for the optimal polynomial order by comparing the local linear regres-
sion approach with higher polynomial orders, up to the fourth order. Figures
B.27 - B.29 show that the point estimates are relatively stable. Next, I evalu-
ate my identification assumption by controlling for a rich set of PSU level geo-
graphic and household level socioeconomic indicators. If wealthier households
were sorting across the time zone border one would expect these controls to
correct the bias emanating from such omitted variables. I control for latitude
and elevation as well as wealth, access to electricity and indicator variables for
93
ownership of various assets like television or car. I do not find evidence for any
residential sorting as my point estimates remain unaffected (Table B.56). Finally,
focusing on outcomes that should not be affected by later sunset I provide a set
of placebo tests. Specifically, I find no evidence of discontinuity in children’s
age, children’s gender or household head’s age (Table B.57).
The time zone boundary perfectly overlaps with provincial administrative
boundaries on Kalimantan, Indonesia. That is, the regression discontinuity de-
sign examines differences in children’s education outcomes for PSUs closest
to the administrative border between West and Central Kalimantan (UTC+7)
and South and East Kalimantan (UTC+8). If administrative boundaries are
drawn to ensure that economically developed locations fall on a certain side
of the time zone boundary then my point estimates may be biased. However,
all four provinces followed the Central Indonesian Time or UTC+8 until 1987.
West and Central Kalimantan only switched to UTC+7 in 1988.44 Importantly,
to my knowledge, administrative boundaries were not altered during or after
this switch. In addition, this means that I can use older cohorts or individu-
als who completed their education before 1988 (>40 year-olds), under UTC+8,
as a placebo sample. As one might expect, I fail to find evidence for a statisti-
cally significant discontinuity in years of schooling at the time zone border for
individuals over 40 years of age (Figure B.30 and Table B.58).
44West Kalimantan followed UTC+7.5 between 1945 and 1963, with the exception of a brief
period between 1948 and 1950 when the province followed UTC+8. West Kalimantan switched
to UTC+8 in 1964.
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Test Scores
Here, I use an individual level longitudinal panel from Andhra Pradesh, India,
the 2002-2013 Young Lives Survey (YLS), and show that later sunset is nega-
tively associated with children’s test scores.45
The impacts of later sunset on academic progression are mediated through
the effect of sunset-induced sleep deficits on learning and cognition. Thus, chil-
dren exposed to later sunsets may also have lower test scores. To provide evi-
dence for this hypothesis, I use comprehensive (low-stakes) tests administered
in YLS, and examine the effect of later sunset on math scores for school-age chil-
dren. The study followed two cohorts of children, born in 1994/95 and 2001/02,
respectively, over a period of more than 10 years. Children between the ages
5 and 19 were administered comprehensive tests in math at regular intervals
between 2002-2014. Unlike DHS, YLS is conducted in a single state in India,
Andhra Pradesh, and only provides district-level identifiers. Given these fea-
tures of the YLS data, I exploit both cross-sectional variation in annual average
sunset time at the district level as well as seasonal variation in daily sunset time
at the district-test-date level to estimate the effects of long- and short-term sleep
deprivation on math test scores, respectively.
First, I estimate the impact of long-term or chronic sunset-induced sleep
deficits on test scores. I compare test scores of children of the same age re-
siding in districts with different annual average sunset times within the state
of Andhra Pradesh. I show that children residing in districts with later annual
average sunset times have lower test scores. A one hour delay in annual av-
erage sunset time (approximately two standard deviation) is associated with
45I briefly describe the YLS data in Appendix B.1.
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a 0.8 standard deviation decrease in math scores (Table B.59). Controlling for
latitude and weather does not affect the point estimate. If district-specific unob-
servables, that are correlated with children’s test scores, co-vary with annual av-
erage sunset time across eastern and western districts within Andhra Pradesh,
then these estimates may be biased.46 Because YLS does not provide village/city
block identifiers, I am unable to exploit within-district cross-sectional variation
in annual average sunset time.47
Next, I examine the impacts of short-term sleep deprivation on math scores.
Because the same child is tested at different dates every survey round, I exploit
seasonal variation in sunset time at the district-test-date level after absorbing
fixed child-specific confounders via lagged test scores or child fixed effects. I
control for seasonal confounders common across all children in the sample via
week-of-year fixed effects. I find an hour delay in sunset time on the day of
the test reduces children’s test scores by 0.5 standard deviation (Table B.60).48
I control for potential omitted variables using lagged test scores as a proxy for
child-specific unobservables (e.g., ability) that plausibly co-vary with daily sun-
set time and educational output. It is reassuring that controlling for lagged test
scores explains meaningful variation in subsequent test scores, but does not af-
fect the sunset-test score relationship. Moreover, although the point estimate is
noisily estimated, I show that the short-run impact of sunset time on test scores
is robust to the inclusion of child fixed effects.49 The short-run impacts of later
46Figure B.31 presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between residualized annual
average sunset time and residualized math test scores; I show the relationship is roughly linear.
47The comparison of India DHS estimates under state vs. district fixed effects specification
suggest that these estimates may be biased downwards. Moreover, districts in western Andra
Pradesh are close to two leading economic centres of India: Bangalore and Hyderabad.
48This estimate should not be interpreted as the single day effect of later sunset on test scores;
sunset time on the day of the test is strongly correlated with sunset time observed days or weeks
prior to the test date.
49Figure B.32 presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between residualized daily sun-
set time and residualized math test scores; I show the relationship is roughly linear. As a falsifi-
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sunset are comparable to the short-run effects of later school start times on test
scores. For example, (86) find that a start time of 7 am reduces test scores for
a course taught in the first period class by 0.15 standard deviation while a 7.50
am start time has no effect on test scores. Furthermore, with a 7 am start time
students performed significantly worse (-0.10 standard deviation) even in sub-
sequent classes, suggesting poor performance throughout the day.
3.7 Effects of Later Sunset on Adults’ Time Use and
Wages
Many studies have shown that both parental money and time investments are
important for children’s human capital production (104; 105; 158). As an ad-
ditional channel, later sunset may affect children’s education production by
decreasing adults’ wages, and consequently parental investment in children’s
human capital (215; 220; 254; 403).
Later sunset may reduce adults’ sleep duration, and depending on how
adults trade-off sleep with work, home production and leisure, later sunset may
affect monetary and time investments in children’s education. If labor markets
are competitive, workers are paid their marginal revenue product, and sleep
is more work-productivity enhancing than home-productivity enhancing, later
sunset may reduce sleep and wages, disincentivizing work effort but increasing
time allocated to home production. In such a scenario, later sunset may reduce
cation test, in Table B.61 I show sunset time on the previous survey round test date and sunset
time on the next survey round test date do not affect children’s math scores in the current survey
round.
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household expenditure on children’s education but increase parental time in-
vestment in children. On the other hand, if sleep is more home-productivity
enhancing than work-productivity enhancing, later sunset will reduce time al-
located to home production but increase time allocated to labor activities.
To test these hypotheses, I estimate the baseline ITUS specification (Equation
8) and examine the effects of later sunset on adults’ time allocation. I find that an
hour delay in sunset time reduces adults’ sleep and work effort by 30 minutes,
but increases time allocated to home production and leisure (Table 3.5). How-
ever, I fail to find evidence for an effect on parental time investments in children.
The magnitude is smaller than 5 minutes and statistically insignificant.5051
Next, I estimate the baseline DHS specification (Equation 10) using data from
the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), and evaluate the effect
of later annual average sunset on adults’ daily wage rate. That is, I compare the
prevailing wage rate among adult daily wage laborers who reside in villages
with different annual average sunset time within a district. In line with the
effects on time use, an hour delay in annual average sunset reduces adult wage
rate by INR 8. Although the point estimate both males and females is negative,
the effect on male wage rate noisier (Table 3.6).52 Overall, an hour delay in
50I do not find evidence for a significant relationship between later sunset and time spent with
children even when restricting the sample to households with school-age children, households
with younger children, or households with multiple children (Table B.72).
51In Tables B.73-B.75, I control flexibly for district-specific seasonal unobservables that may
be correlated with both adults’ time use and sunset time by including a suite of interacted fixed
effects: state-by-season, latitude-by-week-of-year and district-by-season. I find the point esti-
mates for the effect of later sunset on sleep and leisure are relatively unaffected by the inclusion
of these fixed effects. However, the coefficient on time allocated to work is now roughly zero.
This may reflect the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities in village labor markets in
the face of transitory negative shocks (228).
52Rural markets for hired labor in India are active with most households buying and/or sell-
ing labor (36; 329). Labor is typically traded in decentralized markets for casual daily workers.
In fact, 98% of agricultural wage employment is through casual wage contracts (228). Within
a village, there is typically a sex-age-specific wage for casual daily labor for any given task
(58; 138; 328). Minimum wage policies are in practice ignored and there is little government in-
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sunset is associated with a decrease of roughly INR 2,500 (INR 8 x 312 working
days) or USD 40 in annual earnings of a rural daily wage worker.5354
3.8 Can Poverty Help Explain Why Households Fail
to Adjust?
If sleep is productivity-enhancing, why don’t families adjust their sleep sched-
ules when the sun sets later? Investigating the determinants of such an adjust-
ment failure, and not just the reduced form impacts, is necessary for effective
policy design. In this section, I investigate if poverty helps explain why house-
holds fail to adjust to later sunset.
Poverty may impede adjustment in two ways. First, the sleep environment
in developing countries is associated with noise, heat, mosquitoes, overcrowd-
ing, and overall uncomfortable physical conditions (180; 310), and unlike the
non-poor, the poor may simply lack the financial resources to invest in sleep-
inducing goods (e.g., window shades, separate rooms, indoor beds, food) and
adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later. Second, poverty may cause
stress and negative affective states, such as depression, impede cognitive func-
tervention in the private wage labor market (329; 330). Therefore, these point estimates capture
the effect of a fixed (time-invariant) feature – annual average sunset time – associated with a
village on the prevailing gender-specific wage rate.
53Because I fail to find evidence for a significant relationship between sunset time and adults’
work hours under more demanding econometric specifications, any decrease in wages likely
results from wage changes due to the productivity impacts of sleep, rather than changes in
hours worked.
54By increasing dropouts, later sunset may increase the supply of child labor at the village
level, in turn reducing adults’ wage rate. Because the estimates are at the village level I cannot
rule out such a general equilibrium effect. In addition, these wage effects might also be mediated
by the childhood impacts of later sunset on education production.
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tion by consuming mental resources or through reduced food intake, all of
which affect decision-making (65; 112; 191; 259; 342; 347; 354; 367).55 There-
fore, psychological considerations associated with poverty may make it harder
to assess one’s own sleep-productivity relationship and optimize sleep sched-
ules when the sun sets later. On the other hand, the non-poor, by the virtue of
owning these physical and psychological goods, may be better able to adjust
their sleep schedules when the sun sets later.
To explore this hypothesis, I use ITUS and examine the heterogeneous im-
pacts on sleep by correlates of poverty or socioeconomic status: type of house
structure (temporary vs. permanent), rural vs. urban status, education, and av-
erage monthly household expenditure.56 I find households that reside in a tem-
porary structure get less sleep on later sunset days compared to households that
reside in a permanent structure (Table 3.7). The interaction term is statistically
significant and exacerbates the level effect by 25% (7 minutes). The negative ef-
fect of later sunset on sleep is significantly (8 minutes) larger for less-educated
individuals. The impact of an hour delay in later sunset is almost 11 minutes
larger for rural households compared to urban households. Lastly, the negative
effect of later sunset on sleep is significantly larger for households with aver-
age monthly expenditure less than that of the 75th percentile household com-
pared to households above the 75th percentile household; sunset-induced sleep
deficits are largest for households with average monthly expenditure below the
55Several medical studies have linked poverty with elevated levels of the stress hormone
cortisol and poor cognitive function in children (94; 132; 151; 252; 253; 266; 290; 340).
56Average monthly expenditure for households that reside in permanent structure is INR
3,500 compared to roughly INR 2,000 for households that reside in a temporary structure. Simi-
larly, average monthly expenditure among rural households is INR 2,200 compared to INR 3,600
among urban households. While average monthly household expenditure for individuals who
have at least primary education is INR 3,100 compared to INR 2,100 for individuals who are
illiterate or have not completed primary school.
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25th percentile.57 Overall, these results suggest that socioeconomic status (SES)
plays an important role in explaining sunset-induced sleep deficits.
However, it is plausible that these interaction effects are confounded by
omitted variables that are correlated with socioeconomic status, particularly
for adults. For instance, if low-SES individuals are disproportionately em-
ployed in occupations with formal work start times, it is possible that the in-
teraction effect reflects morning work constraints rather than poverty;58 unlike
self-employed high-SES individuals (e.g., agricultural cultivators), low-SES in-
dividuals or daily wage workers (e.g., agricultural laborers) may fail to com-
pensate for later bedtimes – due to later sunset – by waking up later. There-
fore, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in income around the harvest period
to present a plausibly causal relationship between poverty and sunset-induced
sleep deficits.
3.8.1 Empirical Model
My research design compares the effects of later sunset on sleep allocation be-
fore harvest, when crop cultivator households are poorer, with after harvest,
when richer. Crop cultivator households in India receive much of their annual
income at harvest time or shortly after and are unable to smooth consumption
over states of nature and across time (114; 124; 316; 331; 334; 407). (259) show
57These heterogeneous impacts are of similar magnitudes among both children and adults
(Table B.77).
58In Table B.78 I examine the heterogeneous impacts on children’s time use by electrification
status, as proxied by district-level annual average nighttime lights. I find the negative effect of
later sunset on sleep and study time are significantly larger for children in districts with poor
electricity access. This may be consistent with an explanation where high-SES households have
better electricity access, facilitating adjusted sleep when the sun sets later. Because sleep is
productivity-enhancing, it also increases study effort.
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farmers in India show diminished cognitive performance and higher stress lev-
els before harvest as compared with after harvest. They also show pre-harvest
poverty reduces cognitive capacity as poverty-related concerns consume men-
tal resources. Thus, financial and psychological considerations associated with
pre-harvest poverty may induce unadjusted, sub-optimal sleep when the sun
sets later.
For the main analysis, I restrict the ITUS sample to individuals from house-
holds whose primary source of income is agricultural cultivation, comparing
the effect of later sunset on sleep between the pre- and post-harvest period. In-
dia has two agricultural seasons, and the agricultural calendar for each state
varies by crop. Therefore, for both agricultural seasons in each of the six states
in ITUS, I define pre- and post-harvest month according to the agricultural cal-
endar for the main crop grown in each state during a particular agricultural
season.59 Because harvest calendars vary across locations and seasons, I also
include calendar and location fixed effects, controlling for all fixed differences
between time periods and districts.60
59India’s first agricultural season is the kharif season, and broadly the growing season lasts
from June through October and harvest from October through November. While the second
agricultural season in India is called rabi, and broadly the growing season lasts from October
through March and harvest from April through May. In Appendix B.5, I describe the pre- and
post-harvest months for both agricultural seasons for all 6 states in ITUS.
60Figure B.33 presents the relationship between the pre-post harvest periods and sleep among
crop cultivator households in the raw data. As expected, crop cultivator households allocate
less time to sleep in the pre-harvest period compared to post-harvest period. It also presents the
relationship between the pre-post harvest periods and time allocated to crop sale (and purchase)
related activities in the raw data. Unfortunately, ITUS does not provide time use separately by
crop sale and purchase related activities. I find no crop sale (and purchase) related activity in
the first two weeks of the pre-harvest period. And as one might expect, crop sale (and purchase)
related activity increases towards the end of the pre-harvest period. Importantly, most of sale
(and purchase) related activity takes place in the post-harvest period.
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I estimate the following econometric model:
yidwt =β1S unsetdwt + β2PreHarvestdw
+ β3S unsetdwt ∗ PreHarvestdw + µw + µd + idwt (3.11)
where yidwt is time allocated to sleep by individual i, in district d, on date t, dur-
ing week-of-year w. S unsetdwt is sunset time observed by that individual i, in
district d on date t. PreHarvestdw is the state-specific indicator equal to 1 if week
w is the pre-harvest period for district d, 0 otherwise. I also control for district
(µd) and week-of-year (µw) fixed effects. My coefficient of interest is the interac-
tion between the indicator variable for pre-harvest month and daily sunset time
(β3). It captures the effect of pre-harvest poverty on sleep by comparing the dif-
ference in sleep duration between late sunset days and early sunset days during
the pre-harvest period with the difference in sleep duration between late sunset
days and early sunset days during the post-harvest period.
The identification assumption underlying this econometric strategy is that
there is no time-varying district-specific confounder that differentially affects
sleep on only later sunset days during the pre-harvest month. I evaluate the
validity of this assumption through various falsification and robustness checks.
Lastly, because pre- and post-harvest months only include four months of
data corresponding to two agricultural seasons, the week-of-year specification
may absorb significant identifying variation in daily sunset times. Therefore,
I also estimate econometric models that instead include season or month fixed
effects. As before, standard errors are clustered at the district-week level.
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3.8.2 Results
Table 3.8 shows that the negative effect of later sunset on sleep is significantly
larger before harvest (interaction effect). In fact, almost the entire effect of
later sunset on adults’ sleep seems to be associated with pre-harvest poverty.
That is, an hour delay in sunset time during the pre-harvest period decreases
adults sleep by roughly 25 minutes, but the effect of later sunset during the
post-harvest period (the level effect) is closer to zero. As adult crop cultivators
are self-employed, and not constrained by start times for work, sunset-induced
sleep deficits for adult crop cultivators are largely driven by considerations re-
lated to poverty. However, as one might expect, both the level and interac-
tion effects are economically meaningful for school-age children, who unlike
adult cultivators face other constraints – e.g., school start times – in addition
to poverty.6162 Importantly, although the point estimates are not always pre-
cisely estimated, the magnitude of the interaction term (and the level effects for
children) is statistically indistinguishable across specifications. Overall, for in-
dividuals with formal morning start time constraints – school-age children from
crop cultivator households – pre-harvest poverty explains about a quarter of the
effect of later sunset on sleep. But for individuals that don’t have formal work
start time constraints – adults from crop cultivator households – the entire ef-
fect of later sunset on sleep is driven by the period when the household is poor
61In Table B.79 I provide evidence that although adult cultivators delay bedtimes on later
sunset days during the post-harvest period, they are able to compensate by waking up later.
On the other hand, during the pre-harvest period, adult cultivators go to bed even later on late
sunset days; moreover, they are less able to compensate by waking up later. While children
from crop cultivator households fail to adjust to later bedtimes by waking up later on later
sunset days, both before and after harvest. But during the pre-harvest period children are less
able to compensate by waking-up later on late sunset days, exacerbating effects of later sunset
before harvest.
62As one might expect, the lack of level effects for adult crop cultivators are driven by farmers
with no children. I find that the level effect is negative for farmers with school-age children
(Table B.80).
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(pre-harvest).
3.8.3 Robustness Checks
There is more agricultural work to be done in the pre-harvest period. If crop
cultivator households work longer hours when the sun sets later during the
pre-harvest month, because they have more daylight, and this increase in work
effort is correlated with sleep, then the interaction effect (β3) may be explained
by more daylight or an increase in work hours instead of ‘pre-harvest poverty’.
Therefore, I control for possible changes in hours worked by crop-cultivator
cultivators on later sunset days (Table B.81). The interaction effect remains un-
affected, suggesting that any changes in work hours do not explain the decrease
in sleep during the pre-harvest period compared to the post-harvest period.63
Next, because non-cultivator households do not depend on lumpy harvest
income and have other, stable sources of income, I use non-cultivator house-
holds as a falsification test. I fail to find evidence for pre-harvest period effects
for individuals from non-cultivator households (Table B.83). The interaction ef-
fects are not statistically significant or economically meaningful. However, as
expected, the level effects of later sunset on sleep for adults from non-cultivator
households, either employed in urban locations or working as daily wage la-
borers in rural locations, are economically and statistically significant.64 In ad-
dition, as before, the level effects of later sunset on sleep for school-age children
are economically significant and statistically indistinguishable across specifica-
63Furthermore, in Table B.82 I show controlling for daylight duration does not have a signifi-
cant effect on the magnitude of the interaction term.
64In Table B.84 I show that adults from non-cultivator households are unable to compensate
for later bedtimes due to later sunset by waking up later both before and after harvest.
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tions.
I implement another falsification test using non-cultivator households
whose primary source of income is agricultural labor. Daily wage agricul-
tural laborers perform the same tasks as crop cultivators during the pre-harvest
month – e.g., land clearing, weeding, threshing and harvesting etc. – but unlike
crop cultivators, who depend on lumpy harvest income, agricultural laborers
are paid daily wages for these services throughout the agricultural season.65
Thus, agricultural laborers are not poorer before harvest compared to after har-
vest. In fact, agricultural laborers might be poorer after harvest because there
may be less agricultural work available during the post-harvest month: in the
post-harvest period they increase work hours in non-agricultural sectors (Table
B.85), however, total work hours for an individual from the average agricultural
laborer household declines slightly. Overall, agricultural laborers are signifi-
cantly poorer in terms of absolute wealth than cultivator households.66 Even
so, Table B.86 fails to find evidence that effect of later sunset is larger before
harvest compared with after harvest for agricultural laborers. The interaction
term is positive but not statistically significant. The existence of a significant
pre-harvest effect among richer cultivator households and an insignificant pre-
harvest effect among poorer agricultural laborer households is consistent with
the explanation that the interaction term arises from financial and psychological
considerations related to liquidity constraints, precisely as one would expect.
Interestingly, the level effects for agricultural laborers are economically and
65Agricultural wage contracts in Indian rural labor markets are typically bilaterally arranged
between employers and workers and are of short duration, usually one day (138; 228).
66The average monthly household expenditure among agricultural laborers is roughly INR
1,605, compared to INR 2,240 among other non-cultivators. Similarly, while agricultural labor-
ers have negligible landholdings, the average landholdings among cultivator households is 3.5
acres.
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statistically large. This may either be because of other constraints on sleep in the
form of work start times or material and mental constraints related to poverty.
To explore this further, I compare level effects between agricultural laborers and
other non-cultivator households. Both sets of individuals likely face some man-
ner of structured work schedule, but agricultural laborers are much poorer than
other non-cultivators on average.67 I find that the level effects among agricul-
tural laborers are economically larger compared to other non-cultivators, per-
haps again suggesting that considerations associated with poverty are at least
partially responsible for sub-optimal sleep on later sunset days among poorer
households like agricultural laborers.
Lastly, using the sample of crop cultivator households, I estimate a triple-
difference research design by adding interactions between an indicator variable
for wealth, Richeridwt, and S unsetdwt, PreHarvestdw and S unsetdwt ∗ PreHarvestdw to
Equation 11. Richeridwt is equal to 1 if individual i belongs to a household with
average monthly household expenditure greater than that of the median house-
hold in the sample, 0 otherwise. The identification assumption for the triple-
interaction term is that there is no time-varying district-specific confounder that
differentially affects sleep of only richer crop cultivator households on late sun-
set days during the pre-harvest month. As before, individuals lose significantly
more sleep before harvest, when poorer, that after harvest, when richer (Table
B.87). However, as one would expect, these interaction effects are economically
smaller for individuals from richer households. Together these results suggest
a causal effect of poverty on sleep.
67The average monthly household expenditure among other non-cultivators is roughly INR
3,170, almost 100% greater than agricultural laborers.
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3.9 India-Wide Human Capital Costs
Emerging out of the British Empire in the mid-20th century, India reckoned a
single time zone would serve as a unifying force, and adopted the Indian Stan-
dard Time or IST (UTC+5.5) across her territorial boundaries. However, India
measures 3,000 km from east to west, spanning roughly 30◦ longitude, corre-
sponding with a two-hour difference in mean solar time.68 That corresponds
roughly to New York and Utah sharing one time zone, but with a billion more
people, of whom 200 million live below the USD 1.90-a-day poverty line (402).
In such a context, individuals in western India may begin sleep later than those
in eastern India due to the relationship between the timing of sunset and bed-
time, but fail to compensate by waking up later as India uniformly follows a
standard time zone, resulting in potentially large implications for human capi-
tal production across the east-west gradient, ceteris paribus.
To generate India-wide, back-of-the-envelope human capital costs, I use the
point estimate of the effect of a one-hour difference in annual average sunset
time on adults’ wages as it plausibly includes both the life-cycle impacts on
human capital production as well as the contemporaneous effects on worker
productivity. Importantly, for each district I compute estimates relative to the
central meridian. The meridian passing through at 82.5◦ E is the central merid-
ian for India. Thus, clocks across the country are set to the solar noon of the
central meridian, but clock noon corresponds to solar noon only at 82.5◦ E. But,
residents west of 82.5◦ E are ahead of the solar clock (late sleepers), while res-
idents east of the central meridian are behind the solar clock (early sleepers)
(Figure B.37(a)).69 Therefore, I compute the following equation for each district
68Figure B.35 shows the spatial variation in annual average sunset times across India.
69Thus, the point estimate of a one-hour difference in annual average sunset time can also be
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i:
HumanCapitalCostsi = −8 ∗ 312 ∗ Populationi ∗ (MeanS olarT imei − IS T ) (3.12)
where INR −8 is the point estimate for adults’ wages and 312 are the number of
working days in a year as per the ITUS data. While Populationi is the population
of adults at the district level and MeanS olarT imei− IS T is difference between the
district-specific annual average sunset time and the annual average sunset time
at 82.5◦ E.
The countrywide estimate is calculated as follows:
HumanCapitalCostsIndia =
N∑
i=1
HumanCapitalCostsi (3.13)
where N is the total number of districts in the country.
I find that India incurs annual human capital costs of roughly 4.1 billion USD
or 0.2% of India’s nominal GDP due to the existing policy regulating time zone
boundaries in the country.70 This is a significant number as India’s education
expenditure is less than 3% of the GDP (145). Moreover, note that this net esti-
mate masks substantial spatial heterogeneity. I find that while highly-populated
western districts incur large human capital costs, while their counterparts in the
east accrue substantial gains (Figure B.37(b)).
These estimates are calculated against an unrealistic counterfactual of con-
tinuous time zones across India. Therefore, I also calculate human capital costs
associated with the existing time zone policy against the counterfactual of a two
time zone policy: UTC+5 for western India and UTC+6 for eastern India, where
interpreted as the effect of a one-hour difference between mean solar time and clock time.
70Using the 95% confidence interval for the point estimate on adults’ wages, the lower and
upper bounds for these human capital costs are roughly 2 million USD and 6 billion USD, re-
spectively.
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western (eastern) India includes districts to the left (right) of 82.5◦ E, and the
meridian passing through 75◦ E (90◦ E) defined as its central meridian. In fact,
this counterfactual is precisely what was intended by the worldwide standard
time zone scheme at conception (51). Figure B.37 calculates human capital costs
associated with this hypothetical time zone policy against the counterfactual of
continuous time zones. While Figure B.38 presents estimates for human capital
costs associated with the existing time zone policy – UTC+5.5 – compared to
this hypothetical counterfactual – UTC+5/UTC+6. Interestingly, the net human
capital costs of this hypothetical policy compared to the counterfactual of con-
tinuous time zones are positive, albeit small (+100 million USD). Therefore, the
net human capital gains associated with a switch to the realistic two time zones
policy – UTC+5/UTC+6 – are comparable to the gains from a switch to the un-
realistic continuous time zones policy. That is, India would incur annual human
capital gains of over 4.2 billion USD if she switches from the existing time zone
policy to the proposed two time zone policy.
The assumption underlying these calculations is that daily schedules fail to
adjust to differences between solar time and clock time. This is a strong as-
sumption. I evaluate it in four ways. First, a review of the existing literature
suggests that work schedules are unaffected by solar cues instead responding
to uniform policy choices at the federal or state level (173; 175; 185). Second,
as shown above, in India, individuals fail to compensate for sunset-induced de-
lays in bed time by waking up later. Third, I find that school schedules fail to
adjust to sunset times across the east-west gradient (Table B.88). Fourth, reports
in the popular press indicate that work hours for government offices across the
country do not respond to solar cues.71
71The Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, a state in the northeast, is quoted as saying, “Sev-
eral daylight hours are wasted as government offices open only at 10 am.” Meanwhile, the Chief Min-
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There may be benefits associated with the synchronization of daily schedules
across the country,72 and one must be cautious about proposing changes to the
existing time zone policy without a thorough cost-benefit analysis. In Appendix
B.7, I also explore two other policy interventions that may mitigate the effects
of later sunset on children’s education outcomes: (i) later school start times and
(ii) social protection programs. I find suggestive evidence that later school start
times allow children to compensate for later bedtimes by waking up later, and
attenuate the effect of later sunset on schooling outcomes. Meanwhile, each
additional year of exposure to a conditional cash transfer program mitigates the
effect of later sunset on children’s test scores.
3.10 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide evidence that arbitrary clock conventions – by generat-
ing large discrepancies in when the sun sets across locations – help determine
the geographic distribution of educational attainment levels. I establish four
results. First, later sunset reduces children’s sleep: when the sun sets later, chil-
dren go to bed later; by contrast, wake-up times are not regulated by solar cues.
Sleep-deprived students decrease study effort, consistent with a model where
sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of effort.
ister of another northeastern state, Assam, proposed advancing working hours in the state, “The
sun rises here earlier than rest of the country and we can start our work half an hour earlier, from 9.30am.”
(e.g., (285; 385; 387; 392))
72For instance, employing bilateral data on FDI stock from the OECD direct investment statis-
tics, (370) show time zone difference reduces bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock.
Using data on bilateral trade among individual states of the US and individual provinces of
Canada, where cultural, economic, institutional, and geographical determinants of trade are
much more homogeneous than in cross-country studies, (148) find time zone differences reduce
bilateral trade. However, in both studies the effects are non-linear; time zone differences of less
than 4 and 1.5 hours do not matter for bilateral FDI and trade, respectively.
111
Second, sunset-induced sleep deficits have significant negative effects on aca-
demic outcomes; school-age children exposed to later sunsets attain fewer years
of education, are less likely to complete primary and middle school, are less
likely to be enrolled in school, and have lower test scores. Third, later sunsets
are also associated with fewer hours of sleep and lower wages among adults.
Fourth, the non-poor adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later; the
negative effects of later sunset on sleep are most pronounced among the poor,
especially in periods when households face severe financial constraints.
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3.11 Tables and Figures
3.11.1 Figures
Figure 3.1: Annual Average Sunset Time and Children’s Education in the De-
veloping World
Notes: This figure presents a binned scatterplot and linear fitted values for the raw relationship (correlation) between
years of schooling and annual average sunset time for children between 6 and 16 years of age across the developing
world. Data on years of schooling is obtained from nationally representative surveys conducted by the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS). I assembled and harmonized all DHS datasets collected through 2016 for which latitude
and longitude of the primary sampling unit (PSU) or cluster was recorded allowing me to generate annual average
sunset time at the PSU level. That is, I use the universe of DHS data with geolocation information from Latin America,
Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia: 90,000 locations in 45 countries. The 45 countries include Angola, Bangladesh,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Dominican Republic, East Timor, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
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3.11.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Effect of Late Sunset on Bedtime and Wakeup Time (Hours)
(1) (2)
Bedtime Wake-up Time
β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.36*** -0.13
(0.10) (0.08)
District FE Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean 21.33 6.43
Observations 13863 13911
R2 0.178 0.250
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on bedtime and wakeup time for children between 6 and
16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the
outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. I generate bedtimes using ITUS
for all children who started sleep between 6 pm and 12 am such that they slept continuously for at least two hours.
While wake-up times are generated for all children who ended sleep between 4 am and 10 am such that they were
continuously awake for at least two hours. Unfortunately, this means that I am unable to generate bedtimes (wakeup
times) for 101 (53) school-age children out of the 13,964 in the entire sample. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table 3.2: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.47*** -0.67*** 1.65*** 0.10
(0.14) (0.24) (0.41) (0.33)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.091 0.169 0.294 0.070
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work (in hours) by
children between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating
Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use by Primary Activity
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.44*** -0.88*** 2.03*** 0.21
(0.14) (0.24) (0.41) (0.26)
Sunset Time*Worker -0.11** 0.82*** -1.36*** -0.69***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.17)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.091 0.342 0.321 0.477
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work (in hours) by
children between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating
Equation (8) on the outcome variable with an interaction term between daily sunset time and child’s primary activity;
the interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for child laborer compared to a student.
All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table 3.4: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment,
and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (24-Hour Clock) -0.86*** -0.13*** -0.08** -0.11**
(0.31) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.44 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 638682 638682 638682 638682
R2 0.732 0.643 0.561 0.093
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary (0/1) and middle school (0/1), and enrollment status (0/1) for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India.
Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
age and district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Late Sunset on Adults’ Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sleep Study Leisure Work HH Chores Time With Kids
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.50*** -0.03 0.90*** -0.56*** 0.21* 0.08
(0.10) (0.03) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.05)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.11 0.11 7.06 5.40 2.72 0.43
Observations 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.078 0.012 0.044 0.026 0.018 0.022
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure, work, home
production and time spent with children by individuals (in hours) over the age 16 on weekdays in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and
week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table 3.6: Effect of Late Sunset on Adults’ Daily Wage Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Adult Wage (INR) Male Wage (INR) Female Wage (INR)
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -8.03** -3.92 -13.98**
(3.69) (3.91) (5.81)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Place FE Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Mean 63.97 67.49 49.66
Observations 6055 5952 2491
R2 0.592 0.612 0.550
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on adult’s daily wage rate by industry at the village
level in India. Each column represents a separate regression; all regressions include district, industry and place (inside
or outside the village) fixed effects, and geographic controls: latitude, rainfall, temperature and elevation. Daily wage
rates are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity by Correlates of Poverty: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.43***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Sunset Time*Temporary House Structure (0/1) -0.11***
(0.04)
Sunset Time*Rural (0/1) -0.19***
(0.05)
Sunset Time*No Primary Education (0/1) -0.13***
(0.03)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(50p,75p) -0.09*
(0.04)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(25p,50p) -0.08**
(0.04)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(0p,25p) -0.17***
(0.05)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
Observations 62768 62768 62768 62768
R2 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.072
Notes: This table presents the heterogeneous effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep by correlates of
socioeconomic status on weekdays for all individuals over the age of 6 in India. Each column represents a separate
regression. Column 1 shows the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for households that live in a temporary house
structure compared to households that live in a permanent house structure. Column 2 shows the effect of daily sunset
time on sleep for households living in rural areas compared to households living in urban areas. Column 3 shows the
effect of daily sunset time on sleep for individuals that have completed primary education compared to individuals
that have not completed primary education. Column 4 shows the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for households
with average monthly expenditure below the 25th percentile, between 25th and 50th percentile, and between 50th and
75th percentile, compared to households with average monthly expenditure above the 75th percentile. All regressions
include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level.
Source: ITUS.
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Table 3.8: Crop Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Individuals’
Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
All
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.69*** -0.06 0.04
(0.15) (0.23) (0.26)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.28*** -0.47** -0.35*
(0.09) (0.20) (0.18)
Mean 8.42 8.42 8.42
Observations 10827 10827 10827
R2 0.102 0.107 0.117
Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.65*** -0.01 0.18
(0.15) (0.25) (0.29)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.25*** -0.44** -0.39**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.19)
Mean 8.20 8.20 8.20
Observations 8460 8460 8460
R2 0.139 0.144 0.157
Children
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.73*** -0.52 -0.57
(0.19) (0.37) (0.43)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.23* -0.31 -0.13
(0.12) (0.29) (0.27)
Mean 9.19 9.19 9.19
Observations 2367 2367 2367
R2 0.131 0.141 0.157
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes No No
Month FE No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for crop cultivator households in India. Panel ‘All’ includes all individuals over the age of 6.
Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of 16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals between 6 and 16
years of age. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome
variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households
in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. All regressions include district fixed effects. Column 1
includes season fixed effects, while Column 2 includes month fixed effects and Columns 3 includes week-of-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Chapter 4
Temperature and Human Capital in
India
4.1 Introduction
To what extent does the human condition vary with weather? This relationship
has been of long-standing interest in the economics literature, and the fact that
the earth’s climate is warming has renewed interest in the effects of weather on
economic outcomes (73; 120; 121; 269). Because human capital is an important
driver of economic growth (40; 287; 326), a critical yet understudied question
is the impact of temperature on human capital production. This question is
of particular interest in developing countries, which will experience dispropor-
tionately higher temperatures (190), where predominantly agrarian livelihoods
are climate-exposed, and where individuals are unable to consumption smooth
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over aggregate weather shocks.
We use math and reading test scores for more than 4.5 million children in
primary and secondary school to examine how high temperatures affect hu-
man capital production in India, where the number of extremely hot days is
expected to double by the end of the 21st century. We identify one mechanism
of impact through reduced agricultural productivity and estimate impacts of
policy interventions designed to offset fluctuations in agricultural income. In
developed countries, temperature affects performance primarily through expo-
sure to higher temperatures on the day of the test and the sensitivity of certain
parts of the brain to those higher temperatures, effects that can likely be offset
by climate-controlled classrooms and test centers (179; 306). However, in poor
countries, human capital production may also be affected by agricultural pro-
ductivity (255), and to the extent that agricultural productivity is temperature
sensitive (344; 346), higher temperatures may affect performance through such
an agricultural income mechanism.1
First, using test scores from an India-wide repeated cross-section between
2006 and 2014, we show that over a longer-run horizon, measured as the num-
ber of hot days in the calendar year prior to the year of the test, high temper-
atures affect both math and reading scores; 10 extra days with average daily
temperature above 29◦C (85◦F) relative to 15◦C-17◦C (59◦F-63◦F) reduce math
and reading test performance by 0.03 and 0.02 standard deviations (SD) respec-
tively. These are economically meaningful effects. Using projections from the
Community Climate Systems Model version 4 (CCSM v4), we estimate that by
the end of the century higher temperatures would reduce math and reading test
1While not the focus of our paper, hot weather can also affect human capital through harmful
effects of early childhood exposure to extreme temperature on health (214).
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scores by 0.04 and 0.03 standard deviations respectively each year, which, ac-
crued over the course a student’s education, is equivalent to a loss of roughly
2 years of schooling.2 We corroborate these findings using a rich longitudinal
study from a large state in Southern India, Andhra Pradesh, where we also find
evidence of a day-of-test, physiological effect of heat stress.
Second, we find persuasive evidence that one underlying mechanism for
our longer-run results is the harmful effect of higher temperatures on agricul-
tural yields and incomes: (a) high temperatures have large negative effects
on both agricultural yields, (b) hot days during the agricultural growing sea-
son have large negative effects on test score performance whereas those in the
non-growing season have minimal effects, and (c) the effects of high temper-
atures are concentrated in warmer regions that grow below-median levels of
heat-resistant crops. Other channels could, in theory, mediate the relationship
between longer-run temperature and test scores, such as heat stress affecting
learning in schools, school closures and teacher absenteeism driven by exces-
sive heat, and incidence of diseases that thrive in hot and wet conditions. While
we fail to find strong evidence for these mechanisms, we do not rule them out
completely.
Third, we examine the effect of a national policy, designed to offset fluctu-
ations in agricultural income, in modulating the effect of temperature on test
scores. We consider the world’s largest workfare program, the National Ru-
ral Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), which guarantees 100 days of
paid work each year to every rural household in India. We find that access to
2We provide these calculations in Appendix Section C.2. See (265) for a review of educa-
tional interventions in developing countries. The underlying assumption here is, ceteris paribus,
that the only thing that changes is the underlying temperature distribution with no changes to
underlying trends in adaptation along policy, technology, or other margins.
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NREGA in the previous year attenuates the marginal effect of extra hot days in
the calendar year prior to the test, on both math and reading test scores by 38%.
We also show that hotter days in the previous year increase participation in
NREGA contemporaneously. Our NREGA results not only reinforce the under-
lying agricultural income mechanism linking hotter days to lower test scores,
but also demonstrate the critical role of social protection programs in helping
the poor cope with climate stressors.
In investigating how higher temperatures affect performance and human
capital, we connect two distinct literatures. The first is the literature that exam-
ines the relationship between weather and economic outcomes, within which
a small number of new papers have considered the relationship between tem-
perature and human capital (98; 179; 306).3 These studies have been set in de-
veloped countries, limiting them to a singular channel: the physiological effect
of day-of-test temperature on math, but not reading performance (179; 306).
However, they fail to find evidence for the effects of temperature on test scores
over a time horizon longer than the day of the test. (98) does find that longer-
run exposure to heat stress during the summer months affects both math and
reading scores in South Korea, but the study is ambivalent about the underly-
ing mechanism. In this paper, we provide the first evidence for the day-of-test
physiological effects of heat stress, and more importantly, the effects of longer-
run temperature on human capital, in a developing country context. Further-
more, in contrast to previous work, we find evidence that one mechanism un-
derlying the effects of longer-run temperature on test scores is agricultural in-
come. Our work highlights the fact that a shared environmental issue—high
3A rich literature considers the impacts of higher temperatures on a variety of economic
outcomes including output (72; 73; 365), mortality (38; 70; 130), morbidity (419), and conflict
(74).
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temperatures—may have vastly different mechanisms and impacts depending
on the country context, emphasizing the importance of examining environmen-
tal issues in developing countries (181).
Second, we contribute to a new but growing literature on the role of pub-
lic programs in helping households and individuals cope with environmental
shocks. Relevant work in this literature includes (126), who explores the role of
social safety net transfers in providing insurance to US hurricane victims; (183),
who find that a randomized public health intervention (vitamin A supplemen-
tation) in Bangladesh protected infants from negative tornado impacts; and, (6),
who find that conditional cash transfers in Mexico mitigate the negative im-
pacts of early-life rainfall shocks on child human capital attainment. Our paper
is the first to provide evidence on the role of public programs in helping house-
holds in poor countries to cope contemporaneously with extreme temperatures.
As such, we demonstrate that social protection programs such as NREGA re-
duce the temperature sensitivity of poor households, providing benefits that
have previously received little consideration (204).4 In doing so, we identify an
important policy instrument for adaptation, especially in developing countries
where the rural poor are often unable to smooth consumption over district-level
aggregate weather shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide
a conceptual framework for the varying channels through which temperature
could affect human capital production and in Section 4.3 we describe the nu-
merous datasets used in this paper. In Section 4.4 we cover the main empir-
ical specifications and the corresponding results. In Section 4.5.1 we provide
4The closest work to us in this regard is (154), who shows that NREGA weakens the relation-
ship between rainfall and conflict.
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evidence that the underlying mechanism is agricultural income and in Section
4.5.2 we explore other candidate mechanisms. In Section 4.6 we demonstrate the
role of social protection programs for adaptation and in Section 4.7 we provide
concluding remarks.
4.2 Background
There are several mechanisms by which high temperatures could affect human
capital accumulation. The two foremost mechanisms are an agricultural channel
and a physiological channel. We provide more background on each of these
channels below.
Agriculture is the primary occupation for a significant proportion of low-
income households in developing countries, whether through subsistence agri-
culture or as hired labor. Agricultural incomes, however, can be low and erratic
in the face of adverse weather conditions, as agricultural productivity in low-
income countries is sensitive to both rainfall and temperature. Furthermore,
markets in these agrarian economies are incomplete or imperfect. Thus, agri-
cultural households in low-income countries are often unable to smooth con-
sumption over states of nature and across time. In such a context, investments
in children may be influenced by household consumption needs instead of the
rates of return. That is, if households cannot borrow, lend or store, negative in-
come shocks could reduce human capital investment. For instance, (216) argue
that time devoted to schooling is influenced by family resources by showing that
income fluctuations among households in India lead to variability in school at-
tendance. Similarly, (221) shows that children living in regions that experienced
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adverse rainfall shocks had lower investments in education and health. Since
time and income are important inputs into human capital, increased volatility
in agricultural incomes due to weather conditions can have significant implica-
tions for children’s educational outcomes in developing countries.
India is a hot country and currently experiences close to 50 days with av-
erage temperature over 29◦C (84◦F), compared to seven days over 29◦C in the
United States. Furthermore, more than 60% of the Indian population lives in
rural areas and depends on agriculture for their livelihood. Therefore, if agri-
cultural yields and the demand for agricultural labor is affected by the physical
relationship between heat stress and crop growth (344; 346), and if agricultural
households are liquidity constrained,5 higher temperatures could lead to a re-
duction in children’s human capital investment for many households, through
reductions in time and resources devoted to schooling or health investments in
children (216; 221; 255). Thus, higher than normal temperatures in the previous
period can have negative impacts on children’s current human capital outcomes
through reductions in the previous- and current-period resources available to
the household. Conversely, it is possible that higher temperatures during the
previous year could affect human capital via a farm labor productivity mecha-
nism. For example, if children perform agricultural labor, their marginal prod-
uct of on-farm labor will likely be higher during years with fewer hot days.
As a result, parents may decide to keep children home from school more dur-
ing those years. Conversely, during a year with many hot days, it may be more
valuable for children to develop their human capital at school. Under this mech-
anism, higher than normal temperatures in the previous period would have
positive impacts on children’s current human capital outcomes.6
5See for example, (70; 101; 113; 122; 125; 315; 333; 335; 406).
6(356) find evidence of this effect in India, but looking at low rainfall, rather than hot days.
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High temperatures could also affect children’s human capital production
through a physiological mechanism. Ambient temperature affects brain tem-
perature. The brain’s chemistry, electrical properties, and function are all tem-
perature sensitive (66; 116; 200; 341; 423), and both warm environmental temper-
atures and cognitive demands can elevate brain temperature. There exists a vast
body of empirical evidence linking cognitive impairment to high temperatures
as a result of heat stress. For instance, military research has shown that soldiers
executing complex tasks in hot environments make more errors than soldiers in
cooler conditions (155; 161). Further, LED lighting, which emits less heat than
conventional bulbs, decreases indoor temperature, and has been shown to raise
productivity of workers in garment factories in India, particularly on hot days
(5). Exposure to heat has also been shown to diminish attention, memory, in-
formation retention and processing, and the performance of psycho-perceptual
tasks (208; 412). Note that cold temperatures have also been shown to have an
adverse effect on learning and cognitive function (245; 257; 279; 357; 379). How-
ever, India experiences few very cold days in a year, and the number of hot
days are projected to increase disproportionately in the future. Hence, the focus
of this paper is on hot, rather than cold, days.
Exposure to high temperatures can manifest in insults to children’s human
capital through the physiological mechanism in two ways: i) a hot day could
continue to affect future learning if the human body is unable to internally self-
regulate to higher ambient temperatures, and ii) repeated exposure to heat stress
at school can affect learning repeatedly. (179), (306) and (98) show that day-of-
test temperatures affect test scores through a physiological relationship between
heat stress and cognition. However, these studies either found no evidence for
the effects of longer-run temperature on cognition (179; 306), or are ambivalent
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about the underlying mechanism (98).
In Section 4.5.1 we present compelling evidence for agricultural income as
one mechanism underlying the longer-run temperature-test score relationship.
Subsequently, in Section 4.5.2 we examine the influence of the physiological
mechanism, and although we fail to find strong evidence for such a mediating
channel, we do not rule it out completely. Other mechanisms through which
high temperatures might affect children’s human capital in India include inci-
dence of diseases that thrive in hot and wet conditions, and school closures or
teacher absenteeism driven by excessive heat. We also explore these channels in
Section C.3.
4.3 Data
In this section, we describe the data sets that we use to explore the relationship
between temperature and test scores. We use multiple data sets on test perfor-
mance as well as detailed daily gridded weather data that include temperature,
rainfall, and humidity. We obtain agricultural data from the International Crops
Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
4.3.1 Test Scores
We obtain data on cognitive performance from two sources of secondary data:
the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) and the Young Lives Survey
(YLS). The ASER provides a repeated cross-section that allows us to generate
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a pseudo-panel at the district level for all of India, whereas the YLS is an indi-
vidual panel that provides coverage for the single state of Andhra Pradesh.
Annual Status of Education Report
The Annual Status of Education Report is a survey on educational achievement
in primary school children in India and has been conducted by Pratham, an
educational non-profit, every year starting in 2005. The sample is a nationally
representative repeated cross-section at the district level. The ASER surveyors
ask each child aged from 5 to 16, up to four potential questions in math and
reading. In each subject, the surveyors begin with the hardest of the four ques-
tions. If a child is unable to answer that question, they move on to the next
hardest question, and so on and so forth. The questions are asked in the child’s
native language,
The ASER is a valuable data set for our analysis for multiple reasons. First,
ASER provides national coverage and a large sample size; in our study period
of 2006 to 2014, ASER conducted more than 4.5 million tests across every rural
district in India.7 Given the considerable spatial variation in weather in India,
the national coverage of ASER allows us to study the impacts of temperatures
on test scores over a large support. Importantly, it is administered each year
on two or three weekends during the period from the end of September to the
end of November, limiting considerations of spatially systematic seasonality in
data collection. Second, unlike schools-based data, ASER is not administered
in schools and therefore covers children both in and out of school. To ensure
that children are at home, the test is administered on weekends. This allows us
7While the ASER originated in 2005, the 2005 wave is not publicly available.
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to measure effects on test performance without confounding selection related
to school attendance or access to schools. Note that ASER samples households,
not children. All children in the 3-16 age group who are resident in the samples
households are included in the survey, while learning assessment are done with
all children age 5-16.
The ASER has two limitations. First, its repeated cross-sectional nature
doesn’t allow us to account for the role of prior human capital accumulation.
Second, the ASER test instrument is relatively simple and is designed to cap-
ture the left-tail of the distribution, e.g., to test for basic competence.8 Note
that we address these limitations by complementing our ASER analysis with an
analysis of the YLS test data (described below), which is a much broader test
that effectively captures variation across the ability spectrum (362).
Young Lives Survey
The Young Lives Survey is an international study of childhood poverty coor-
dinated by a team based at the University of Oxford.9 The YLS study in India
collects data from a single state, Andhra Pradesh, which is the fourth-largest
state in India by area and had a population of more than 84 million in 2011. In
this study, we use YLS data from 2002 to 2011. The study has collected data
on two cohorts of children: 1,008 children born between January 1994 and June
1995, and 2,011 children born between January 2001 and June 2002. Data were
8However, the left-tail of the distribution or low-performing students are more likely to come
from households with marginal livelihoods, especially considering the scope of the ASER data:
rural districts in India. Thus, the ASER data set is ideal for investigating the hypothesized
income channel underlying the temperature-test score relationship.
9Young Lives is funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are those of the author(s). They are not necessarily those
of Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID, or other funders.
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collected from children and their families using household visits in 2002, 2006,
2009, and in 2013/14. Extensive test data were collected from children in the
sample in all rounds of the survey. The tests differed in terms of which dimen-
sion of cognitive achievement they attempted to capture and how closely they
related to the formal school curriculum in Andhra Pradesh; often, different tests
were administered to children across rounds in order to ensure that they were
appropriate for each child’s age and current stage of education. In contrast to
the ASER tests, the YLS tests are much longer and more comprehensive, with
the math questionnaire containing 30 questions and the reading test covering
close to 100 questions. Furthermore, YLS has additional information about the
socio-economic background of the children’s households and health data. We
restrict our sampling frame to children who were in enrolled in school (362),
and were tested at least thrice in both math and verbal.
4.3.2 Weather Data
In an ideal research setting, we would use observational weather data from
ground stations in each location where the ASER and YLS data were collected.
However, the spatial and temporal coverage of ground stations in India is poor.
In the absence of consistent coverage from ground weather stations, we use
temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity reanalysis data from the ERA-
Interim archive, which is constructed by researchers at the European Centre for
Medium-Term Weather Forecasting. Such reanalysis data has been supported
in the literature as generating a consistent best-estimate of weather in a grid-cell
and has been used extensively in economics (26; 344). We use the ERA-Interim
daily temperature and precipitation data on a 1 x 1 degree latitude-longitude
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grid, from 1979 to present day. (117) provide more details about the method-
ology and construction of the ERA-Interim data set. To construct weather vari-
ables for each district or village, we construct an inverse-distance weighted av-
erage of all the weather grid points within a 100-kilometer range of the district
centroid. For each district, we construct the daily average temperature, daily
total rainfall, and daily mean relative humidity.10 Figure 4.1 shows the spa-
tial distribution of temperature in India during the study period and Figure 4.2
shows the distribution of daily temperatures for India and the state of Andhra
Pradesh.
4.3.3 Other Data Sources
Agricultural Yields and Rural Wages
We use agricultural data from the Village Dynamics in South Asia Meso data set,
which is compiled by researchers at the International Crops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (209). The data set provides district-level information
from 1979 to 2014 on annual agricultural production, prices, acreage, and yields,
by crop. We generate aggregate price-weighted district level measures of total
yield in each district for the six major crops (rice, wheat, sugarcane, groundnut,
sorghum, and maize), as well as the five major monsoon crops (excludes wheat).
ICRISAT also provides data on district-level averages of yearly rural wages.
10Because we are using gridded weather data measurement error is likely classical and there-
fore resulting in attenuation bias. To the extent that such measurement error exists, our reported
results constitute a lower bound on the effects of temperature on test scores.
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National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, also known as the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, is the largest workfare pro-
gram in the world. It legally guarantees each rural household up to 100 days
of public-sector work each year at the prevailing minimum wage. It was rolled
out non-randomly, in three phases, according to a backwardness index devel-
oped by the Planning Commission of India (320). The backwardness index was
based on three outcomes—agricultural wages, agricultural productivity, and the
fraction of low-caste individuals in each district—based on data from the mid-
1990’s. The first phase began with 200 districts in February 2006; an additional
130 districts received the program in 2007. By April 2008 the scheme was op-
erational in all rural districts in India. Any rural resident who is 18 years or
older can apply for work at any time of the year. Men and women are paid
equally, though at least one-third of the beneficiaries must be women. Projects
under NREGA involve construction of local infrastructure that improves wa-
ter management through conservation, rain water collection, and irrigation, as
well as flood control, drought proofing, rural connectivity, and land develop-
ment. NREGA wages vary from state to state, but the floor and ceiling wages
under the scheme are set by the central government. We obtain data on NREGA
participation for the period from 2006 to 2016 from the Management Informa-
tion Systems (MIS). In particular, we focus on the number of rural households
enrolled in NREGA in a particular district in a given year.
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4.4 Do Longer-Run Temperatures Affect Test Scores?
To examine the effect of temperature on test scores, we rely primarily on the
ASER data set. The ASER data set has the advantage of national coverage,
with greater spatial variation in temperature exposure with a repeated yearly
cross-section at the district level. To verify the robustness of our results, we also
analyze the YLS data set, which provides an individual level panel but with
coverage limited to a single state. With each data set we estimate both flexible
and parsimonious models.
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy
To understand the relationship between temperature and test scores throughout
India, we use the ASER data set. Following (129) and (203), we first estimate a
flexible model:
Yia jqt =
10∑
k=1
γkTMEANkjq,t−1 + f
(
rain jq,t−1
)
+ g
(
humidity jq,t−1
)
+ χa + α j + µt + i jqt
(4.1)
Yia jqt is math or reading test scores for child i, of age a, in district j, in state q,
in year t, standardized by year-age. TMEANkjq,t−1 is the k
th of 10 temperature bins
in year t − 1. We estimate separate coefficients γk for each of these k bins. The
coldest temperature bin is a count of the number of days with average temper-
ature less than 13◦C, and the hottest temperature bin is a count of the number
of days with average temperature greater than 29◦C. We chose these endpoints
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because 13◦C and 29◦C are the 10th and 90th percentiles of average daily tem-
peratures across India from 2006 to 2014. The bins in between are evenly spaced
two degrees apart. The omitted bin is the 15◦C-17◦C bin, which we chose to
omit because it has the maximum coefficient of all the bins (e.g., it has the most
optimal effect on test scores). All other bins are interpreted relative to this bin.
For example, γ10, the coefficient on the hottest bin, is the marginal effect on test
scores of an extra day with average temperature greater than 29◦C relative to a
day with average temperature between 15◦C and 17◦C.
For rainfall, we control for dummy variables that represent whether total
annual rainfall for a certain district in a certain year was in the top, or bottom,
tercile, relative to the long-run historical distribution of rainfall in that district.11
For humidity, we control for dummy variables for whether average annual hu-
midity for a certain district in a certain year was in the top, or bottom, tercile.
We control for age fixed effects (χi), district fixed effects (α j) and year fixed ef-
fects (µt). We cluster standard errors at the district level to account for serial
correlation within a district over time. Each coefficient γk is identified under
the assumption that, after controlling for rainfall and humidity, changes in the
number of hot days are exogenous to district-specific unobservable character-
istics that vary over time. The assumption is plausible given the randomness
of weather fluctuations and the inability of rural households in India to predict
such fluctuations. In estimating this flexible approach we follow prior work
in climate economics and avoid imposing restrictive assumptions on the func-
tional relationship between temperature and test scores (203). We also estimate
a parsimonious version of Equation (4.1) with an upper threshold of 21◦C and
a lower threshold of 15◦C. Our choice of 15◦C and 21◦C for the parsimonious
11Our results are robust to alternative specifications of rainfall, including linear and quadratic
terms for total annual rainfall.
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model is based on the kink points that were revealed by our estimation of the
nonparametric analysis (Equation 4.1).
Yi jaqt =γ1TMEAN(> 21◦C) jq,t−1 + γ2TMEAN(< 15◦C) jq,t−1
f
(
rain jq,t−1
)
+ g
(
humidity jq,t−1
)
+ χa + α j + µt + i jqt (4.2)
An important limitation of the ASER data is that it does not provide the exact
date of the test. Therefore, we can’t control for day-of-test temperature. How-
ever, the omission of temperature on the day of the test would only confound
our estimates if the day-of-test temperature is correlated with more hot days
in the previous year. We believe that such a systematic correlation is unlikely
because the day-of-test temperature is plausibly random.12
4.4.2 Results
We estimate Equation (4.1) and find that, relative to a day with average daily
temperature between 15◦C and 17◦C, one extra day in the previous year with av-
erage daily temperature above 29◦C reduces math and reading performance by
0.003 and 0.002 SD in the current year, respectively (Table 4.1). Using our binned
approach, we find that test performance decreases for temperatures above 17◦C.
The results are similar to those estimated with our parsimonious approach: one
extra day above 21◦C reduces math and reading performances by 0.002 and
0.001 SD, respectively (Table 4.2).13
12In fact, we test this assumption explicitly using the YLS data where we have information on
the day of the test.
13In addition to the significant negative effects of high temperatures, there are two other fea-
tures to note about Table 4.1: first, there are also negative impacts of very low temperatures and,
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In addition to our analysis of standardized test scores, we also estimate the
effects of previous year temperature using raw scores (Figure C.2). We find
that a 10-day increase in the number of hot days above 29◦C in the previous
year decreases math scores by 0.03 points and reading scores by 0.02 points.14
Both point estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore,
to understand how higher temperatures impacted specific skills, we present ef-
fects on competencies covered on both math and reading tests. The effects of
heat are driven by the harder questions on both math and reading tests. We find
large negative effects on paragraph- and story-reading skills, but statistically in-
significant effects on word- or letter-reading skills (Figure C.3). Ten extra days
in the previous year with average daily temperature above 29◦C (84◦F) relative
to 15◦C-17◦C (59◦F-63◦F) reduce story-reading ability by almost 1 percentage
point. In 2006, almost 45% children in the ASER data set could read a story, so
1 percentage point decrease translates into a reduction of 2% in story reading
skills. Similarly, we find negative effects on division and subtraction skills, but
statistically insignificant effects on single- or double-digit number recognition
(Figure C.4). Ten extra days in the previous year with average daily tempera-
ture above 29◦C (84◦F) relative to 15◦C-17◦C (59◦F-63◦F) reduce division-solving
ability by more than 1 percentage point, or 3%.
second, the gradient of the temperature impacts is relatively flat. The low temperature impacts
are not the focus of our study, because there are fewer days in these bins and, furthermore, the
number of days in these bins will decrease as climate change accelerates. However, as noted
in Section 4.5.2, these cold-temperature impacts may be due to a physiological channel. Sec-
ond, the flat gradient of the graph stands in contrast to other work on temperature impacts that
often finds sharp threshold effects, such as (346). However, as explored further in Section 4.5,
this flat gradient may arise because the annual specification captures the combined effects of
many channels (e.g. agricultural, physiological, and other), across many parts of the year (e.g.
growing season versus non-growing season), which may vary in magnitudes.
14The average scores for both math and reading tests are approximately 2.5 points out of the
maximum possible score of 4.
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Robustness Checks: We demonstrate that our results are insensitive to nu-
merous robustness checks, supporting the validity of our baseline model. First,
we find no effect of hotter days in the current year or the next year on perfor-
mance in the current year, and including these does not appreciably change our
primary coefficient of interest (Table 4.2). Second, our point estimates are quan-
titatively similar for the limited sample of “on-track” students who are in the
correct school-grade-for-age (Table C.1). Third, the addition of lags does not
affect our point estimates (Table C.2). Fourth, our results remain unchanged
with the inclusion of state-specific linear and quadratic trends (Table C.3). Fifth,
our results remain unchanged with the inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects,
which control for all time-varying unobservables at the state-level that may
be correlated with children’s test scores (Table C.4). Sixth, our results remain
largely unchanged when we use nearest weather grid points or daily maxi-
mum temperature (Table C.5). Finally, we also control for a proxy of the same-
day temperature—the number of hot days during the weekends of the testing
month—and find that controlling for this does not change the coefficients ap-
preciably (Table C.6).15
4.4.3 Individual Panel Analysis
Next, we use a longitudinal panel data set—the YLS—in which we have infor-
mation on the exact date of the test, allowing us to control for temperature on
the day of the test, as well as time-invariant child level attributes (e.g., ability),
and estimate the effect of hot days between successive tests (covering at least
one full agricultural cycle) on test scores.
15Recall that we have to use such a proxy since the exact day of the ASER test is unavailable.
We do, however, know that these tests take place during the weekends.
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Empirical Strategy We first estimate the following flexible model of the effects
of temperature on test scores:
Yi jdmt = γ2T (23◦C − 25◦C) j,t−1 + γ3T (25◦C − 27◦C) j,t−1 + γ4T (> 27◦C) j,t−1
+ β2(23◦C − 25◦C) jdmt + β3(25◦C − 27◦C) jdmt + β4(> 27◦C) jdmt
+ f
(
rain j,t−1
)
+ rain jdmt + αi + µ1d + µ2m + µ3t + i jdmt (4.3)
Yi jdmt is the math or reading test score of child i in district j on day-of-week
d in month-of-year m in survey-round t, standardized by year-age. Our coeffi-
cients of interest are T (·), counts of the number of the days since the previous
test with average daily temperature within the specified range. For example,
T (23◦C − 25◦C) is the number of days since the last test with average daily tem-
perature between 23◦C and 25◦C. We control for cumulative rainfall, and include
fixed effects for child (αi), day-of-week (µ1d), month-of-year (µ2m), and survey-
round (µ3t). Inclusion of child fixed effects controls for unobservable child level
attributes that do not vary over time (e.g., ability). Furthermore, we control
for day-of-test temperature by including dummies indicating temperature was
between 23◦C and 25◦C, 25◦C and 27◦C, or above 27◦C, respectively. This also al-
lows us to capture the effects of temperature on the day of the test. For instance,
β4 is the marginal effect of the average day-of-test temperature being above 23◦C
relative to a day with average temperature below 23◦C. rain jdmt controls for rain-
fall on the day of the test.
Since the YLS data covers a single state (Andhra Pradesh), the temperature
distribution is narrower than in the other national data sets that we use. Fur-
thermore, since the number of days in a year is fixed at 365, we normalize the
coefficient on the “optimal” temperature bin, in this case T (< 23◦C jt), to 0, mak-
ing it the reference bin. Thus γ4 is the marginal effect of an extra day since
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the last test with average temperature above 27◦C relative to a day with av-
erage temperature below 23◦C. Our four temperature bins have, on average,
an equal density with 23◦C, 25◦C, and 27◦C representing the first, second and
third quartiles of the temperature distribution in Andhra Pradesh during our
study period. We cluster standard errors at the district-week level to allow for
arbitrary correlation in test scores in a district in a given testing week and for
conservative inference when multiple children are assigned the same tempera-
ture observation. Each γi is identified under the assumption that the number of
hot days experienced by a child in a given bin between successive tests is ex-
ogenous to child-specific unobservable characteristics that vary over time. Im-
portantly, by tracking the same children over time, we are able to account for
prior human-capital production and provide causal estimates of the effects of
the daily temperature distribution between successive tests on changes in stu-
dent test performance.
We also estimate a second parsimonious approach with a single temperature
cutoff instead of flexible temperature bins:
Yi jdmt = γT (> 23◦C) j,t−1 + β(> 23◦C) jdmt + f
(
rain j,t−1
)
+ rain jdmt
+ αi + µ1d + µ2m + µ3t + i jdmt (4.4)
The notation is the same as in Equation (4.3), with the key difference that
T (> 23◦C) jt is a count of the number of days above 23◦C experienced by a stu-
dent district j between successive tests. Following the common practice in the
literature on climate economics, we chose the threshold of 23◦C because our
estimation of the nonparametric specification (Equation 4.3) revealed a kink at
that level (203).
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Results: We find qualitatively similar (though quantitatively larger) effects
when we estimate Equations (4.3) and (4.4) using the YLS individual panel data
set. We find that 10 extra days between successive tests above 27◦C relative
to below 23◦C reduce math and reading test scores by 0.07 and 0.10 standard
deviations, respectively (Table 4.3).1617
Furthermore, consistent with the neuroscience literature and recent work in
economics on the impacts of temperature on cognitive performance, we find
strong evidence for the presence of a physiological channel connecting temper-
atures to test scores in the short run (66; 200; 341). Specifically, we find that a 1◦C
increase in average day-of-test temperature above 23◦C reduces within-cohort
math test performance by 0.17 standard deviations, but find no discernible or
meaningful relationship between higher temperatures and reading comprehen-
sion. Different portions of the brain perform different cognitive functions. For
instance, the pre-frontal cortex, which is responsible for providing the “working
memory” needed for performing mathematical problems, is more temperature
sensitive than the portions of the brain responsible for reading functions (200).
These day-of-test estimates are similar with those in prior work in developed
countries (98; 179; 306). Crucially for our analysis, controlling for day-of-test
temperature does not affect the relationship between longer-run temperature
and test scores (Table C.9).
Recall that the ASER test instrument primarily captures variation in the left-
tail of the ability spectrum, whereas YLS is a more comprehensive test that cap-
tures variation over the entire distribution of ability. The fact that our results are
16While our YLS analysis includes only the younger sample to maintain comparability with
the ASER results, the results are similar to when we consider the combined sample as well (Table
C.7).
17We also cluster-bootstrap our standard errors at the district level (7 clusters) following (79).
Our estimates remain precisely estimated (Table C.8).
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consistent across the two data sets indicates that temperature shocks over the
previous year have impacts on both low-performing students and students on
other levels of the ability spectrum. From a policy point of view, we care about
both groups of students: low-performing students may be coming from partic-
ularly disadvantaged households or vulnerable livelihoods; but conversely to
understand economy-wide impacts, it is important to understand impacts that
span the entire ability distribution.
4.5 Mechanisms
In this section we examine two primary mechanisms that may mediate the
longer-run temperature-test score relationship: i) agricultural income and ii) di-
rect physiological impacts on learning. Other plausible mechanisms such as the
incidence of diseases that thrive in hot and wet conditions and school closures
or teacher absenteeism driven by excessive heat are explored in Section D.1.
4.5.1 Is Agriculture a Mechanism Underlying the Relationship
Between Longer-Run Temperatures and Test Scores?
If agricultural yields and the demand for agricultural labor are affected by the
physical relationship between heat stress and crop growth, and if agricultural
households are liquidity constrained, then higher temperatures could lead to
a reduction in children’s human capital investment. For instance, we find that
previous year temperature reduces current year school attendance (Table C.10)
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and children’s body mass index (Table C.11), which suggests decreases in time
and resources devoted to schooling (216) and health investments (221) in chil-
dren. Thus, if higher temperatures have large, negative effects on agricultural
income in the previous year, it is possible that these effects have consequences
for children’s human capital production in the future. We find strong evidence
in support of such a pecuniary mechanism underscoring the effect of tempera-
ture on test scores. First, we provide evidence that agricultural yields respond
negatively to higher temperatures. Next, we use the ASER data to provide two
distinct tests to support the agricultural income hypothesis: (a) comparing ef-
fects of hot days across the growing and non-growing seasons of the agricultural
calendar, and (b) comparing effects of heat on test scores across the geographic
dispersion of heat-resistant crops.
Temperature and Agricultural Yields
To demonstrate that temperature affects human capital production by affecting
the livelihoods of the rural poor, we first demonstrate that temperature affects
agricultural yields. We find that agricultural yields, like test scores, are highly
responsive to higher temperatures in the growing season, with comparatively
modest effects of non-growing season temperatures. We use two different price-
weighted agricultural yield indices: (a) the six major crops (rice, wheat, sugar-
cane, groundnut, sorghum, and maize), and (b) the five major monsoon crops
(excludes wheat).
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Growing Season versus Non-Growing Season
To further demonstrate evidence of an agricultural mechanism, we disaggre-
gate our results by the growing season versus the non-growing season. India’s
main agricultural season (kharif ) runs from June through November and the
secondary growing season (rabi) runs October through February. We know that
the ASER test is conducted in a given district on a single weekend between the
end of September and the end of November. If hot days affect test scores by
affecting household income that relies on agricultural output, these effects must
be predominantly driven by growing season temperatures in the previous year.
Thus, we subdivide each temperature bin in Equation (4.1) into days in that
bin in the growing season and days in that bin in the non-growing season. We
define the growing season as June through December and the non-growing sea-
son as March through May, broadly following the approach in (70). We exclude
January and February from the growing season because very few hot days oc-
cur during these months. We focus on the growing season of the previous year
(rather than the current year), because the previous year’s output has been fully
harvested, whereas the current year’s harvest may be still in progress, at the
time of the ASER test.
We find that the effect of temperature on test scores is primarily driven
through higher temperatures in the previous years’ agricultural growing sea-
sons: an extra hot day above 29◦C in the growing season has an order of magni-
tude larger effect on test scores than a corresponding extra hot day above 29◦C in
the non-growing season. Specifically, an extra 10 days above 29◦C in the grow-
ing season reduce math scores by 0.1 standard deviations and reading scores
by 0.06 standard deviations, compared to negligible effects in the non-growing
143
season (Figure 4.4). These are large effects: 10 extra hot days in the previous
year growing season could effectively wipe out gains made from a median edu-
cational intervention (265). Furthermore, the difference between the effect of an
extra hot day above 29◦C in the growing season versus the non-growing season
is statistically different at the 1% level. The differences between the effects of
temperature on test scores across growing versus non-growing seasons increase
with higher temperatures for both math and reading scores.
Additionally, we test the impact of temperature across the growing and non-
growing seasons on agricultural yields of the six major crops as well as the five
major monsoon crops. Using district level yields data, we find that an extra day
above 29◦C in the growing season reduces yields by three times more than the
same type of day in the non-growing season. In absolute terms, the magnitude
is large; an extra day above 29◦C in the growing season relative to a day between
15◦C and 17◦C reduces yields by 1% (Figure 4.4), with no effect of temperature
on yields in the non-growing season. Our estimates are comparable to those
found elsewhere in the literature (70; 83; 376). Consistent with our finding of
extremely cold days reducing performance, cold days also reduce agricultural
yields, though to a lesser extent than hot days.1819 The large impact of tempera-
ture on yields in the growing season but not in the non-growing season is con-
sistent with a model in which temperature affects test scores through declines
in agricultural income.
Our test score results are robust to several specification variation. Our base-
18In addition to analyzing aggregate, price-weighted yields, we have estimated temperature
bin regressions for the raw yields (tons/hectare) of the six major crops. The results demonstrate
that high temperatures negatively affect raw yields (Figure C.8).
19We also find that rural wages respond linearly to higher temperatures. An extra day above
29◦C (relative to a day between 15◦C and 17◦C) decreases rural wages by 0.4% (Figure C.7).
However, because our wage data is annual, we are not able to disaggregate this result by the
growing versus the non-growing season.
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line specification uses dry bulb temperatures, rather than wet bulb globe tem-
perature (WBGT), because we believe that agricultural income is the primary
channel that is driving the temperature-test score relationship. However, our re-
sults are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to using WBGT instead of dry
air temperatures (Figure C.5). Separately, our baseline specifications are clus-
tered at the district level. However, to address concerns over spatial correlation,
we also run a specification with standard errors clustered at the state-level. The
coefficients for previous year’s growing season temperature bins remain pre-
cisely estimated (Figure C.6). Finally, we also show as a falsification test that
future temperatures don’t affect prior agricultural yields (Table C.13).
Heat-Resistant Crops
To further explore the impact of temperature on agricultural yields and test
scores, we analyze the role of heat-resistant crops. Following (207), we sepa-
rate crops into C4 crops and C3 crops. C4 crops extract carbon from carbon
dioxide more efficiently than C3 crops, and are more resistant to high temper-
atures. In our data, the C4 crops are maize, sorghum, pearl millet, sugar cane,
finger millet, and fodder, and all remaining crops are C3. For each district-year,
we calculate the fraction of cultivated area that is planted with C4 crops, and
then we calculate a long-run average of this value. Then we label a district to
be a heat-resistant crop district if its long-run average proportion of C4 crops is
above the median, which is 23%. Figure C.9 shows the geographic distribution
of the take-up of heat-resistant crops.
We find that the effects of temperature on test scores are pronounced in dis-
tricts where the dominant crops are not heat-resistant, with no economically
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meaningful effects of temperature on test scores in districts that grow heat-
resistant crops. Since we are interested in the interaction term on heat-resistant
crops and temperature, we estimate the parsimonious Equation (4.2) to preserve
power. We find that growing heat-resistant crops erases most of the effect of
higher temperatures on test scores. An extra 10 hot days above 21◦C in dis-
tricts that grow below-median levels of heat-resistant crops lower math scores
by 0.022 standard deviations, compared with a near-null effect in districts that
grow above-median levels of heat-resistant crops (Table 4.4).
However, the decision to plant heat-resistant crops is endogenous to,
amongst other factors, long-term average temperature, or the “climate normal.”
Therefore, the decision to grow heat-resistant crops could be a proxy for under-
lying economic conditions that reflect adaptation to long-term average temper-
atures along agricultural (e.g., heat-resistant crops) and non-agricultural (e.g.,
fans) margins. To investigate the differences in the effects of temperature on
test scores across different long-term historical climates, we break down the
relationship between temperature and test scores based on long-term average
temperature deciles. We find that districts with higher historical average tem-
peratures plant a larger fraction of their total cultivated area with heat-resistant
crops (Figure 4.6(a)). In the lower and middle deciles, there is very little take-
up of heat-resistant crops but in districts with the highest long-term average
temperatures, more than 30% of the total cultivated area is covered by heat-
resistant crops. Furthermore, the relationship between days with temperature
above 29◦C and test scores largely follows the take-up of heat-resistant crops; the
effects are present only in the middle climate deciles, where there are enough
hot days to find a discernible effect but the take-up of heat-resistant crops re-
mains low, for both math (Figure 4.6(b)) and reading scores (Figure 4.6(c)). In
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the hottest climate deciles, as expected, there is little effect of hot days in the
previous year on test scores with high prevalence of heat-resistant crops. These
results are consistent with earlier work that has found crop yields in hot regions
are less sensitive to higher temperatures, due to agricultural adaptation (376).
As an important robustness check, we show that future temperature shocks are
not correlated with baseline levels of heat resistant crop adoption (Table C.14).
4.5.2 Can the Physiological Effects of Heat Stress Explain the
Relationship Between Longer-Run Temperatures and Test
Scores?
In this section, we consider human physiology as a potential underlying mech-
anism behind the longer-run temperature-test score relationship. Exposure to
high temperatures harm children’s human capital through the physiological
mechanism in two ways: (i) a hot day could continue to affect future learning if
the human body is unable to internally self-regulate to higher ambient temper-
atures, and (ii) repeated exposure to heat stress at school could affect learning
repeatedly.20
20Temperature on day-of-test can affect performance on high-stakes exams and translate into
lower human capital production due to the structure of the education system, typically in the
form of arbitrary cutoffs for passing or placing into high-achievement programs (306). In our
study, however, we evaluate the effects of temperature on low-stakes cognitive tests and abstract
away from this pathway.
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Persistent Effects of a Hot Day
First, we test whether high temperatures can have persistent impacts: a hot day
today could continue to affect performance in the future if the human body is
unable to internally self-regulate to higher ambient temperatures. We examine
this hypothesis by estimating the lagged effects of short-run temperature using
the YLS data set. We find no evidence for the persistence of the effects of short-
run temperature on test scores: over the four days prior to the test, heat stress
has no effect on test performance (Figure C.10). This pattern largely holds for
at least up to four weeks of leads and lags (Figure C.11). The large day-of-test
effect and the null week-of-test effect are consistent with a model of internal
self-regulation in which the human body self-regulates higher temperatures,
making the direct effects of temperature on cognitive performance temporary
(380).
Repeated Exposure to Heat Stress
Yet, if children are repeatedly exposed to heat stress at school or on the field,
then the cumulative effect of that heat stress can still affect performance as a
result of impaired learning. Thus the effect of hot days in the previous year on
performance in the current year could also be the cumulative physiological ef-
fect of heat stress on learning. To rule out this explanation, we first show that
only hot days in the previous calendar year affect performance in the current
year, with hot days in the current year having no effect on test scores (Table
4.2). If the physiological mechanism were driving the relationship between an-
nual (or longer-run) temperature and test scores, we would see the effects on
performance of hot days in both the current year and the previous year. As ex-
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plained in Figure 4.3, only hot days in the previous calendar year should affect
test scores in the current year through the agricultural income channel.
Second, the physiological channel, unlike the agricultural income channel,
should not be contingent on the agricultural calendar. We see strong effects of
hot days in the previous year’s growing season on test score performance but
no effect of hot days in the non-growing season (Figure 4.4). To rule out con-
cerns of overlapping agricultural and schooling calendars, we further split the
growing season by months when the school is in session and when students are
on break.21 Our hypothesis is that the physiological effects of heat on learning
should be limited to hot days in the school year, whereas the agricultural income
mechanism should be in effect during both school and non-school months in the
growing season. Consistent with an agricultural income mechanism, we find
that hot days in school and non-school months have similar effects on perfor-
mance (Figure C.12), suggesting that it is unlikely that the relationship between
higher temperatures in the prior year and test scores is driven by reduced learn-
ing due to heat stress in the classroom.
The combination of large effects of heat in the growing season, paired with
the negligible effects of heat during the non-growing season, could also be ex-
plained by heat exposure of agricultural workers from working in the field.
If these workers are the same children being tested, then the growing season
heat effects could be physiological effects on the human body, rather than those
driven through an agricultural income mechanism. However, as mentioned ear-
lier, heat stress during the concurrent year as the test has no effect on test scores
(Table 4.2). India’s main agricultural season lasts from June through November.
21Within the growing season that lasts from June through December, June and December
typically have summer and winter holidays, with school in session more or less continuously
from July through November.
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Since ASER tests are conducted from late September to late November, physi-
ological exposure to heat, for children contributing labor to agriculture, would
have transpired by the time of the test. Thus, we would expect to see effects of
heat exposure in the concurrent year.
Finally, another test for the physiological versus agricultural income channel
is to draw a distinction between math and reading scores. Prior studies in both
economics and neuroscience posit that the physiological effects of heat are expe-
rienced primarily in the part of the brain responsible for mathematical function
(179; 200; 306). The effects of short-run (day-of-test) temperature, for example,
are seen on math performance but not on reading performance. Our estimates
for day-of-test temperatures are consistent with such a hypothesis. However,
effects of longer-run (previous calendar year) temperature are observed in both
math and reading scores. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect on both
math and reading performance is similar. Together, these results suggest that
the longer-run temperature-test score relationship for high temperatures is not
driven solely by a physiological mechanism.22
22In fact, the existence of significant negative effects of cold days may indicate that a physio-
logical mechanism does exist. Our baseline specification finds statistically significant negative
impacts from low temperatures in the previous year on current-year test scores. However, our
growing vs. non-growing season estimates fail to find strong evidence for existence of an agri-
cultural mechanism for cold days. Thus, it is plausible that cold stress affects learning due to
physiological channels (245; 257; 279; 357; 379). Importantly, agricultural income and physiol-
ogy are not mutually exclusive mechanisms.
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4.6 Can Social Protection Programs Mitigate the Re-
lationship Between Longer-Run Temperatures
and Test Scores?
If income is indeed one mechanism of impact, can social protection programs
play a role in shielding the poor from higher temperatures and facilitating adap-
tation to climate change? To investigate this question, we consider the largest
workfare program in the world—the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act of 2005—which guarantees every person in rural India 100 days of paid
employment on rural infrastructure projects, making NREGA a self-targeting
conditional cash transfer program that has an income-stabilizing effect in the
face of low and erratic agricultural incomes.
4.6.1 Empirical Strategy
If high temperatures reduce crop yields and the demand for agricultural labor
in the previous year, it is plausible that rural households use NREGA in the pre-
vious year to help smooth consumption, and compensate (at least partially) for
heat induced agricultural income losses. Thus, hotter days in the previous year
might increase NREGA take-up in that year, attenuating the relationship be-
tween previous year temperature and current year test scores.23 We exploit the
23NREGA has been shown to have impacts on a multitude of economic and social outcomes,
as reviewed in (374). Outcomes affected include the demand for labor-intensive technologies
(53) and agricultural yields, as laborers may switch from agricultural to NREGA participa-
tion (377). We abstract away from these details and focus on the net effect of NREGA on the
temperature-test score relationship.
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staggered district-level roll-out of NREGA and test this hypothesis in an event
study framework since the variation in treatment timing could result in biased
difference-in-difference estimates (177). To do so, we estimate the marginal ef-
fect of an extra hot day above 29◦C (relative to between 15◦C and 17◦C) for the
same district before and after the introduction of NREGA. We estimate the fol-
lowing equation:
Yia jqt =
10∑
k=1
γkTMEANkjq,t−1 +
τ=2∑
τ=−3,τ,−1
θτNREGA(t − T ∗j = τ) jq,t−τ ∗ TMEAN10jq,t−1
+
τ=2∑
τ=−3,τ,−1
βτNREGA(t − T ∗j = τ) jq,t−τ + χa
+ f (rain jq,t−1) + g(humidity jq,t−1) + α j + µt + ia jqt (4.5)
The equation is identical to Equation (4.1) with an additional term,
NREGA(t−T ∗j = τ) jq,t−τ ∗TMEAN10jq,t−1, which captures the interaction of the num-
ber of days in the hottest temperature bin in the previous year with NREGA
event time dummies that take values 0 or 1. Specifically, we estimate separate
coefficients on the hottest temperature bin for the periods before and after the
introduction of NREGA in district j in state q. For instance, event time T = 0
takes the value 1 if NREGA was available in any district j in the previous year,
0 otherwise. So, if a district j got NREGA in 2009, NREGA : T = 0 ∗ Days > 29◦C
captures the interaction of number of days in the previous year where the tem-
perature is over 29◦C in 2009 with the dummy variable T = 0, to estimate the
protective effects of NREGA on children’s test scores in 2010. Similarly, the
interaction of T = 1 with number of days in the previous year where the tem-
perature is over 29◦C would capture the compensatory effects of NREGA one
year after it was made available to a district j in the previous year. The omitted
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event time T = −1 is the year before the previous year NREGA is introduced
in a district, and we interpret the coefficient of interest θτ relative to that pe-
riod. In our baseline specification, we include district (α j) and year (µt) fixed
effects. We also control for age-for-grade status considering the level effects of
NREGA on grade progression (355). Our specification compares the effect of a
hot day on test scores before and after a district received NREGA in the previ-
ous year, relative to the effect of that hot day in other districts that didn’t receive
NREGA in that same year. NREGA was introduced in 2006 and, because all dis-
tricts had received NREGA by 2008, we restrict the ASER sample to include
only survey-rounds between 2006 and 2009. Finally, to address any potential
incidental correlation between NREGA and weather shocks, we explicitly test
whether future weather shocks predict the rollout of NREGA. In Table C.15 we
show that NREGA rollout is not predicted by future temperature shocks.
4.6.2 Results
The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between NREGA event time
dummy variables and the number of days above 29◦C in the previous year. Con-
sistent with an income mechanism, we find that NREGA attenuates the effect
of an extra hot day above 29◦C in the prior calendar year on math and reading
scores by more than 50% (Table 4.5).24 Figure 4.6 presents the event study graph-
ically and shows that the introduction of NREGA attenuates the effect of those
extra 10 hot days above 29◦C on test scores by 0.01 standard deviations on both
24We show that prior to NREGA roll-out in a district, an extra 10 days above 29◦C (relative to
between 15◦C and 17◦C) reduce math and reading scores by 0.02 and 0.01 standard deviations,
respectively, although because we use only data from 2006 to 2009 we are relatively underpow-
ered.
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math and reading.25 We note that the effects of NREGA represent intent-to-treat
(ITT) estimates, since not all households in a district will respond by taking up
NREGA. We also employ a triple-differences design (comparing the effects of
a hot versus a cold day in districts with and without NREGA, before and after
they receive NREGA) to estimate the effect of NREGA on the marginal effect of
an extra hot day in the previous calendar year and find comparable estimates
(Table C.16). Our event study results are robust to a parsimonious model simi-
lar to Equation (4.2), with an upper threshold of 21◦C and a lower threshold of
15◦C (Table 4.6). Our coefficient of interest is the interaction of NREGA roll-out
with number of days above 21◦C.
Since workfare requires individuals to sign up for work, it would be rea-
sonable to expect NREGA take-up to respond contemporaneously to higher
temperatures to offset declines in agricultural incomes. Indeed, we find that
NREGA take-up responds to higher temperatures. We obtain annual NREGA
district level take-up and expenditure data from 2006 to 2016 and show that
hotter days in the current year drive NREGA take-up and expenditures (Fig-
ure 4.7). Specifically, an extra hot day with average temperature above 29◦C in
a district (relative to a day between 15◦C and 17◦C) increases NREGA take-up
by nearly 1.3%. For the same extra hot day in a year, 3.4% more households
are likely to use all 100 days of eligibility in the program. For each extra day
above 29◦C, district NREGA expenditure increases by 2% on labor and nearly
3% on materials. These results suggest that households use NREGA to stabilize
damage to agricultural income in hotter years.
The remarkable effect of NREGA in attenuating the relationship between
25We find that NREGA exposure has a negative level effect on math and reading scores, and
this effect is statistically significant. These are the opportunity cost effects shown in (355).
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temperature and test scores is of considerable importance. The result reinforces
the underlying income mechanism linking higher temperatures to lower test
score performance. Not only do higher temperatures lower test performance
by adversely affecting household agricultural income, but income-stabilizing
social protection programs can attenuate the negative effects of higher tempera-
tures. The implication is that in poor countries, where large parts of the popula-
tion are dependent on agriculture, social protection programs can play a central
role in shielding the poor from weather and facilitating adaptation to climate
change.26
4.7 Conclusion
As weather, in the age of climate change, becomes more pronounced, it is likely
to dramatically impact the poor by limiting pathways out of poverty that de-
pend on human capital production. We find that temperature in the calendar
year prior to the test, or “longer-run” temperature affects human capital produc-
tion. Furthermore, we show that agricultural income is likely one mechanism
driving this relationship. Importantly, these effects are separate from the phys-
iological impacts of day-of-test “short-run” temperature on test performance
documented in the literature this far. The separation of the pathways through
which temperature affects human capital over different time horizons has im-
portant implications for both climate change research and policy.
26These types of programs act as a powerful potential “public” adaptation to climate change,
which may mitigate some of the most harmful damages from climate change. Importantly, they
complement to private adaptations that households can undertake in response to heat, such as
crop choice, irrigation, livelihood adjustments and asset purchases, such as fans. Due to the
nature of our data, private adaptations fall outside of the scope of our work.
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First, the different structural relationships connecting short- and longer-run
temperature to economic outcomes highlights the limitations of existing ap-
proaches in quantifying ex-post adaptation by comparing the effects of short-
and longer-run temperatures (72; 120). This is especially likely to be the case
when considering low- and middle-income countries, where the majority of the
world’s population lives, and where the propagation of defensive investments
(e.g., air conditioners) is limited and livelihoods remain climate-exposed. The
existence of multiple structural relationships implies that modeling and pro-
jecting the impact of climate change in poor countries will require not only
understanding how these existing relationships will change over time through
adaptation, but also how new structural relationships between temperature and
economic outcomes will emerge over the next century.
Second, the presence of multiple pathways linking heat stress and a single
economic outcome suggests adaptation to higher temperatures will be required
along multiple margins. Effects of short-run temperature, driven by physiology,
can likely be corrected through defensive investments such as air conditioners,
or by changing the test calendar. For instance, India’s main board for primary
and secondary education has decided to move the important school-leaving
exams that are often the sole criterion in college admissions from March and
April, when the average temperatures in India are 22◦C and 26◦C respectively,
to February, when average temperatures are 17◦C (176). While this change is
not being made explicitly as a response to heat stress, it provides an opportu-
nity to understand how adjustments to the testing calendar can alter the effects
of short-run temperature.
By contrast, the effects of longer-run temperature are driven by damage to
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livelihoods that, in agrarian poor settings, are vulnerable to weather. Impor-
tantly, these effects of longer-run temperature may reduce human capital pro-
duction by adversely affecting agricultural income, and therefore may require
social protection programs that can protect the livelihoods of the poor from
weather and climate. While there is considerable work on the benefits of condi-
tional cash transfers and similar social protection programs, we know relatively
little about the role of such programs in combating vulnerability. If the suscep-
tibility of cognitive performance (or another measure of productivity) to tem-
perature can be characterized as vulnerability, social protection programs can
have not only direct effects, but also indirect benefits in reducing vulnerability.
Consequently, governments and policy makers should expect the dependence
on their social protection programs to increase in the face of climate change.
Developing countries will have to carefully allocate scarce resources between
productive capital and adaptive capital (272), and will have to make difficult
decisions about which margins of climate change damages to adapt to. Given
the central role of human capital production as a pathway out of poverty in
poor countries (39), climate change will not only affect the livelihoods of the ru-
ral poor but also, absent social protection programs, likely perpetuate persistent
poverty.
157
4.8 Tables and Figures
4.8.1 Figures
Figure 4.1: Average Annual Temperature in India at the District Level
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Daily Average Temperatures for India and Andhra Pradesh
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Figure 4.3: Timeline of Effects of Previous Year Temperature and Average Temperatures by Month and Season
(a) Timeline of Effects of Longer-run Temperature
(b) Average Temperatures By Month and Season
Notes: Figure (a) demonstrates the timeline over which the effects of temperature manifest. Figure (b) shows the average temperature by month over the 2006-2014 time period along
with average total rainfall in each month. The non-growing season is characterized by low rainfall whereas the growing season is characterized by high rainfall. GS: Growing Season;
NGS: Non-Growing Season; PY: Previous Year; CY: Current Year.
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Figure 4.4: Growing Season v. Non-Growing Season: Previous Year Tempera-
ture, Test Scores (ASER), and Agricultural Yields
(a) Math Scores (b) Reading Scores
(c) Top 6 Crops (d) Top 5 Monsoon Crops
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance divided amongst the growing season (June—Dec)
and the non-growing season (March—May). In panel (c) and (d) the figure shows the effect of longer-run temperature
(defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on previous year agricultural yields from
1979—2014 divided amongst the growing season (June—Dec) and the non-growing season (March—May). In all
panels, the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative
to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district and year fixed effects. Panel (a) and (b) also include age fixed effects.
We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at district level. GS: Growing Season;
NGS: Non-Growing Season.
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Figure 4.5: Heat-Resistant Crops and Effect of Previous Year Temperature on
Test Scores (ASER) by Historical Temperature Deciles
(a) Heat-Resistant Crop Area as a Fraction of
Total Cultivated Area
(b) Math Scores (c) Reading Scores
Notes: Figure (a) shows the average proportion of area within each district that is used to grow heat-resistant crops by
deciles of average long-term temperature or the climate normal. Figures (b) and (c) show the the marginal effects of
an additional hot day in the previous year (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3)
above 21◦C on current year math and reading performance respectively by deciles of average long-term temperature,
or the climate normal. The effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero and coefficients are interpreted
relative to 15◦C-21◦C. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation
and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 4.6: Event Study: Previous Year Temperature, NREGA, and Test Scores
(a) Math Scores: NREGA(T = τ) ∗ Days > 29◦C (b) Reading Scores: NREGA(T = τ) ∗ Days >
29◦C
(c) Math Scores: NREGA(T = τ) ∗ Days > 21◦C (d) Reading Scores: NREGA(T = τ) ∗ Days >
21◦C
Notes: The figure shows the influence of NREGA (in previous year) in attenuating the impact of longer-run temperature
(defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year test performance in both
math and reading. In Panel (a) and (b) (Panel (c) and (d)) the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is
normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). In Panel (a) and (b)
(Panel (c) and (d)) the omitted variable is the days above 29◦C (21◦C) in the year prior to the introduction of NREGA
(τ = −1). The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade status. We also
control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Previous Year Temperature on NREGA Take-Up
(a) Person Days (b) HH’s Completed All 100 Days
(c) Labor Expenditure (d) Material Expenditure
Notes: The figure shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on previous year NREGA take-up, completion, and program expenditures. The effect of days
between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions
include district and year fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered
at the district level.
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4.8.2 Tables
Table 4.1: Previous Year Temperature and Test Scores (ASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0024*** -0.0019***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
PY Days >21C -0.0016*** -0.0007*
(0.0005) (0.0004)
PY Days <13C -0.0034*** -0.0025***
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0031*** -0.0021***
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0021** -0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0008)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0008 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0027*** -0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0030*** -0.0014**
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0023*** -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0024*** -0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days >29C -0.0030*** -0.0018**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.084 0.084 0.068 0.068
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance using the ASER data set. In Columns (2) and (4)
(Columns (1) and (3)), the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is normalized to zero and all other coefficients
are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control
flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous
Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.2: Previous Year, Current Year and Next Year Temperature and Test
Scores (ASER)
(1) (2)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0030*** -0.0027***
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days >21C -0.0020*** -0.0008*
(0.0005) (0.0005)
CY Days <15C -0.0004 -0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0006)
CY Days >21C 0.0012* 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0005)
NY Days <15C -0.0006 -0.0017***
(0.0007) (0.0006)
NY Days >21C 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Observations 4182681 4182681
R2 0.088 0.071
Notes: This table shows the effect of previous year (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure
4.4(a)), current year, and next year temperature on current year math and reading performance using the ASER data set.
The effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-
21◦C. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year; CY: Current Year; NY: Next Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.3: Longer-Run Temperature and Test Scores (YLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Days Between Two Tests >23C -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Day-of-Test >23C -0.114*** 0.042
(0.043) (0.057)
Days Between Two Tests 23-25C -0.007*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Days Between Two Tests 25-27C -0.002** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002)
Days Between Two Tests >27C -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002)
Day-of-Test 23-25C -0.088** 0.006
(0.044) (0.056)
Day-of-Test 25-27C -0.164*** 0.153**
(0.056) (0.076)
Day-of-Test >27C -0.133* 0.252***
(0.075) (0.092)
Observations 2604 2604 2541 2541
R2 0.058 0.071 0.077 0.091
Notes: This table shows the effect of temperature (defined as number of days in a given bin between successive tests) on
math and reading performance using the YLS data set. The effect of days below 23◦C is normalized to zero and all other
coefficients are interpreted relative to below 23◦C. The regressions include individual, day of week, month, and survey
round (age) fixed effects. We control for day-of-test temperatures, and both cumulative and day-of-test precipitation as
well as cumulative and day-of-test precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by district-
week.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.4: Heat-Resistant Crops (HRC): Previous Year Temperature and Test
Scores (ASER)
(1) (2)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0026*** -0.0020***
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days >21C -0.0031*** -0.0015***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
PY Days >21C * HRC 0.0021*** 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Observations 4403838 4403838
R2 0.083 0.069
Notes: This table shows the effect of temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure
4.3) on current year math and reading performance by districts that grow heat-resistant using the ASER data set. In
all specifications, the effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted
relative to 15◦C-21◦C. All specifications include district, year, and age fixed effects. We control for precipitation and
humidity in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by district. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.5: Event Study: Previous Year Temperature, NREGA, and Test Scores
(ASER)
(1) (2)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE
NREGA: T = -3 -0.0269 0.0068
(0.0373) (0.0338)
NREGA: T = -2 -0.0216 -0.0255
(0.0342) (0.0316)
NREGA: T = 0 -0.0841*** -0.0585**
(0.0257) (0.0239)
NREGA: T = 1 -0.1385*** -0.1187***
(0.0342) (0.0325)
NREGA: T = 2 -0.1278** -0.1379**
(0.0600) (0.0553)
PY Days <13C -0.0031** -0.0014
(0.0015) (0.0013)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0009 -0.0013
(0.0017) (0.0015)
PY Days 17-19C 0.0028* 0.0024
(0.0016) (0.0015)
PY Days 19-21C 0.0027** 0.0021*
(0.0014) (0.0013)
PY Days 21-23C 0.0020 0.0014
(0.0014) (0.0012)
PY Days 23-25C 0.0015 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0012)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0015) (0.0013)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0016) (0.0014)
PY Days >29C -0.0017 -0.0012
(0.0017) (0.0015)
NREGA: T = -3 * PY Days >29C 0.0009* 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005)
NREGA: T = -2 * PY Days >29C 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004)
NREGA: T = 0 * PY Days >29C 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003)
NREGA: T = 1 * PY Days >29C 0.0010** 0.0010**
(0.0005) (0.0004)
NREGA: T = 2 * PY Days >29C 0.0009 0.0014*
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Observations 1866623 1866623
R2 0.177 0.168
Notes: This table shows the influence of NREGA (in previous year) in attenuating the effects of longer-run temperature
(defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading perfor-
mance. The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to
15◦C-17◦C. The omitted variable is the days above 29◦C in the year prior to the introduction of NREGA (τ = −1) The
regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade status. We also control flexibly for
precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 4.6: Event Study: Previous Year Temperature, NREGA, and Test Scores
(ASER)
(1) (2)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE
NREGA: T = -3 0.3797*** 0.2525***
(0.0915) (0.0902)
NREGA: T = -2 0.0052 -0.0331
(0.0996) (0.0914)
NREGA: T = 0 -0.1073 -0.0920
(0.0676) (0.0654)
NREGA: T = 1 -0.2285*** -0.1742**
(0.0834) (0.0768)
NREGA: T = 2 -0.2840** -0.2178*
(0.1266) (0.1190)
PY Days <15C -0.0047*** -0.0037***
(0.0011) (0.0010)
PY Days >21C -0.0011 -0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0007)
NREGA: T = -3 * PY Days >21C -0.0013*** -0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
NREGA: T = -2 * PY Days >21C -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003)
NREGA: T = 0 * PY Days >21C 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
NREGA: T = 1 * PY Days >21C 0.0006** 0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003)
NREGA: T = 2 * PY Days >21C 0.0009** 0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 1866623 1866623
R2 0.177 0.167
Notes: This table shows the influence of NREGA (in previous year) in attenuating the effects of longer-run temperature
(defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading perfor-
mance. The effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to
15◦C-21◦C. The omitted variable is the days above 21◦C in the year prior to the introduction of NREGA (τ = −1) The
regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade status. We also control flexibly for
precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Chapter 5
Within-Season Producer Response to
Warmer Temperatures: Defensive
Investments by Kenyan Farmers
5.1 Introduction
With short-run weather risk – e.g., due to extreme events like heat waves –
widely projected to grow in the years ahead due to climate change, it is crucial
to know how well and quickly farmers in low-income countries adjust to ex-
ogenous shocks to production. This question has interested development and
agricultural economists for decades, at least since (350), (21) and (152). More re-
cently, environmental economists have begun to explore this issue, recognizing
that agricultural damages induced by global warming may be especially prob-
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lematic for farmers in low-income countries who rely on traditional methods
for weather forecasting and may be unable to detect a change in temperature or
to respond promptly even to changes they notice, for example due to binding
financial liquidity constraints. But if farmers indeed detect and quickly adjust
to warming temperatures on their own, the resulting damages could be con-
tained. Therefore, understanding how and how fast farmers adapt to temper-
ature shocks can usefully inform allocation of scarce public resources to build
resilience and avoid permanent damage.
In this paper we use household-level panel data from maize farmers in
Kenya, and temperature data disaggregated across different stages of the crop
growth cycle, to investigate if and how farmers adjust agricultural inputs in
response to within-season temperature variation. Exploiting plausibly exoge-
nous variation in temperature at the village level after absorbing fixed village
level attributes (i.e., controlling for village fixed effects) as well as time vary-
ing province level characteristics (province-by-year fixed effects), we show that
Kenyan farmers respond promptly to temperature variation. More specifically,
they increase pesticide use in response to heat-induced increased biotic stress
from diseases and pests that are most effectively addressed soon after emer-
gence, early in the season. And farmers increase weeding effort throughout the
season in response to higher temperatures that promote weed growth. Mean-
while, farmers reduce inorganic fertilizer use early in the growing season, con-
temporaneously with increased pesticide use. That could be a response to in-
creased yield risk, or binding financial liquidity constraints inducing trade-offs
among input expenditures, or both. Farmers expressly identify warmer tem-
peratures as a threat to maize productivity due to greater incidence of pests,
weeds and crop diseases. And they undertake defensive investments quickly in
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response to short-run temperature shocks.
More precisely, we find that 10 extra growing degree days (GDD) over 8C
during the initial vegetative growth stage increases the proportion of farmers
using pesticides by around 10%, and reduces the proportion using inorganic
fertilizer by approximately 2%, compared to the baseline. Similarly, a 10 day in-
crease in GDD increases pesticide application rates per acre by roughly 20%,
while reducing fertilizer application rates by over 10%. And 10 extra GDD
during the pre-planting phase increases weeding labor by 0.2 days. Because
most farmers report financial liquidity constraints limit their purchase of in-
puts, temperature shocks may confront farmers with a trade-off between defen-
sive investments in pesticides and weeding labor, versus yield-increasing fer-
tilizers. Farmers’ responsiveness to short-run temperature shocks also appears
positively associated with wealth, as reflected in land holdings.1 Overall, our
results are consistent with a model in which farmers make production decisions
sequentially, promptly adjusting to new information as it arrives within season,
subject to financial constraints.
These findings are noteworthy as well because the maize growing regions
of Kenya fall in temperate zones in which warming temperatures are widely
anticipated to boost staple crop yields through higher temperatures accelera-
tive effect on photosynthesis. Average daily temperatures in the villages we
study range from 12-29C (Figure 5.1), a range over which maize yields typically
increase with warming temperatures. In fact, the 99th percentile of the distri-
bution of daily maximum temperatures for villages in our sample is 32C (Fig-
ure 5.2). Maize only declines physiologically due to heat stress above 29-30C
1This result is consistent with numerous papers that show that financial constraints faced
by farmers in low-income countries inhibit the adoption of modern agricultural inputs (e.g.,
(102; 123; 278; 332)).
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(249; 345). Large swaths of maize farms in Africa fall in similar agro-ecological
zones (Figure 5.3). Because these Kenyan households’ maize crops are unlikely
to experience direct, abiotic heat stress from the modest warming observed in
the data – and anticipated in coming years – any adverse effects on agriculture,
and consequent margins of adjustment, almost surely result from indirect, biotic
stresses arising from the temperature response of pests and pathogens.
In investigating if maize farmers in Kenya adapt in the short run to within-
season temperature variation, we contribute to two related literatures. First, a
longstanding literature shows that farmers in low-income countries can and do
adjust production decisions quickly, adapting to new information as it emerges
(21; 152; 350). This paper appears to be the first since (152) to empirically investi-
gate if farmers promptly adjust their input allocation in response to exogenous
shocks to production. However, while (152) evaluates farmer response to ini-
tial rainfall in Burkina Faso, we examine how and how fast do Kenyan farmers
adjust their inputs in response to warmer temperatures during the growing sea-
son.
Second, this paper also contributes to a large environmental economics lit-
erature on agricultural adaptation to climate change. Within this literature, few
studies examine how farmers adjust to higher than normal temperatures in de-
veloping countries (e.g., (236; 237; 238; 353)).2 These papers typically rely on
cross-sectional variation to compare longer-run outcomes such as irrigation and
crop choice in hot versus cold areas. While the cross-sectional approach approx-
imates the ideal climate change experiment, omitted variables concerns in this
approach mean that the average climate could be correlated with other fixed,
2A number of papers have examined the extent of adaptation rather than how farmers adjust
to warming temperatures (e.g., (268); (343); (127); (128) (345); (119); (375); (71)). However, among
these only (375) examines agricultural adaptation in a developing country, India.
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unobserved factors. In this paper, we exploit plausibly exogenous short-run
variation in weather to examine within-season adjustments in agricultural in-
puts. If farmers promptly adapt input applications within season in response
to warmer temperature that differentially affect crop growth across different
stages in the agricultural cycle – both directly through plant physiological ef-
fects of temperature and indirectly through temperature-induced changes in the
supporting agro-ecology – then any analyses based on seasonal or annual tem-
perature variation may miss important behavioral responses in the short-run.
Moreover, if farmers can adjust in the short run, it is more plausible that they
will also be able to adjust in the long run using methods unavailable to them in
the short run.3 Lastly, this literature has also overlooked farmer defensive in-
vestments arising not due to heat stress but rather due to biotic stresses arising
from broader agroecological response to warmer weather. To our knowledge,
this is the first economics study to isolate this mechanism behind farmer adap-
tation to temperature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we provide
background on relevant ecological and agronomic literatures, and briefly dis-
cuss the role of credit and insurance markets in agricultural technology adop-
tion in poor countries. Section 5.3 describes the data. In Section 5.4 we outline
the empirical strategy and our main results for the effects of temperature on
agricultural input decisions. Finally, Section 5.5 offers concluding remarks.
3For example, (339) famously argues that the Le Chatelier principle implies that demand and
supply elasticities are lower in the short run than in the long run because of the quasi-fixed-cost
constraint that binds only in the short run.
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Temperature, Pests, Weeds and Pesticides
The dependence of plant diseases and pests on weather is well-known amongst
plant pathologists and entomologists (e.g., (91; 99; 165)). For that reason, the
broader ecological literature concludes that climate change will increase chal-
lenges to agriculture from pests, weeds and diseases, in part due to higher than
normal temperatures (e.g., (312); (327)).
For instance, grey leaf spot is a major maize fungal disease in Kenya. It
was first reported in Kenya during 1995, and small-scale farmers have contin-
ued to experience considerable yield losses from grey leaf spot (360). Infection
and growth of grey leaf spot are most likely to occur following a humid and
warm period. Specifically, at 100% relative humidity, the optimum temperature
for sporulation is between 25-30C. Similarly, the highest rates of lesion expan-
sion were observed at 25C and 30C (314). Experiments indicate that fungicide
treatment should be initiated after the disease was observed but before high
levels were present (418). So higher temperatures could increase gray leaf spot
incidence and induce early season adaptive responses by farmers. Delayed re-
sponse to fungal infection is typically ineffective and thus a poor use of scarce
resources.
Similarly, insect behavior, distribution, development and survival are
strongly coupled with environmental conditions, especially temperature, since
insects do not use their metabolism to control their body temperature, but rather
depend on ambient air temperature. Global warming will favor insect prolifera-
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tion and increase the incidence and severity of insect-related damages in maize
(76).
The most common insect maize pest in Kenya is the stem borer. Dam-
age caused by stem borers is one of the main causes of low maize yields
(366). Lepidopteran stem borers such as the indigenous noctuids Busseola fusca
(Fuller) and Sesamia calamistis (Hampson) and the exotic crambid Chilo partel-
lus (Swinhoe) attack the maize crop in East Africa: larval survival rates across
these stem borer species is highest at 20C.4 On the other hand, growth rates
for Busseola fusca (Fuller), Sesamia calamistis (Hampson), and Chilo partel-
lus (Swinhoe) are highest at 30C, 25C, and 20C, respectively, and lowest at 15C
(294). Female stem borer moths lay eggs on maize leaves. The newly emerged
larvae enter into the whorls of young maize plants and feed actively on the ten-
der leaves. Later, the larvae bore into the stem and start tunneling. Stem borers
can be controlled by applications of insecticides to the leaf whorl early in crop
growth cycle to kill early larval instars; this method has limited effectiveness
once the larvae bore into the stem (169). So as with gray leaf spot disease, the
stem borer pest pressure on maize in Kenya should increase with higher tem-
peratures, inducing early season response through pesticide application.
Weeds compete with crops for nutrients, moisture, light and space, ad-
versely affecting crop yields. Weed growth is also influenced by abiotic con-
ditions such as temperature and humidity (144; 317; 361). For instance, milder
winters are likely to increase the survival of some winter annual weeds, whereas
warmer summers may allow other type of weeds to grow in previously inhos-
pitable regions (60; 189; 415). Weed control during the first weeks after planting
4Busseola fusca (Fuller) has higher survival rates at 30C than at 25C. Sesamia calamistis
(Hampson) and Chilo partellus (Swinhoe) have higher survival rate at 25C than at 30C (294).
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is crucial because weeds compete vigorously with the maize crop for nutrients
and water during this crucial period of plant growth (139). Extension recom-
mendations call for maize fields to be kept weed-free for the first 56 days after
planting to achieve maximum yields (11). One week’s delay in first weeding
may reduce maize yields by as much as one-third (298). Very early in the sea-
son, weed control among small farmers in Kenya is typically accomplished with
household labor. But if weed growth is aggressive, farmers might use herbi-
cides - a pesticide targeted specially at weeds before planting or in the early
post-planting stage as a substitute for weeding labor (170). Once the crop is
established, however, any further weed control requires additional labor effort,
which continues nearly until harvest. As with maize disease and pests, higher
temperatures are thus expected to induce greater weed competition with crops,
forcing farmers to devote more labor and pesticides to combating weeds. The
effects of warmer temperatures on manual weeding may extend deeper into the
growing season as farmers can adjust labor inputs later in the season. These
predictions from the agro-ecological literature mirror what we find in the data.
5.2.2 Fertilizer Use Under Liquidity Constraints and Risk
Higher than normal temperatures increase the prevalence of pests and diseases,
plausibly forcing farmers to increase defensive investments on loss-reducing
inputs like pesticides (e.g., herbicides, insecticides, fungicides) and diverting
resources from productivity-enhancing technologies like fertilizer. Such effects
on fertilizer uptake might be driven by ex ante credit constraints that compel
poor farmers to trade off expenditures in one area for another.
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Alternatively, farmers might anticipate increased risk of crop losses and re-
duce the capital they put at risk through fertilizer purchases. These two effects
are not mutually exclusive and can be difficult to fully disentangle. For instance,
(332) show that poor farmers facing increased rainfall variability tend to hold
a portfolio that is less influenced by rainfall, although wealthier farmers fac-
ing varying exposure to risk do not exhibit changing portfolios of investments.
More recently and nearby, (123), find that both ex ante credit constraints and
the possibility of low consumption outcomes when harvests fail discourage the
application of fertilizer in Ethiopia.
Typically, maize farmers apply fertilizer twice. Basal fertilizer applications
occur at planting. Top dressing fertilizer application occurs after plant emerges
but seldom without basal fertilizer application. But if fertilizer is used at plant-
ing, top dressing often occurs post-germination, roughly 4-6 weeks into the
growing season. Thus, if farmers promptly adjust to new information (21; 152),5
these effects should respond primarily to temperature shocks during the pre-
planting or early vegetative growth phase. This is particularly true in our con-
text, as agricultural input markets in Kenya are relatively well-developed com-
pared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (358), and because Kenyan farm-
ers usually buy fertilizer just before applying it (143).
5(134) shows that within-season measures of the subjective probability distributions that
farmers hold dictate the effectiveness of policies intended to support agrarian households.
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5.3 Data
We use a qualitatively rich, household-level panel data set, representative of
farmers in Kenya’s main maize cultivating provinces. We augment these with
detailed village level data with daily weather variables including temperature,
rainfall, humidity and soil moisture.
5.3.1 Household Data
The household panel survey data are representative of the main maize-growing
areas in Kenya. The survey was designed and implemented under the Tege-
meo Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis (TAMPA) project, a collabo-
ration among Tegemeo Institute of Egerton University, Michigan State Univer-
sity, and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute. Figure D.1 maps the sur-
vey villages across Kenya. These villages were selected randomly from each
of eight predetermined agro-economic zones and then households were sam-
pled randomly from each selected village. We use data from a balanced panel
of 1242 households collected over five rounds: 1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-
07, and 2009-10. The survey includes detailed agricultural input and output
data, demographics, credit and infrastructure information. The 2009-10 round
collected rich subjective data on farmers perceptions of the impacts of changes
in temperature, as well as reasons for non-adoption of fertilizer. Villages were
geo-referenced, allowing us to merge the household data with daily tempera-
ture, precipitation, relative humidity and soil moisture data at the village level
as well as agro-ecological zone crop calendars.
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Table D.1 presents summary statistics for our balanced sample from 1997-
2010. ‘Pesticide 0/1’ and ‘Pesticide/Acre(kgs)’ capture the uptake rate and
application intensity of pesticide use (irrespective of take-up) during the main
growing season, respectively.6 These detailed data were only collected in 2003-
04, 2006-07, and 2009-10. While answering questions on inputs, respondents
often used pesticides and specific pests, weeds and disease repellents (e.g., her-
bicide, insecticide, fungicide) interchangeably. Therefore, our measure of pesti-
cide use takes the binary value of 1 if a farmer uses any chemical or biological
agent that protects crops from pests, weeds or crop diseases, and 0 otherwise.
Almost 30% of households in our balanced panel adopted some variety of pesti-
cides in 2003, use then increased to 65% in 2006, before dropping off somewhat
to 50% in 2009. The average maize farmer used 0.25 kg/acre of pesticides in
2003, increasing to over 0.5 kg/acre by 2009. ‘Own Weeding Days/Acre’ indi-
cates the average number own (household) labor days spent in weeding activi-
ties. ‘Fertilizer 0/1’ depicts the uptake of inorganic fertilizer in the main grow-
ing season, 1997-2010. Fertilizer use is high amongst maize farmers in rural
Kenya. In 1997, almost 65% of households used fertilizer, while the correspond-
ing figure is 75% for 2010. The average maize farmer used around 45 kgs/acre
in 1997. Average quantity use then increased to over 55 kgs/acre in 1999, before
dropping to 50 kgs/acre in 2009. Lastly, ‘Maize Output/Acre(kgs)’ captures
average maize yields over time.
Finally, Tables D.2 and D.3 show household-level transitions of pesticide and
fertilizer use in the data, with 30% (60%) of households switching into or out of
fertilizer (pesticide) use across survey rounds. So there is clearly considerable
across-round variation in input use patterns by Kenyan maize farmers around
6We assume all pesticides to have the same density and convert all units to kilograms (kgs).
181
the broader trend of expanding purchased input use over time. We exploit the
inter-temporal variation in household-specific input use to identify the causal
effects of temperature shocks within specific periods of the growing season on
farmer defensive investments in preventing crop loss due to biotic stresses and
any contemporaneous adjustment in productivity-enhancing fertilizer invest-
ments.
5.3.2 Kenyan Maize Calendar
To uncover the underlying mechanisms that influence farmer climate adapta-
tion strategies, and plausibly related spillover effects on productivity-enhancing
inputs, we need to disaggregate the main growing season. So as to parse the in-
formation set available to farmers as they make sub-season-specific input use
choices, we use maize crop calendars specific to each sub-agro-ecological zone
(AEZ) in Kenya, obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations, and broken into three distinct stages of the agricultural cy-
cle.7 This calendar gives the usual start and end dates of the planting period and
harvest period for each sub-AEZ and for long and short rainy seasons. We use
the calendar for the long rainy season, which is the main growing season. We
define as the ‘pre-planting’ period the two months right before planting begins,
with or without basal fertilizer application. Land preparation occurs during this
pre-planting period, sometimes including clearing weeds.8 We define the four
to six weeks right after planting as the initial post-planting period. This is the
7The maize calendar was downloaded from http://www.fao.org/agriculture/seed/
cropcalendar/welcome.do.
8Please see http://nafis.go.ke/agriculture/maize/establishment-of-maize/ for recom-
mendation on land preparation and http://www.nafis.go.ke/agriculture/maize/field-
management-practices/ for recommendation on fertilizer application.
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recommended period for top dressing application of fertilizer. Thus, the three
phases of the main agricultural cycle are: 1) ‘PP’: land preparation period (from
onset of pre-planting to onset of planting) 2) ‘GS1’: planting and basal fertil-
izer application period (the initial post-planting period from onset of planting
to onset of top dressing fertilizer application), and 3) ‘GS2’: post-planting top
dressing fertilizer application period (after top dressing fertilizer to onset of har-
vest) (Figure D.2).
Kenya’s topography is quite heterogeneous (Figure D.3). There exist sub-
stantial heterogeneity in agro-ecological zones that span the villages in our data.
Table D.4 provides maize crop calendar specific to each province in Kenya, bro-
ken into three stages of the agricultural cycle described above.9 Although there
exist differences in the maize crop calendar within provinces, discrepancies in
the maize crop calendars across provinces are far more significant. Therefore,
our baseline econometric specification includes village and province-by-round
fixed effects. Any remaining temperature variation pertains only to within-
province-round deviations from village means. For example, the amount by
which western parts of Nyanza province are warmer than normal in a given
survey round in GS1, compared to how much eastern Nyanza is warmer than
normal in the same round in GS1.
There exist almost no differences in the maize crop calendar within districts.
In robustness checks, we show our results are robust to the inclusion of district-
by-round fixed effects where the remaining temperature variation pertains only
to within-district-round deviations from village means. In addition, we show
our point estimates are largely unaffected when we assign a uniform maize
9Growing degree days are calculated holding maize crop calendars fixed across survey-
rounds. Therefore, growing degree days do not vary due to potentially endogenous weather-
induced changes to the maize crop calendar from year to year.
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crop calendar to all villages in the Western, Coast, Central, Nyanza, and Rift
Valley province and a uniform maize crop calendar to all villages in the Eastern
province, as well as when we subsequently drop the Eastern province from our
sample.
5.3.3 Weather Data
Because of the incomplete coverage of ground weather stations in Kenya, we
use daily temperature, precipitation, relative humidity and soil moisture data
from various gridded and satellite data sets. Daily temperature data are from
the ERA-Interim Reanalysis archive, which is constructed by researchers at the
European Centre for Medium-Term Weather Forecasting. It is a gridded reanal-
ysis data set providing information on average daily temperature on a 1 de-
gree x 1 degree latitude-longitude grid, from 1979 to present day (118). A point
shapefile for each village in the TAMPA sample was used to generate the value
of each point for each daily temperature pixel it intersects with. We generated a
table containing daily temperature values for each village coordinate point for
our study period. Similarly, we generated daily precipitation data from the Cli-
mate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation Station (CHIRPS) data set of daily
0.5 degree resolution gridded data for all of Africa.10 Daily relative humidity
data came from NASA.11 These satellite and model derived solar and meteoro-
logical data cover the global surface at 1 degree x 1 degree resolution. Lastly,
daily soil moisture data are sourced from the European Space Agency. This
global soil moisture data set has been generated using active and passive mi-
crowave spaceborne instruments and covers the 37 year period from 1978 to
10CHIRPS was downloaded from http://chg.geog.ucsb.edu/data/chirps/
11The relative humidity data are from https://power.larc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/agro.cgi?na
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2015. It provides daily surface soil moisture with a spatial resolution of 0.25
degrees.12
From daily data, we generate aggregate weather indicators for each stage of
the crop growth cycle, across five rounds of the TAMPA data. For our primary
variable of interest, temperature, we use the concept of cumulative growing de-
gree days (GDD). GDD measures the intensity of daily exposure to temperatures
above a lower bound, beneath which cold stress might impede plant growth,
and below an upper bound at which heat stress might begin, to estimate the
effects of temperature on fertilizer and pesticide use, as well as weeding labor
days. The literature has demonstrated the relationship between temperature
and agricultural outcomes using GDDs (249; 343; 345). We use daily average
temperatures to calculate the number of days each village is exposed to tem-
peratures above a lower bound (8C), and below an upper bound (30C), and
then sum these daily exposures for each of the three phases during the main
growing season for those bounds. GDD8,30 represents a typical measure used
to predict maize development rates (249), and is perfectly correlated with aver-
age growing-season temperature: we do not observe any temperatures below
8C. And average daily temperatures in the data are less than 30C (Figure 5.1).13
Figure D.4 shows the distribution of daily average temperatures in each phase
of the agricultural cycle during the main growing season for all villages in the
TAMPA data. Table D.5 presents summary statistics for GDD above 8C in each
phase of the agricultural cycle for all five rounds of the household survey.
12The soil moisture data are downloaded from http://www.esa-soilmoisture-
cci.org/node/145
13In fact, the 99th percentile of the distribution of maximum daily temperatures for villages
in our sample is 32C (Figure 5.2). This is significant since optimum maize growth occurs at
temperatures of 24-30C (319). Relatedly, (345) and (249) find that maize yields only decline
physiologically due to heat stress above 29-30C.
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5.4 Temperature and Agricultural Input Use Re-
sponse
Almost 50% of households in this sample reported having noticed a change in
temperature in the last 10 years, and over 80% of those households indicated
that they were affected by said change (Table D.6).14 If higher temperatures
increase the incidence of pests, weeds and diseases, then farmers may incur
greater adaptive expenditures on pesticides and weeding labor, and simulta-
neously reduce use of productivity enhancing fertilizer due to financial con-
straints, as just explained. Indeed, the qualitative evidence from the TAMPA
data set supports such an explanation: almost 40% of maize-farmers affected by
changes in temperature pointed to an increase in the incidence of pests, weeds
and crop diseases as one of the primary consequences of changes in temperature
(Table D.7). Close to 60% of all non-adopters of fertilizer pointed to financial
constraints as the reason for non-adoption (Table D.8).
In this section, we formally test the hypothesis that temperature varia-
tion during the growing season induces prompt agricultural input adjustments
among maize farmers in Kenya. We rule out alternative mechanisms in Ap-
pendix D.1.
14Figure D.5 presents the historical temperature trends for villages in the TAMPA data and
shows that average yearly temperatures have increased in the last 10 years.
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5.4.1 Research Design
To examine the effect of temperature on agricultural input use, we estimate the
following model:
Yi jdqt = β1(GDD8,30)PPjdqt + β2(GDD8,30)
GS 1
jdqt+
β3(GDD8,30)GS 2jdqt + f (Rain)
PP
jdqt + f (Rain)
GS 1
jdqt
+ f (Rain)GS 2jdqt + α j + µqt + i jdqt (5.1)
Yi jdqt is fertilizer or pesticide use (a binary variable equal to one if pesticides
were used) for household i in village j, in district d in province q in round t.
We control for cumulative rainfall using upper and lower tercile indicators cal-
culated for each period in the agricultural cycle using daily data, and include
village fixed effects (α j). We also include province-by-round fixed effects (µqt) to
control for unobservables that vary by province over time, such as input prices
or seasonal climate forecasts. (GDD8,30) jdqt is the sum of degree days over 8C
during each stage of the main growing season in Kenya.15 For example, β1 repre-
sents the marginal effect of an extra growing degree day during the pre-planting
phase.
We also estimate a second, more flexible model of the effects of temperature
15In Section 5.4.2, we demonstrate that our results are robust to the choice of lower bound
used to calculate growing degree days.
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on agricultural input use:
Yi jdqt = β2T (18C − 19C)PPjdqt + β3T (19C − 20C)PPjdqt + β4T (20C − 21C)PPjdqt
+ β5T (21C − 22C)PPjdqt + β6T (> 22C)PPjdqt
+ γ2T (18C − 19C)GS 1jdqt + γ3T (19C − 20C)GS 1jdqt + γ4T (20C − 21C)GS 1jdqt
+ γ5T (21C − 22C)GS 1jdqt + γ6T (> 22C)GS 1jdqt
+ α2T (18C − 19C)GS 2jdqt + α3T (19C − 20C)GS 2jdqt + α4T (20C − 21C)GS 2jdqt
+ α5T (21C − 22C)GS 2jdqt + α6T (> 22C)GS 2jdqt
+ f (Rain)PPjdqt + f (Rain)
GS 1
jdqt + f (Rain)
GS 2
jdqt + α j + µqt + i jdqt (5.2)
The notation is the same as in Equation 5.1. The key difference is our coefficients
of interest: T(.). Temperature bins or T(.) are counts of the number of the days in
each stage of the main growing season with average daily temperature within
the specified range. For example, T (20C − 21C)GS 1jdqt is the number of days in the
initial vegetative growth phase (GS1) with average daily temperature between
20C and 21C. The coldest temperature bin is a count of the number of days
with average temperature less than 18C, and the hottest temperature bin is a
count of the number of days with average temperature greater than 22C. We
chose these endpoints because 18C and 22C are the 20th and 80th percentiles of
average daily temperatures across villages in the TAMPA sample from 1990 to
2012. The bins in between are evenly spaced one degree apart. The omitted bin
is the <18C bin, which we chose to omit because it has the maximum (minimum)
coefficient of all the bins for fertilizer use (pesticide use and weeding labor). All
other bins are interpreted relative to this bin. For example, γ6, the coefficient on
the hottest bin, is the marginal effect on agricultural inputs of an extra day with
average temperature greater than > 22C in GS1 relative to a day with average
temperature below 18C in GS1. In estimating this flexible approach we follow
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prior work in climate economics and avoid imposing restrictive assumptions
on the functional relationship between temperature and agricultural production
decisions (205).
We cluster standard errors at the village level. The identifying assumption
is that changes in temperature experienced by a village during each phase of
the agricultural cycle is exogenous to unobservable household or village level
characteristics that vary over time. The assumption is plausible given the ran-
domness of weather fluctuations and the inability of rural households to predict
such fluctuations beyond common spatial features such as season climate fore-
casts which we control for with province-by-round fixed effects (µqt). As robust-
ness checks, we also control for time-invariant household level characteristics
(e.g., farming skill, access to groundwater, education, relationship with input
suppliers), as well as district level attributes that vary over time (e.g., local elec-
tions), and provide plausibly causal estimates for the effects of temperature on
agricultural input use.
5.4.2 Results
The Response of Pesticides Use to Temperature
We estimate equation 5.1 and find that an extra 1 degree day above 8C in the
initial growth period (GS1) increases the proportion of households using pesti-
cides by almost 0.3 percentage points (Table 5.1: Column 1). In 2003, almost 30%
of maize-farmers in the TAMPA data adopted pesticides. Thus our point esti-
mates imply that an extra 1 DD in GS1 leads to an approximately 1% increase
in pesticide users. Similarly, an extra DD in GS1 leads to a 2% increase in the
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intensity of pesticide use (Table 5.1: Column 2). Note that since pesticide appli-
cation is most effective - and thus most commonly applied - soon after pests are
found on germinated crop, the effect should be most pronounced in GS1, not
in pre-planting (PP) or post-planting (GS2) periods. This is precisely what we
find.
If greater heat increases the incidence of weeds, we should also observe an
increase in manual weeding labor. Indeed, we find that an extra degree day
in the pre-planting period (PP) is associated with a 0.017 days (0.2%) increase
in own (household) weeding labor per acre (Table 5.1: Column 5). In fact, the
effects on weeding labor start during pre-planting (PP), when increased weed-
ing during land preparation would be a natural response to more robust weed
growth in warmer weather.16
Next, we estimate Equation 5.2 and find that an extra day above 22C relative
to a day with average temperature below 18C in the initial growth period (GS1)
increases the proportion of households using pesticides by over 1.5 percentage
points (Figure 5.4: Panel (a)). Similarly, an extra day above 22C relative to a
day below 18C in the initial growth period (GS1) leads to a 12% increase in the
intensity of pesticide use (Figure 5.4: Panel (b)). Lastly, an extra day above 22C
relative to a day below 18C in the pre-planting period (PP) is associated with a
16The effect of an extra degree day over 8C in the initial growth period (GS1) and the post-
planting period (GS2) on own weeding effort, however, is quite imprecise. If weed growth is ag-
gressive, farmers might use herbicides - a pesticide targeted specially at weeds in the early post-
planting stage (GS1) as a substitute for weeding labor (170). Once the crop is established (GS2),
however, any further weed control requires additional labor effort, which continues nearly un-
til harvest. One explanation for the noisy GS2 coefficient might be non-linearities in the effects
of temperature on weed growth: (i) we find a statistically significant positive effect of an extra
degree day over 21C in GS2 on own weeding labor and (ii) in our nonparametric econometric
model, we find large positive effect of temperature on own weeding labor in the post-planting
period. Lastly, we find an extra degree day over 8C in the initial vegetative growth phase (GS1)
is associated with a 1% increase in expenditure on hired labor per acre (Table D.9). This suggests
during the planting period (GS1), presumably facing greater constraints on own labor, farmers
tackle aggressive weed growth using herbicides and hired weeding labor.
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0.14 day increase in own (household) weeding labor per acre (Figure 5.4: Panel
(e)). The effects on weeding labor continues throughout the growing season:
although imprecisely estimated, an extra day above 22C relative to a day below
18C in the initial growth period (post-planting period) is associated with a 0.04
(0.07) day increase in own weeding labor per acre.
Combined with the qualitative evidence presented in Table D.7, these results
strongly suggest that early growing season temperatures in the pre-planting and
initial vegetative growth stages increase the incidence of pests and diseases,
driving use of adaptive inputs like pesticides in the early crop growth stages.
We find no significant impact of heat during latter stages of the growing season,
by which time farmer response to crop diseases and pests is likely unproductive.
Effects on weeding labor start early, and are equally pronounced deeper into the
growing season as the ability to reverse the adverse effects of weed competition
persists longer as well. Household labor can clear weeds manually if they sur-
vive initial application of herbicides, or to tackle encroachment of weeds that
arise later in the growing season, due to higher than normal temperatures.
The Effects of Temperature on Fertilizer Use
Next, we examine effects on productivity-enhancing inputs like inorganic fer-
tilizer. We find that an extra DD above 8C in the initial planting or basal fertil-
izer application period (GS1) decreases the proportion of households applying
fertilizer by 0.1 percentage points (Table 5.1: Column 3). These effects coin-
cide temporally with the pesticide effects observed, consistent with a liquidity
constraint or a production risk mechanism. Almost 65% of the households in
our balanced panel applied fertilizer in 1997, so a 0.1 percentage point decrease
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translates into a 0.15% decrease from adoption levels in Round 1. Similarly, an
extra DD over 8C in GS1 reduces fertilizer application rates per acre by around
1.3% (Table 5.1: Column 4). These effects are driven by early growing season
temperatures, coinciding with the basal fertilizer application period, by which
time financial constraints typically begin to bind, consistent with qualitative ev-
idence presented in Table D.8.
We estimate Equation 5.2 and find that an extra day above 22C relative to a
day with average temperature below 18C in the initial growth period (GS1) de-
creases the proportion of households applying fertilizer by roughly 1 percentage
point (Figure 5.4: Panel (c)). Similarly, an extra day above 22C relative to a day
below 18C in the initial growth period (GS1) reduces fertilizer application rates
per acre by 10% (Figure 5.4: Panel (d)).
Back of the envelope estimates indicate a roughly one-to-one correspon-
dence between increase in defensive expenditures and reduction in expenditure
on fertilizer: An extra degree day in the initial planting period (GS1) increases
expected pesticide expenditure by KES 4.17, and reduces fertilizer expenditure
by KES 12.99. Additionally, an extra degree day in PP increases the cost of own
weeding labor (opportunity cost) by KES 9.87.1718 This might suggest that as
liquidity constraints begin to bind for farmers, expenditure on loss-reducing
adaptive inputs necessitates reduction in fertilizer use.
171 United States Dollar (USD) = 100 Kenyan Shilling (KES).
18We compute the average price/kg for both pesticides and inorganic fertilizer using the
shilling amount spent by users of each input per acre divided by the kilogram quantity used per
acre across rounds. We use the cost of hired weeding labor/day for households who hired weed-
ing labor to impute the cost of own weeding labor/day. On average 52.14 kg/acre of fertilizer
is used across rounds, and a kilogram of fertilizer costs KES 24.91 on average. So, using coeffi-
cients from Table 5.1, an extra degree day decreases fertilizer expenditure by (0.01*52.14)*24.91.
Similarly, pesticide expenditure increased by (0.02*0.43)*484.77, while cost of own weeding la-
bor increased by (0.02*4.88)*101.08.
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However, another mechanism might be that increased ex ante maize yield
risk, due to an increase in disease, pest, and weed pressure, could adversely
affect fertilizer uptake. In Table D.10, we show an extra degree day in the ini-
tial vegetative growth stage (GS1) decreases total agricultural input expendi-
ture per acre by 0.9%. The negative and statistically significant point estimate
is consistent with the hypothesis that farmers are trading off defensive input
expenditures for productive input expenditures but perhaps also responding to
changes in output risk due to increase in the incidence of pests, crop diseases,
and weeds.
Robustness Checks
We exploit plausibly random round-by-round variation in temperature at
the village level beyond time-invariant village level characteristics and time-
varying spatial or administrative features, for which we control with province-
by-round fixed effects, to provide plausibly causal estimates for the effects of
temperature on agricultural input use.19 After removing village and province-
by-round fixed effects, any remaining temperature variation pertains only to
within-province-round deviations from village means.
Since Kenyan provinces are large and topographically heterogeneous, it is
plausible that we can control for time varying administrative features at a much
smaller spatial unit like district, and still have enough variation to precisely
estimate our coefficients of interest. However, generally whenever, for exam-
ple, eastern Migori, a district in Nyanza province, is warmer than normal, so
is western Migori, because temperatures vary smoothly in space due to ther-
19Including household fixed effects doesn’t affect our estimates since the treatment (tempera-
ture) is at the village level (Table D.11 and Figure D.6).
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modynamics. Therefore, we might not have sufficient identifying variation in
temperature after removing household and district-by-year fixed effects to get
precise estimates.
We report within- and across-province temperature deviations from
province-specific time trends and village means, as well as within-province-
round and within-district-round temperature deviations from village means in
Table D.12. The entries report the percentage of households-by-round obser-
vations with deviations at least as large as 5 or 10 degrees, averaged over the
five survey rounds. For example, the “Removed Prov-Specific Time Trends”
degree-days column indicates that 65% and 49% of households-by-round ob-
servations observed deviations larger than 5 and 10 degree-days in the planting
period (GS1), respectively. The corresponding percentages for the “Removed
Province*Round Effects” and the “Removed District*Round Effects” degree-
days columns are 50% and 21% and 23% and 7%, respectively. Unsurpris-
ingly, an econometric model with province-round fixed effects exploit smaller
(greater) residual temperature variation than a specification with province-
specific time trends (district-round fixed effects).
In Table D.13 and Figure D.7, we remove province-by-round fixed effects, in-
stead including province-specific linear, quadratic, and cubic time trends to con-
trol for province-specific time-variant unobservables. We exploit both within-
and across-province temperature deviations from province-specific time trends
and village means. Our point estimates remain unaffected.
Next, we estimate Equations 5.1 and 5.2 with district-by-round fixed effects
instead of province-by-round effects. We lose precision for pesticide use, al-
though the point estimate remains relatively unaffected (Table D.14 and Figure
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D.8).
A sizable proportion of households, across rounds, did not use fertilizer
or pesticides. Thus, limited (specifically, censored) dependent variable mod-
els might be appropriate for estimating the effect of temperature on intensity
of input use. However, fixed effects in tobit models based on the normal dis-
tribution yield inconsistent estimates, as fixed effects cannot be treated as inci-
dental parameters without biasing the other model coefficients, so long as N>T
(206). Thus, for consistent estimation, we provide regression estimates using
the Honore´ semi-parametric fixed effect tobit estimator (201).20
As before, the effects on pesticide and fertilizer use are driven by early grow-
ing season temperatures. Moreover, early growing season estimates are statisti-
cally significant as well. We also provide regression estimates for weeding labor.
Table D.15 shows the effects of temperature on intensity of pesticide and fertil-
izer use based on Honore´ household fixed effects tobit. For comparison, the
standard tobit is also presented in Table D.16. Qualitative conclusions drawn
from our main results presented in Table 5.1 remain unchanged with either cen-
sored dependent variable estimator.
In Tables D.17 and D.18, we show our results are relatively unaffected when
we assign a uniform maize crop calendar across villages in the data. In Ta-
ble D.19, we adjust standard errors to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in
(103), and implemented by (202). We allow errors to be spatially autocorrelated
within a distance of 500 km. Our point estimates remain precisely estimated.21
20We use Honore´’s Pantob program, accessible here: http://www.princeton.edu/ hon-
ore/stata/
21We used 22 unique grid points to generate weather data for villages in our data (Figure D.1).
In Table D.20, we cluster our standard errors at the grid point level. In Table D.21, we cluster-
bootstrap (22 clusters) our standard errors following (80). Our coefficients of interest remain
precisely estimated.
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In Tables 5.2 - 5.6 we demonstrate that effects of temperature on agricultural
input decisions are robust to the choice of lower bound used to calculate cumu-
lative growing degree days (GDDs).
Next, we employ a sinusoidal interpolation between the daily minimum and
maximum temperature (108; 364). We follow (323), and generate growing de-
gree days accounting for within-day temperature variations, not just the daily
mean temperature, and estimate the effects on agricultural input response. The
core story line remains; the point estimates are qualitatively similar across tem-
perature thresholds (Tables 5.7 - 5.10).
Lastly, we examine the relationship between growing degree days over 8C
and agricultural yields amongst maize farmers in the data. Almost 45% of
maize-growers in the TAMPA data set indicated that variation in temperature
reduced crop yields (Table D.7). Yet the warmer temperatures experienced
in these temperate zones should not weaken maize growth physiologically.22
Farmers’ responses therefore most likely reflect the biotic stresses we have em-
phasized.
To unpack this effect, we estimate a reduced form relationship between tem-
peratures in the growing season and maize yields; that is, we observe the net
effect of at least the following channels of impact: an increase in incidence of
pests, weeds and crop diseases, consequent increase in pesticide use and man-
ual weeding, decrease in fertilizer use, and an unlikely direct effect of higher
temperatures on maize yields. We find that an extra degree day over 8C in the
initial growth stage (GS1) reduces maize yields by 0.38% (Table D.22). Next, we
22Maize yields only decline above 29-30C (249; 345). The average daily temperatures for vil-
lages in our sample are well below 30C (Figure 5.1). In fact, the 99th percentile of the distribution
of daily maximum temperatures for villages in our sample is 32C (Figure 5.2).
196
estimate a flexible model of the effects of temperature on maize yields. Relative
to the kink point, T (19C − 20C)GS 1jdqt , we find an extra day below 19C and above
20C in GS1 reduces maize yields, with comparatively model effects of an extra
day below 19C and above 20C in PP and GS2 (Figure D.9). Lastly, we account
for within-day temperature variations, we find an effect of between -0.6 and
-0.9% from the initial planting period temperatures, consistent with our prior
results (Table D.23).
In Appendix D.3, we present a lower bound back-of-the-envelope estimate
of the value of these within-season adaptations. Defensive investments under-
taken by the average maize farmer in response to an extra DD over 8C protected
3.48 kg of maize yield/acre, roughly 75% of expected loss.
Overall, the estimation results are consistent with predictions from the agro-
nomic literature and with farmers qualitative comments, and stand up to vari-
ous robustness tests.
Hetereogenous Effects by Wealth
Precisely disentangling the effects of credit constraints and ex ante risk falls out-
side the scope of this paper, especially because we lack good measures of farmer
risk aversion or liquidity constraints.23 We can nonetheless provide suggestive
empirical evidence of an association between farmer input response and farmer
wealth that suggests plausibly heterogeneous effects of rising temperatures
due to farmers’ differential ability and willingness to cope with temperature-
induced increased incidence of pests and diseases. To examine such a mech-
23We would have liked to at least test the liquidity constraints hypothesis by looking for
within-season adjustments in other expenditures, but the data set does not include temporally
disaggregated (monthly) consumption expenditures, so we are unable to do a test like (48).
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anism, the key thought experiment involves the question of whether, ceteris
paribus, changes in ex ante income or income risk affect input use. We exploit
plausibly exogenous changes in temperature over time across relatively ‘poor’
and ‘wealthy’ households under the maintained hypotheses that poor house-
holds are more likely to face binding financial liquidity constraints and will be
more risk averse for a given increase in biotic risk exposure (i.e., preferences
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion). We show suggestive evidence that
household wealth differences are associated with different responses to higher
within-season temperatures, consistent with a story of heterogeneous effects
among farmers.
We use baseline (Round 1) land ownership as a proxy for wealth. We sepa-
rate the balanced sample by terciles, and denote households in the bottom ter-
cile as relatively ‘poor’. We then estimate the relationships between heat and
agricultural input use, now adding interaction terms between degree days in
each phase of the crop cycle (PP, GS1 and GS2), and a 0-1 binary wealth vari-
able which takes value 1 if wealth for household i is in the bottom tercile, that
is if the 1996-97 land holding is less than 2.5 acres, 0 otherwise. We find that
poorer households are less likely to adapt to higher temperatures via pesticide
use. These effects are consistent with the binding liquidity constraints hypothe-
sis, but less so with a risk aversion story if pesticide purchases reduce risk and
farmers exhibit constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion.
We also examine the relationship between GDDs and fertilizer use by house-
hold wealth. We find that poorer households use less fertilizer in response
to higher temperatures. Lastly, we find poorer households engage in fewer
own (household) weeding labor days in response to higher temperatures (Ta-
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bles D.24, D.25, and D.26).24
These results suggest that (i) wealthier farmers adapt more through in-
creased pesticide use than their poorer neighbors in response to a temperature-
induced increase in incidence of pests, weeds and diseases; (ii) wealthier farm-
ers also reduce their expenditure on fertilizer less in face of higher temperatures.
These associations suggest that higher temperatures may lead to regressive dis-
tributional yield and income effects within low-income agrarian communities.
Limited financial resources thus constrain uptake of loss-reducing inputs and
aggravate the reduction in fertilizer application as temperature increases.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that farmers in a low-income country can quickly ad-
just agricultural input use to within-season temperature variation. We find that
maize farmers in Kenya increase pesticide use and household weeding labor
in response to higher temperatures, and reduce fertilizer use. We present sug-
gestive evidence that these effects are driven by pests, weeds and crop diseases
that are sensitive to temperature, and confront farmers with a trade-off. Finan-
cially constrained households are induced to reduce spending on productivity-
enhancing fertilizer and to increase defensive expenditure on loss-reducing pes-
ticides and on weeding labor.
Yields are the joint product of crop physiological responses to higher tem-
peratures holding input use constant, and the effects of induced changes in
24In Tables D.27, D.28, and D.29, We use average land ownership across all five rounds as a
proxy for wealth for all rounds. The point estimates remain largely unchanged.
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input application patterns on crop yields. Our findings indicate that warmer
temperatures, by influencing input application patterns, may affect agricultural
production even in regions where temperatures are not high enough to directly
adversely affect crop growth. The defensive investments farmers quickly under-
take within a growing season in response to temperature-induced biotic stresses
affect patterns of uptake of modern agricultural technologies in low-income
agrarian communities. Finally, our results suggest that farmer responsiveness is
sensitive to the distribution of landholding, and thus wealth, in these commu-
nities.
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5.6 Tables and Figures
5.6.1 Figures
Figure 5.1: Daily Average Temperature in TAMPA Sample (1990-2012)
Notes: Distribution of average daily temperatures in villages in TAMPA from
1990-2012. According to existing literature, temperature affects maize yields
only after 30C, represented by the red line (249; 345).
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Figure 5.2: Daily Maximum Temperature in TAMPA Sample (1990-2013)
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Figure 5.3: Agro-Ecological Zones and Maize Production in Africa
Source: Agro-ecological zones - IFPRI Harvest Choice
(www.harvestchoice.org.); Maize Production in Africa: Spatial Production
Allocation Model (SPAM), 2005 (www.mapSPAM.info)
Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZs): Agro-ecological zones (AEZs) are geographi-
cal areas sharing similar climate characteristics (e.g., rainfall and temperature)
with respect to their potential to support (usually rain-fed) agricultural produc-
tion. Because of the general similarity of production conditions, many agri-
cultural technologies, practices and production systems tend to behave or re-
spond consistently within a specific AEZ. AEZs therefore provide a useful spa-
tial framework for identifying the potential area extent of applicability of given
innovations and, futhermore, the likely potential for production related innova-
tions to “spillover” from one country (or continent) to another. AEZs provide
an ecology-based division of geographic space as opposed to administrative
or political boundaries within which environmental conditions could vary sig-
nificantly. The tabulation of rural population by AEZ for Sub-Saharan Africa
indicates that almost 23% of the rural population lives in more humid highland
regions.
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Figure 5.4: Temperature Bins: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(a) Pesticides 0/1 (b) Ln Pesticide/Acre
(c) Fertilizer 0/1 (d) Ln Fertilizer/Acre
(e) Own Weeding Days/Acre
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The figure
presents the effects of temperature (captured via number of days in each temperature bin) on agricultural input use.
CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application
- onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. All figures include village and
province-by-year fixed effects as well as controls for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered by village.
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5.6.2 Tables
Table 5.1: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0171**
(0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0004) (0.0042) (0.0086)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027*** 0.0214*** -0.0013** -0.0131** -0.0068
(0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0005) (0.0050) (0.0117)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0062)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.336 0.353 0.594 0.657 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.2: Alternative GDD Lower Bounds: Temperature and Pesticide Use
(0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >18C 0.0013
(0.0010)
CY GS1 DD >18C 0.0028***
(0.0010)
CY GS2 DD >18C -0.0005
(0.0005)
CY PP DD >19C 0.0015
(0.0010)
CY GS1 DD >19C 0.0029**
(0.0011)
CY GS2 DD >19C -0.0006
(0.0006)
CY PP DD >20C 0.0017
(0.0012)
CY GS1 DD >20C 0.0034**
(0.0016)
CY GS2 DD >20C -0.0007
(0.0008)
CY PP DD >21C 0.0019
(0.0014)
CY GS1 DD >21C 0.0063**
(0.0026)
CY GS2 DD >21C -0.0004
(0.0015)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table
presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP:
pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing
fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.3: Alternative GDD Lower Bounds: Temperature and Pesticide Use
(kg/acre)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >18C 0.0081
(0.0066)
CY GS1 DD >18C 0.0229***
(0.0064)
CY GS2 DD >18C -0.0025
(0.0036)
CY PP DD >19C 0.0084
(0.0071)
CY GS1 DD >19C 0.0236***
(0.0072)
CY GS2 DD >19C -0.0042
(0.0043)
CY PP DD >20C 0.0088
(0.0079)
CY GS1 DD >20C 0.0285***
(0.0104)
CY GS2 DD >20C -0.0064
(0.0052)
CY PP DD >21C 0.0084
(0.0090)
CY GS1 DD >21C 0.0450***
(0.0159)
CY GS2 DD >21C -0.0108
(0.0079)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.353 0.353 0.353 0.354
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table
presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP:
pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing
fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.4: Alternative GDD Lower Bounds: Temperature and Fertilizer Use
(0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >18C -0.0003
(0.0004)
CY GS1 DD >18C -0.0014**
(0.0005)
CY GS2 DD >18C 0.0001
(0.0002)
CY PP DD >19C -0.0004
(0.0004)
CY GS1 DD >19C -0.0014**
(0.0006)
CY GS2 DD >19C -0.0000
(0.0003)
CY PP DD >20C -0.0004
(0.0005)
CY GS1 DD >20C -0.0016**
(0.0007)
CY GS2 DD >20C 0.0001
(0.0004)
CY PP DD >21C -0.0003
(0.0005)
CY GS1 DD >21C -0.0018**
(0.0008)
CY GS2 DD >21C 0.0003
(0.0004)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210
R2 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.594
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.5: Alternative GDD Lower Bounds: Temperature and Fertilizer Use
(kg/acre)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >18C -0.0044
(0.0043)
CY GS1 DD >18C -0.0130**
(0.0055)
CY GS2 DD >18C 0.0005
(0.0025)
CY PP DD >19C -0.0051
(0.0045)
CY GS1 DD >19C -0.0132**
(0.0059)
CY GS2 DD >19C -0.0009
(0.0029)
CY PP DD >20C -0.0053
(0.0048)
CY GS1 DD >20C -0.0160**
(0.0072)
CY GS2 DD >20C -0.0008
(0.0038)
CY PP DD >21C -0.0054
(0.0055)
CY GS1 DD >21C -0.0180**
(0.0087)
CY GS2 DD >21C 0.0005
(0.0044)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210
R2 0.657 0.656 0.656 0.656
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.6: Alternative GDD Lower Bounds: Temperature and Own (Household) Weeding Labor Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >18C 0.0166*
(0.0093)
CY GS1 DD >18C -0.0072
(0.0128)
CY GS2 DD >18C 0.0041
(0.0066)
CY PP DD >19C 0.0184*
(0.0105)
CY GS1 DD >19C -0.0058
(0.0140)
CY GS2 DD >19C 0.0047
(0.0083)
CY PP DD >20C 0.0236*
(0.0125)
CY GS1 DD >20C 0.0145
(0.0194)
CY GS2 DD >20C 0.0159
(0.0125)
CY PP DD >21C 0.0323**
(0.0149)
CY GS1 DD >21C 0.0375
(0.0271)
CY GS2 DD >21C 0.0392*
(0.0219)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.165
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting
or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.7: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Temperature and
Pesticide Use (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1 Pesticides 0/1
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II 0.0017
(0.0012)
CY GS1 DD >21C II 0.0017
(0.0014)
CY GS2 DD >21C II -0.0011
(0.0008)
CY PP DD >22C II 0.0021*
(0.0012)
CY GS1 DD >22C II 0.0019
(0.0018)
CY GS2 DD >22C II -0.0009
(0.0010)
CY PP DD >23C II 0.0023
(0.0017)
CY GS1 DD >23C II 0.0048***
(0.0015)
CY GS2 DD >23C II -0.0010
(0.0013)
CY PP DD >24C II 0.0027
(0.0022)
CY GS1 DD >24C II 0.0067**
(0.0028)
CY GS2 DD >24C II -0.0011
(0.0018)
CY PP DD >25C II 0.0039
(0.0027)
CY GS1 DD >25C II 0.0100**
(0.0039)
CY GS2 DD >25C II -0.0008
(0.0024)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.335 0.335 0.336 0.336 0.336
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table
presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP:
pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing
fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.8: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Temperature and
Pesticide Use (kg/acre)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Pesticide/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II 0.0096
(0.0078)
CY GS1 DD >21C II 0.0215***
(0.0082)
CY GS2 DD >21C II -0.0054
(0.0060)
CY PP DD >22C II 0.0103
(0.0080)
CY GS1 DD >22C II 0.0225**
(0.0103)
CY GS2 DD >22C II -0.0050
(0.0079)
CY PP DD >23C II 0.0126
(0.0114)
CY GS1 DD >23C II 0.0389***
(0.0095)
CY GS2 DD >23C II -0.0059
(0.0099)
CY PP DD >24C II 0.0163
(0.0144)
CY GS1 DD >24C II 0.0495***
(0.0172)
CY GS2 DD >24C II -0.0090
(0.0122)
CY PP DD >25C II 0.0216
(0.0181)
CY GS1 DD >25C II 0.0680***
(0.0241)
CY GS2 DD >25C II -0.0137
(0.0156)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.352 0.352 0.354 0.352 0.352
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured
via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer
application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.9: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Temperature and
Fertilizer Use (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II -0.0008
(0.0006)
CY GS1 DD >21C II -0.0022***
(0.0008)
CY GS2 DD >21C II 0.0001
(0.0004)
CY PP DD >22C II -0.0004
(0.0006)
CY GS1 DD >22C II -0.0020**
(0.0008)
CY GS2 DD >22C II 0.0004
(0.0006)
CY PP DD >23C II -0.0009
(0.0008)
CY GS1 DD >23C II -0.0023**
(0.0011)
CY GS2 DD >23C II 0.0002
(0.0007)
CY PP DD >24C II -0.0013
(0.0009)
CY GS1 DD >24C II -0.0043***
(0.0014)
CY GS2 DD >24C II 0.0000
(0.0010)
CY PP DD >25C II -0.0015
(0.0012)
CY GS1 DD >25C II -0.0052***
(0.0018)
CY GS2 DD >25C II -0.0000
(0.0013)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210
R2 0.595 0.594 0.594 0.595 0.595
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.10: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Temperature
and Fertilizer Use (kg/acre)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II -0.0093
(0.0059)
CY GS1 DD >21C II -0.0213***
(0.0074)
CY GS2 DD >21C II 0.0016
(0.0045)
CY PP DD >22C II -0.0056
(0.0059)
CY GS1 DD >22C II -0.0193**
(0.0083)
CY GS2 DD >22C II 0.0041
(0.0059)
CY PP DD >23C II -0.0103
(0.0077)
CY GS1 DD >23C II -0.0231**
(0.0099)
CY GS2 DD >23C II 0.0016
(0.0075)
CY PP DD >24C II -0.0129
(0.0091)
CY GS1 DD >24C II -0.0402***
(0.0138)
CY GS2 DD >24C II 0.0003
(0.0104)
CY PP DD >25C II -0.0146
(0.0109)
CY GS1 DD >25C II -0.0461**
(0.0178)
CY GS2 DD >25C II -0.0014
(0.0135)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210
R2 0.657 0.657 0.657 0.657 0.657
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table presents the effects of
temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting
or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table 5.11: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Temperature and Own (Household) Weeding Labor Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II 0.0264**
(0.0122)
CY GS1 DD >21C II -0.0192
(0.0145)
CY GS2 DD >21C II 0.0080
(0.0111)
CY PP DD >22C II 0.0284**
(0.0123)
CY GS1 DD >22C II -0.0215
(0.0140)
CY GS2 DD >22C II 0.0064
(0.0131)
CY PP DD >23C II 0.0350*
(0.0184)
CY GS1 DD >23C II -0.0141
(0.0232)
CY GS2 DD >23C II 0.0106
(0.0161)
CY PP DD >24C II 0.0391*
(0.0234)
CY GS1 DD >24C II -0.0044
(0.0361)
CY GS2 DD >24C II 0.0210
(0.0206)
CY PP DD >25C II 0.0500*
(0.0290)
CY GS1 DD >25C II 0.0095
(0.0483)
CY GS2 DD >25C II 0.0428
(0.0295)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting
or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 of appendix
A.1 Details of the Model
In our text we sketch an outline of a model that generates testable hypotheses
for how public colleges may affect the market for lower levels of schooling. Here
we present the details of the model.
A.1.1 The Supply of Schools
Private schools maximize profit, where profits are pi j for school j. In the text, we
define total educational output (in student-years) as Q j = θX j and cost function
Z(X j) = z1 jX j + 12z2X
2
j to be quadratic. z1 j reflects the heterogeneity in costs across
schools and districts, drawn from the distribution G(z1 j), where some schools
use their inputs more effectively than others. This distribution varies across
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districts as it may be cheaper to hire teachers in some districts, and others may
have better public infrastructure, like electricity or drinking water.
pi j = Q jp − Z(X j) = pθX j − Z(X j)
This implies X∗j =
pθ − z1 j
z2
, output is Q∗j = θ
pθ − z1 j
z2
, and pi∗j =
(pθ−z1 j)2
2z2
.
The total number of potential private schools is N. School j would enter only
if its profit is positive, and cost z1 j is drawn from G(z1 j). The fraction of schools
in the district is G(pθ), and the number of private schools in the district that
enter is1
N1 = N
∫ pθ
0
z1 j dG(z1 j) = pθN
Given this, the total supply of schooling in the district is
QS y =
N1∑
j=1
Q j =
N1∑
j=1
θ
pθ − z1 j
z2
=
pθ
2
N
z2
(pθ − z1) (A.1)
A.1.2 Demand for Schooling and School Choice
Demand for schooling depends on the costs of going to school and the returns
to schooling. The cost for child i to attend school j is
ci j = αpk + βTi j − γln(Wi) − ∆i , (A.2)
where the costs depend on tuition pk, travel costs Ti j, wealth Wi and ability ∆i.
Tuition is pk = 0 for public schools and pk = p for private schools, where p >
0. Increases in wealth makes schooling more affordable, also allowing us to
capture any consumption value of education. Household wealth Wi, travel costs
1Note that there is no uncertainty in costs, so no expectations operator.
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Ti j and abilities ∆i are drawn from distributions such that their means (ln(w), δ
and Tk) vary across districts:
ln(Wi) = ln(w) + ζi & ∆i = δ + δi & Ti j = Tk + ηi j f or {k = s, p}
For ease of notation, we define an error term εi j based on these costs, and
restate ci j:
εi j ≡ βηi j − γζi − δi & ci j = αpk + βTk − γln(w) − δ + εi j f or {k = s, p}
Children will attend school if the returns to education, r, are greater than
the costs. If a child decides to attend, school choice only depends on cost. The
lowest-cost school J is chosen (as captured by the min operator). A child attends
if:
qi ≡ 1(r − min(ci j) > 0) = 1(r − min(αpk + βTk − εi j) + γln(w) + δ > 0) , (A.3)
where the returns to education r for both public and private schools are equal.2
The probability of a student going to school k depends on whether school
k is public or private. There are N0 public schools, N1 private schools, and M
students. If the costs εi j is i.i.d. with distribution F(.), the aggregate demand for
private school is3
Qd = MN1F(φ − αp)[1 − F(φ)]N0[1 − F(φ − αp)]N1−1 , (A.4)
2Theoretically, the returns to schooling can be allowed to be different between private and
public schools, without a change in our comparative statics. Given that (281), find similar test
scores for subjects commonly taught in both schools, we model them to be the same.
3Note that we do not need to derive the demand for each particular private school separately,
just the aggregate demand for private schools.
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where φ ≡ r − βTk + γln(w) + δ. Notice from the supply-side N1 = Npθ. In equi-
librium the supply and demand of private schooling are equal. From Equations
A.1 and A.4 we get:
MN1F(φ − αp)[1 − F(φ)]N0[1 − F(φ − αp)]N1−1 = N1θz2
(
pθ − z1) (A.5)
A.1.3 Comparative Statics Details
From Equation A.5 we derive the equilibrium condition for the market for edu-
cation. In order to solve for a closed form solution and do comparative statics
we specify the error term distribution F(.) to be child and school specific of Type
I Extreme Value. The probability with which a student chooses a private school
from the menu of J schools is
=
exp(r − αp − βTp + γln(w) + δ)
J∑
exp(r − αp − βTk + γln(w) + δ)
=
exp(r − αp − βTp + γln(w) + δ)
Npθexp(r − αp − βTp + γln(w) + δ) + N0exp(r − βTs + γln(w) + δ) + 1
(A.6)
Qd =
MNpθexp(r − αp − βTp + γln(w) + δ)
Npθexp(r − αp − βTp + γln(w) + δ) + N0exp(r − βTs + γln(w) + δ) + 1
(A.7)
Or Qd =
MNpθ
Npθ + N0exp(αp + β(Tp − Ts)) + exp(αp + βTp − γln(w) − δ − r)
(A.8)
Plugging in this value of Qd in A.5 we get With M students, summed over
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all Npθ private schools, from Equation A.5 we get
M
Npθ + N0exp(αp + β(Tp − Ts)) + exp(αp + βTp − γln(w) − δ − r)
=
θ
z2
(
pθ − z1)
(A.9)
After equating private school supply with demand, we derive the following
equation:
M
Λ
− θ
z2
(
pθ − z1) = 0 , (A.10)
where Λ ≡ Npθ + N0exp(αp + β(Tp − Ts)) + λ, and also λ ≡ exp(αp + βTp −
γln(w) − δ − r).
Using this, we can derive the following using the implicit function theorem:
1. dpdln(w) = −
−
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
λγ
> 0 and dN1dln(w) = Nθ
dp
dln(w) > 0
2. dQddTp = −
MNpθλβ
Λ2
< 0
3. dQddTp = −
MNpθλ(−β)
Λ2
< 0
4. dpdδ = −
−
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
λ
> 0 and dN1dδ = Nθ
dp
dδ > 0
5. dpdr = −
−
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
λ
> 0 and dN1dr = Nθ
dp
dδ > 0
6. dp
dθ
= −−
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
Np−2pΛ2θM−1z−12
> 0 and dN1
dθ
= Nθ dpdδ > 0
7. dpdM = −
−M
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
Λ
> 0 and dN1dM = Nθ
dp
dM > 0
8. dpdTs = −
−
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
−(−βN0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts)) > 0 and
dN1
dTs
= Nθ dpdTs > 0
9. dpdz1 = −
−M
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
Λ2θz−12
> 0 and dQsydz1 |p = −
pθ
2
N
z2
< 0
d
dQsy
dz1
|p
dTs
= − θ2Nz2
dp
dTs
< 0
220
10. dpdz2 = −
−M
(
Nθ+N0exp(αp+β(Tp−Ts))α+λα+Λ2θ2z−12
)
Λ2
(
pθ
2−z1
)
z−22
> 0 & dQsydz2 |p = −
pθ
2
N(pθ−z1)
z22
< 0
A.2 Benefit Analysis
We use our results to get an estimate of the ‘unintended’ benefits of elite public
colleges, accrued through effects on markets for primary, secondary or higher
education, as a proportion of direct or intended benefits of higher education
investments, accrued through the training of undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents. We focus only on unintended benefits accrued education markets in the
form of private gains, and ignore other potential benefits like infrastructure up-
grades. The estimates obtained through this exercise involve tremendous un-
certainty (261). Nonetheless, we believe that these estimates will provide some
insight into (hitherto) unaccounted benefits of these elite public colleges.
We begin by estimating the direct or intended benefits of an elite public col-
lege imparting higher education. We obtain the enrollment numbers from web-
sites of elite colleges set-up between 2004-2014. We find that the average enroll-
ment is around 800 students. This figure includes undergraduates, masters and
PhD students. To get an estimate of the benefit accrued through training these
students, we rely on median starting-salaries of students obtained through a
survey of 70 companies.4 Average starting-salaries were summarized by col-
lege tiers, with students from Tier 1 students averaging INR 1,305,625; Tier 2,
INR 641,812.5; Tier 3, INR 407,375. We estimate direct benefits as the value
4Willis Tower Watson, a global advisory company, in (420), polled 70 of Indias top orga-
nizations and HR leaders across sectors to gauge campus hiring trends and differentiation of
compensation philosophy across college tiers for the following degrees BTech, MTech, MBA
and Other Graduates (BA, BCom, BSc and BBA).
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added through attending an elite public college. We come up with two annual
estimates:
LowerBound/College : 800 ∗ (1, 305, 625 − 641, 812.5) = INR 531, 050, 000
UpperBound/College : 800 ∗ (1, 305, 625 − 407, 375) = INR 718, 600, 000
Next, we estimate indirect, or unintended benefits accrued through the pri-
mary and secondary education markets. First, we estimate the benefits accrued
to the social planner due to transfers from public to private schools. (281), find
that although there exists little difference in output, private schools are more
costs effective than public schools. They also provide us with estimates for ‘An-
nual Cost/Child’ for both public and private schools in the state of Andhra
Pradesh, in India; the per child difference in cost is INR 6,541.12.5 We calculate
the number of rural children, aged 5-16, in private schools in an average treat-
ment districts. Using population numbers from the 2011 census (310,816) and
proportion of children in private schools at τ = −1, or ‘pre-treatment’ (27 per-
cent), we come up with an estimate of 83,920 children. Because the magnitude
of decrease in public school enrollment is close to the magnitude of increase in
private school enrollment, to estimate annual benefits accrued through trans-
fers, we use coefficients estimating the impact of elite public colleges on private
enrollment, at τ = 0 (25 percent) and τ = 2 (40 percent):
LowerBound : 310, 816 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.25 ∗ 6, 541.12
5It is important to note that these figures pertain to the cost incurred by schools, and not
household costs. We are not concerned about household costs, since, as per our model children
switch from public to private schools only if the cost of attending private schools < cost of
attending public schools.
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UpperBound : 310, 816 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.40 ∗ 6, 541.12
Next, we estimate benefits due to increase in educational attainment
amongst primary and secondary students. Our NSS estimates suggest that elite
public colleges increased educational attainment by 0.3 years, amongst students
aged 6-20. The literature on returns to education suggests that an extra year of
schooling in India leads to gains ranging from INR 2,000 to 4,000.6 Thus, we use
the 2011 Census to get the number of rural children between ages 6-20 in an av-
erage treatment district 307,726, and provide two annual estimates for private
gains due to increase in educational attainment:
LowerBound : 307, 726 ∗ 0.33 ∗ 2, 038.40
UpperBound : 307, 726 ∗ 0.33 ∗ 3, 902.08
Finally, we present total annual indirect benefits per college:
LowerBound : INR 344, 231, 884.8
UpperBound : INR 615, 827, 738.5
Therefore, annual unintended or indirect benefits are anywhere between 48
to 115 percent of the intended or direct benefits of elite public colleges.7
6Authors’ calculations based on (231), INR 3086.72; (229), INR 3902.08; (311), INR 2038.4
7We also do year-by-year calculations, for 25 years, where direct benefits, and private gains
due to increase in educational attainment only accrue from the fourth year. Furthermore, we
estimate cost-savings from transfers using the coefficient at τ = 0, 25 percent, initially, and the
coefficient at τ = 2, 40 percent from the third year of elite public colleges. Finally, we discount all
future estimates at 5 percent, increase future returns to education, and starting-salaries at elite
colleges by 7 percent (growth rate in India). The annual estimates reached through this exercise
are very close to the estimates presented above.
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A.3 Additional Data Sets
A.3.1 Census Village Directories
We use data from the village census directories in 1991, 2001, and 2011 to pro-
cure information on village level infrastructure indicators like access to electric-
ity, roads and tap water. We code electricity access as “1” if electric power was
available for all users in the village,“0” otherwise. We code road access as “1” if
the village can be accessed through a permanent or paved road, “0” otherwise.
Finally, we code tap water as “1” if untreated or treated tap water is available
within the village, “0” otherwise. In the 2011 wave, these directories also con-
tain information on presence of private schools and colleges.
A.3.2 Village Night Lights
We use nighttime lights as measured by satellite imagery to capture intensity
of changes in electrification within a village. Existing work on India has shown
that nighttime lights can be used to detect electrification ((273; 274; 275)). In
fact, (92) finds a direct relationship between nighttime lights and electric power
consumption in India, and most recently, (75) have used changes in nighttime
brightness as an indicator of electrification in India to evaluate the effects of a
rural electrification program on electricity access at the village level.
Researchers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) process data from weather
satellites that circle the Earth 14 times a day and take pictures between 2030 and
224
2200 hours at night. They use algorithms to filter out other sources of natural
light using information about the lunar cycles, sunset times and the northern
lights, and other occurrences like forest fires and cloud cover. The data is calcu-
lated at approximately every one square kilometer, but we aggregate up to the
village level.
A.3.3 India Human Development Survey
In addition to the data sets mentioned in the main paper, we also make use of the
India Human Development Survey (IHDS), which is a nationally representative,
multi-topic survey conducted across urban and rural areas. There are currently
two waves of IHDS (2004-05 and 2011-12), both of which we obtained from
the survey’s public portal. We use IHDS to examine the effects of elite public
colleges on distance to private schools.
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A.4 Figures
Figure A.1: States with Elite Public Colleges: Old vs. New
Notes: ‘IITs’: Indian Institute of Technology; ‘NITs’: National Institute of Tech-
nology; ‘IIMs’: Indian Institute of Mangement; ‘AIIMS’: All India Institute of
Medical Sciences. These four types of elite public colleges constitute around
75 percent of all elite public colleges. This figure shows that states that had al-
ready received a type of elite public college before 2005 did not receive a new
elite public college between 2005 and 2014. For instance, only states that did not
have an elite public college an IIM before 2005, received an IIM between 2005
and 2014. Similar maps for elite colleges in other fields of study are available on
request.
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Figure A.2: Treatment (Elite Public College) Districts
Notes: This figure shows the spatial distribution of old and new elite public
colleges in India. ‘Est. Pre-2005’ indicates districts where elite public colleges
were established before 2005. ‘Est. Pre-2005 & Post-2004’ indicates districts
where elite public colleges were established both before 2005 and after 2004.
‘Est. Post-2004’ indicates our treatment districts or districts where elite public
colleges were only established after 2004.
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Figure A.3: Event Year Specification: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of
Schooling (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite
public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public
colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1).
For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2009,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −5,
τ = −2, τ = 1 and τ = 3, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and round fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard
errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.4: Event Year Specification: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Educa-
tional Attainment (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates
are average treatment effects of elite public colleges on treated districts relative
to the year before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance,
if the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2009, the NSS sur-
veys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −5, τ = −2, τ = 1
and τ = 3, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and round
fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered
at the district level.
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Figure A.5: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Enrollment Status (0/1)
(a) Event-Survey-Round Specification: Age 6-
20
(b) Event-Survey-Round Specification: Age 6-
16
(c) Event-Year Specification: Age 6-20 (d) Event-Year Specification: Age 6-16
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on enrollment status (0/1). In Panels (a) and (b), τ = 0 is
the round of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment
effects of elite public colleges on treated districts relative to the round before
elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment
district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys
conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and
τ = 1, respectively. In Panels (c) and (d), τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite
public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public
colleges on treated districts relative to the year before elite public colleges were
established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite
public college in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −5, τ = −2, τ = 1 and τ = 3, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence
interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.6: Falsification Test: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of School-
ing (Age 21-65)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 21 and
65 years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts
across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents
a falsification test, that is, the effects of elite public colleges on years of school-
ing for individuals above the school-going age. τ = 0 is the round of entry of
elite public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of
elite public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were estab-
lished (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public
college in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and
2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence
interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.7: Falsification Test: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Educational
Attainment (Age 21-65)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 21 and
65 years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts
across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents a
falsification test, that is, the effects of elite public colleges on educational attain-
ment for individuals above the school-going age. The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are av-
erage treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to the
round before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if
the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.8: Control for Age: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of School-
ing (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite
public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite
public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college
in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well as controls
for age. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure A.9: Control for Age: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Educational
Attainment (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are
average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to
the round before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if
the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects as well as controls for age. 95% confidence
intervals are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.10: Older Children: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of School-
ing (Age 9-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 9 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite
public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite
public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college
in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well as controls
for age. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure A.11: Age-Appropriate Sample: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Edu-
cational Attainment
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). The sample is restricted to children between 9 and 16 years of age
for primary school, between 12 and 16 years of age for middle school, between
14 and 20 years of age for secondary school, and between 17 and 20 years of age
for high school. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are
average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to
the round before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if
the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.12: Younger Children: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of
Schooling (Age 6-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite
public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite
public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college
in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well as controls
for age. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure A.13: Younger Children: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Educational
Attainment (Age 6-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1) and middle school (0/1). τ = 0 is the round of entry of
elite public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts
of elite public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were
established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite
public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007,
2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The
regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well
as controls for age. 95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are
clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.14: Dropping Each District, One-by-One: Impact of Elite Public Col-
leges on Years of Schooling (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on years of schooling. The figure presents results from
25 regressions, each time dropping one treatment district. τ = 0 is the round
of entry of elite public colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated
districts of elite public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges
were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new
elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004,
2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively.
The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects.
95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
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Figure A.15: Dropping Each District, One-by-One: Impact of Elite Public Col-
leges on Educational Attainment (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). Each panel in the figure presents results from 25 regressions, each
time dropping one treatment district. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public
colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public
colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established (τ =
−1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college in
2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are
denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation
2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.16: Dropping all Year-Specific Treatment Districts, One-by-One: Im-
pact of Elite Public Colleges on Years of Schooling (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the ef-
fects of elite public colleges on years of schooling. The figure presents results
from 7 regressions, each time dropping all treatment districts that received an
elite public college in a specific year. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public
colleges. These are average treatment effects on treated districts of elite pub-
lic colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public col-
lege in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and
2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence
interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.17: Dropping all Year-Specific Treatment Districts, One-by-One: Im-
pact of Elite Public Colleges on Educational Attainment (Age 6-20)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across
4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects
of elite public colleges on educational attainment for four levels of schooling;
primary school (0/1), middle school (0/1), secondary school (0/1), and high
school (0/1). Each panel in the figure presents results from 7 regressions, each
time dropping all treatment districts that received an elite public college in a
specific year. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are
average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to
the round before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if
the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.18: Other Controls: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private vs. Pub-
lic Enrollment (Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on private school (0/1) vs. public school (0/1) enrollment status. τ = 0
is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment
effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges
were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new
elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ =
0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3,
includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well as controls for district-
specific linear trends, age, and gender. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.19: Dropping Each District, One-by-One: Impact of Elite Public Col-
leges on Private vs. Public Enrollment (Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on private school (0/1) vs. public school (0/1) enrollment status. The
figure presents results from 14 regressions, each time dropping one treatment
district. τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are
average treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite
public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district
received a new elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation
2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.20: Dropping all Year-Specific Districts, One-by-One: Impact of Elite
Public Colleges on Private vs. Public Enrollment (Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite pub-
lic colleges on private school (0/1) vs. public school (0/1) enrollment status.
The figure presents results from 7 regressions, each time dropping all treatment
districts that received an elite public college in a specific year. These estimates
are average treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before
elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment dis-
trict received a new elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation
2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.21: Placebo Test: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private Enrollment
at T = 0
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the distribution of the
(placebo) estimates of the effects of elite public colleges on private enrollment
status (0/1) at τ = 0 or year of entry of elite public colleges, when the year
of entry is randomly assigned amongst treated districts. That is, it presents
the distribution of estimates at τ = 0 from 200 regressions, randomly assigning
the year of entry of elite public colleges among treatment districts each time.
Regressions includes district and year (round) fixed effects. The blue dashed
line denotes the observed effect size at τ = 0 from the baseline regression, and
the solid red line indicates the 95% percentile of the distribution of the placebo
estimates.
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Figure A.22: Placebo Test: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Public Enrollment
at T = 0
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the distribution of the
(placebo) estimates of the effects of elite public colleges on public enrollment
status (0/1) at τ = 0 or year of entry of elite public colleges, when the year
of entry is randomly assigned amongst treated districts. That is, it presents
the distribution of estimates at τ = 0 from 200 regressions, randomly assigning
the year of entry of elite public colleges among treatment districts each time.
Regressions includes district and year (round) fixed effects. The blue dashed
line denotes the observed effect size at τ = 0 from the baseline regression, and
the solid red line indicates the 95% percentile of the distribution of the placebo
estimates.
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Figure A.23: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Dropout Grade (Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on dropout grade. τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges.
These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to
the year before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the
treatment district received a new elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys
conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as
τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The
regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95%
confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
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Figure A.24: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Dropouts in Primary School
(Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on the likelihood of dropping out in primary school (0/1). τ = 0 is
the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment
effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges
were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new
elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0,
τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.25: Adding District-Specific Linear Trends: Impact of Elite Public Col-
leges on Private vs. Public Schools
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite
public colleges on number of private and public schools (natural logarithm).
τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average
treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public
colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received
a new elite public college in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1,
τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3,
includes district and year (round) fixed effects as well as district-specific linear
trends. 95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
250
Figure A.26: Dropping Each District: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private
Schools
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite
public colleges on number of private schools (natural logarithm). The figure
presents results from 23 regressions, each time dropping one treatment district.
τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average
treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public
colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received
a new elite public college in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1,
τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation
2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.27: Dropping all Year-Specific Districts: Impact of Elite Public Colleges
on Private Schools
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite
public colleges on number of private schools (natural logarithm). The figure
presents results from 7 regressions, each time dropping all treatment districts
that received an elite public college in a specific year. τ = 0 is the year of entry
of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite
public colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges were established
(τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college
in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
and 2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3
and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year
(round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors
are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.28: Placebo Test: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Private Schools at
T = 0
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the distribution
of the (placebo) estimates of the effects of elite public colleges on the number
of private schools (natural logarithm) at τ = 0 or year of entry of elite public
colleges, when the year of entry is randomly assigned amongst treated districts.
That is, it presents the distribution of estimates at τ = 0 from 200 regressions,
randomly assigning the year of entry of elite public colleges among treatment
districts each time. Regressions includes district and year (round) fixed effects.
The blue dashed line denotes the observed effect size at τ = 0 from the baseline
regression, and the solid red line indicates the 95% percentile of the distribution
of the placebo estimates.
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Figure A.29: Rural Schools and Enrollment: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on
Private vs. Public Schools and Private vs. Public Enrollment
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts
across 11 years of DISE data (2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite
public colleges on number of rural private schools [top left], rural public schools
[top right], enrollment in rural private schools [bottom left], and rural public
schools [bottom right] (natural logarithm). τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite
public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public
colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1).
For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2007,
the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011
are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4,
respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round)
fixed effects as well as district-specific linear trends. 95% confidence intervals
are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.30: Relationship between Village Population and Presence of Elite
Public Colleges
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 489,576 villages across 3 Census
Village Directories (1991, 2001 and 2011). The figure presents the relationship
between village-specific distance to the nearest elite public college in 2011 and
village population in 2001, or more specifically, whether the village population
in 2001 was above the eligibility cut off for two government public infrastruc-
ture initiatives launched between 2001 and 2011: PMGSY (villages with popu-
lation above 1000 were eligible, 0/1) and 300 (villages with population above
300 were eligible, 0/1). The regression includes district fixed effects. The vari-
ables on the X-axis are indicator variables (0/1) that denote if the village is less
than 20, 40, 60 and 80 kms away from the nearest elite public college in 2011.
95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust.
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Figure A.31: State-by-Year FE: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Village Level
Night Light Intensity
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 453,921 villages across 9 years
of nighttime lights data (2004-2012). The figure presents the difference-in-
difference estimates of the effects of year-by-year changes in village-specific
distance to the nearest elite public college, due to the entry of new elite pub-
lic colleges between 2004 and 2012, on year-by-year changes in village level
night lights (natural logarithm), a proxy for rural electrification. The regression,
equation 2.4, includes village and state-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence
intervals are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.32: Event Study Specification: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Vil-
lage Level Night Light Intensity
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 453,921 villages across 9 years of
nighttime lights data (2004-2012). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on village level night lights (natural logarithm), a proxy for rural elec-
trification, in villages within 10 km from the nearest elite public college in 2012.
τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average
treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public
colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment village came
within 10 km of a new elite public college in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression,
equation 2.3, includes village and year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals
are presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.33: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Log Population by Age Group
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts
across 2 Census rounds (2001 and 2011). The figure presents difference in dif-
ference estimates of the effects of elite public colleges on district population,
disaggregated by age group: 1-10, 11-20, 31-30, 31-40, 41-50. 95% confidence
intervals are presented, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Figure A.34: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Wages
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals from a balanced
district level panel of 25 treatment districts across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004,
2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the effects of elite public colleges on
wages. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are average
treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to the round
before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treat-
ment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010, the NSS
surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1,
τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and
year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors
are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.35: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Test Scores (Age 5-16)
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16
years of age from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across
9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public
colleges on math and reading test scores (in standard deviations). τ = 0 is the
year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment
effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges
were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new
elite public college in 2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0,
τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes
district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals are presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure A.36: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Presence of Private College
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 489,576 villages from the 2011 Cen-
sus Village Directories. The figure presents the estimates of the relationship
between village-specific distance to the nearest elite public college and presence
of private college (0/1) in 2011. The regression includes district fixed effects.
95% confidence intervals are presented, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
robust.
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Figure A.37: Dropping Districts Governed by ‘Powerful’ Politicians: Impact of
Elite Public Colleges on Access to Electricity, Tap Water and Roads
Notes: Sample includes a balanced panel of 489,576 villages across 3 Census
Village Directories (1991, 2001 and 2011). The figure presents the difference-
in-difference estimates of the effects of change in village-specific distance to the
nearest elite public college, due to the entry of new elite public colleges between
2001 and 2011, on the change in access to village level infrastructure (electricity
(0/1), tap water (0/1), and paved roads (0/1)) between 2001 and 2011. The
analysis sample drops districts governed by Members of Parliament (MPs) from
the ruling coalition. In addition, the figure also presents placebo estimates of
the effects of the change in village-specific distance to the nearest elite public
college, due to the entry of new elite public colleges between 2001 and 2011, on
the change in access to village level infrastructure between 1991 and 2001. The
regression, equation 2.4, includes district and year (round) fixed effects, as well
as indicator variables that denote if the village is less than 20, 40, 60 and 80 kms
away from the nearest elite public college in 2011, respectively. 95% confidence
intervals are presented, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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A.5 Tables
Table A.1: National Sample Survey (NSS): Summary Statistics on Years of Edu-
cation and Educational Attainment (Age 6-20)
Pooled 2004 2007 2010 2012
Years of Education 5.83 5.34 5.87 6.08 6.16
(3.32) (3.24) (3.40) (3.22) (3.34)
Primary (0/1) 0.63 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.65
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Middle (0/1) 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.42 0.42
(0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Secondary (0/1) 0.19 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.23
(0.40) (0.35) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42)
High School (0/1) 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.09
(0.27) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29)
Observations 41151 11363 11305 9330 9153
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20 years of age
from a balanced district level panel of 25 treatment districts across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004,
2007, 2010 and 2012). The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for
years of schooling and educational attainment in treatment districts.
Table A.2: Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER): Summary Statistics on
Public vs. Private Enrollment (Age 6-16)
Pooled 2006 2007 2008 2009
Public Enrollment (0/1) 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.61
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Private Enrollment (0/1) 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.27
(0.47) (0.43) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45)
Observations 120915 15774 15705 14371 13750
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16 years of age
from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across 9 years of ASER data (2006-
2014). The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for private and
public enrollment status in treatment districts.
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Table A.3: Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER): Summary Statistics on
Public vs. Private Enrollment (Age 6-16)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Public Enrollment (0/1) 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Private Enrollment (0/1) 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.40
(0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Observations 13955 13145 12161 11346 10708
Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16 years of age
from a balanced district level panel of 14 treatment districts across 9 years of ASER data (2006-
2014). The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for private and
public enrollment status in treatment districts.
Table A.4: District Information System for Education (DISE): Summary Statistics
on # of Private and Public Schools
All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
# Private Schools (00s) 5.41 3.49 3.84 4.48 5.04 5.36
(4.95) (3.55) (4.06) (4.47) (4.78) (5.11)
# Public Schools (00s) 16.91 15.55 16.52 16.82 17.06 16.77
(13.30) (12.72) (13.61) (14.47) (14.11) (13.56)
Observations 253 23 23 23 23 23
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts across 11 years
of DISE data (2004-2014).The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
for number of private and public schools in treatment districts.
Table A.5: District Information System for Education (DISE): Summary Statistics
on # of Private and Public Schools
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
# Private Schools (00s) 5.69 5.72 5.97 6.33 6.67 6.93
(5.41) (4.90) (4.93) (5.24) (5.62) (5.78)
# Public Schools (00s) 16.86 17.16 17.16 17.47 17.54 17.12
(13.63) (13.37) (13.25) (13.38) (13.94) (13.10)
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23
Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts across 11 years
of DISE data (2004-2014).The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
for number of private and public schools in treatment districts.
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Table A.6: Cluster-Bootstrap P-Values: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on Years
of Schooling and Educational Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of Education Primary Middle Secondary High School
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
T= -2.0000 0.098 0.018 0.004 0.001 -0.000
(0.58) (0.58) (0.86) (1.00) (1.00)
T= 0.0000 0.277 0.049 0.046 0.021 0.011
(0.02) (0.00) (0.24) (0.18) (0.30)
T= 1.0000 0.810 0.099 0.133 0.079 0.053
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14)
Observations 41124 41151 41151 41151 41151
Notes: Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 6 and 20 years of age from a balanced
district level panel of 25 treatment districts across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The table presents
the effects of elite public colleges on years of schooling. τ = 0 is the round of entry of elite public colleges. These are
average treatment effects on treated districts of elite public colleges relative to the round before elite public colleges
were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college in 2008, 2009 or 2010,
the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. The
regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by district (100
replications). P-values are in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Cluster-Bootstrap P-Values: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on on
Private vs. Public Enrollment (Age 5-16)
(1) (2)
Public Enrollment Private Enrollment
β / SE β / SE
T = -3 -0.025 0.018
(0.60) (0.64)
T = -2 0.005 0.008
(0.94) (0.84)
T = 0 -0.049 0.043
(0.06) (0.04)
T = 1 -0.096 0.080
(0.06) (0.02)
T = 2 -0.097 0.101
(0.02) (0.00)
T = 3 -0.079 0.078
(0.02) (0.02)
T = 4 -0.135 0.129
(0.02) (0.00)
Observations 120915 120915
Notes: Notes: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 5 and 16 years of age from a balanced
district level panel of 14 treatment districts across 9 years of ASER data (2006-2014). The table presents the effects of
elite public colleges on private school (0/1) vs. public school (0/1) enrollment status. τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite
public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public colleges relative to the year before elite
public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district received a new elite public college in
2009, the ASER surveys conduced in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2,
τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3, includes district and year (round)
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by district (100 replications). P-values are in parentheses.
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Table A.8: Cluster-Bootstrap P-Values: Impact of Elite Public Colleges on on
Private vs. Public Schools
(1) (2)
Private Schools Public Schools
β / SE β / SE
T = -3 -0.029 0.066
(0.90) (0.34)
T = -2 -0.072 0.010
(0.12) (0.54)
T = 0 0.186 -0.011
(0.00) (0.86)
T = 1 0.205 0.005
(0.00) (0.82)
T = 2 0.258 -0.007
(0.00) (1.00)
T = 3 0.277 0.051
(0.00) (0.22)
T = 4 0.337 0.074
(0.00) (0.24)
Observations 253 253
Notes: Notes: Sample includes a balanced district level panel of 23 treatment districts across 11 years of DISE data
(2004-2014). The figure presents the effects of elite public colleges on number of private and public schools (natural
logarithm). τ = 0 is the year of entry of elite public colleges. These estimates are average treatment effects of elite public
colleges relative to the year before elite public colleges were established (τ = −1). For instance, if the treatment district
received a new elite public college in 2007, the DISE surveys conduced in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and
2011 are denoted as τ = −3, τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0, τ = 1, τ = 2, τ = 3 and τ = 4, respectively. The regression, equation 2.3,
includes district and year (round) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by district (100 replications). P-values are
in parentheses.
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Appendix B
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B.1 Appendix: Data
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
The CHNS is collected by the Carolina Population Center at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and
Health (NINH). This survey includes subjects from a sample of about 7,200
households with over 30,000 individuals in 15 provinces and municipal cities in
China from 1989 to 2011.1 Although the CHNS sample is not representative of
the Chinese population, one-third of the Chinese population (approximately 450
million people in 1989) lives in these provinces. The CHNS has released eight
waves of data so far (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2009). I use
1Figure B.16 presents the provinces in CHNS. A detailed description of the CHNS design
can be found at www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. I am grateful to Teevrat Garg and Matthew
Gibson for sharing the CHNS data with county identifiers.
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the 2004-2009 data waves of the survey because the earlier waves did not col-
lect children’s time use data. Following ITUS, I restricted analyses to school-age
children, individuals over 5 but less than 17 years of age. Unlike ITUS, CHNS
did not collect time use data for a particular date. Children were asked about
the time spent on sleep on a ‘usual’ or ‘typical’ day. Similarly, children were
asked about time spent on leisure activities, both physical (running, soccer, etc.)
and sedentary (TV, video games, etc.) in nature, as well as on homework. Data
on leisure and homework was collected for both weekdays and weekends. Al-
though measures for leisure and study are not comparable to ITUS, the direction
of the estimates would still be useful as corroborative evidence.
Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS)
I use village- and household-level surveys from the 2006 round of REDS, ad-
ministered by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER).
It is a nationally representative survey of rural households in India spanning
over 200 villages across 100 districts in 17 major states.2 The REDS data provide
village identifiers. Therefore, I compute sunset times at the village level. Like
ITUS and DHS, I restrict the REDS sample to children between 6 and 16 years of
age.3 Roughly 90% school-age children are enrolled in school; 52% have com-
pleted primary school and 23% have completed middle school. In the previous
50 years, the average village observed 7 episodes of in-migration and 2 episodes
of out-migration. In the average village 40% households have an electricity con-
nection, and roughly 20% households have access to running water. The REDS
2REDS villages are mapped in Figure B.17. I am grateful to Andrew Foster and NCAER for
sharing the REDS secure data set with village identifiers.
3Table B.6 presents summary statistics for outcomes of interest, while Table B.7 describes the
REDS villages.
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data also include record of the prevailing village-level daily wage rate for chil-
dren and gender-specific daily wage rate for adults.
Young Lives Survey (YLS)
Young Lives Survey (YLS) is a study of childhood poverty coordinated by the
University of Oxford.4 The study has collected data on two cohorts of children
in the state of Andhra Pradesh, in India: 1,008 children born between January
1994 and June 1995, and 2,011 children born between January 2001 and June
2002.5 Data were collected from children and their families using household
visits in 2002, 2006, 2009, and in 2013. Children were tested in math across
these survey rounds. The tests were related to the formal school curriculum in
Andhra Pradesh. Different tests were administered to children across rounds
in order to ensure that they were appropriate for the children’s age and cur-
rent stage of education. These tests were quite comprehensive, with the math
questionnaire containing 30 questions.
In addition, in 2011, the Young Lives study visited a random sub-set of
schools attended by children in the younger cohort to conduct school-level data.
I use data on school start times and school-level test scores in Science, Math, So-
cial Studies, Telugu, Hindi and English to investigate the mitigative effects of
later school start times on the sunset-education relationship.
4Young Lives is funded by UK aid from the Department for International Development
(DFID). The views expressed here are those of the author(s). They are not necessarily those
of Young Lives, the University of Oxford, DFID, or other funders. For more information of YLS,
see: www.younglives.org.uk
5The districts included in the sample are presented in Figure B.18. Figure B.19 presents the
distribution of annual average sunset time for all 7 districts in the YLS data as well as the distri-
bution of sunset time at the district-test-date level.
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Sunset Time
I use two measures of sunset time for my analysis: daily sunset time and annual
average sunset time.
Daily Sunset: ITUS collects time use data for particular dates across a year for
a cross-section of households in India. Therefore, to estimate the effects of sun-
set on time use in India, I examine how daily time use co-varies with seasonal
variation in daily sunset time at the district level.
Seasonal variation in sunset time is highly correlated with seasonal variation
in sunrise time and daylight duration; daily sunset time is positively correlated
with daylight duration and negatively correlated with daily sunrise time. I fo-
cus on sunset time rather than sunrise time because of the link between sunset
time and sleep as emphasized by the existing medical literature. Consistent
with medical studies, I show later sunset delays bedtime but has no influence
on wake-up time.
However, it is possible that daylight duration and not daily sunset time af-
fects sleep through hedonic value of leisure or some other channel. I show that
increase in leisure on later sunset days is largely driven by indoor and not out-
door leisure. Furthermore, because sunset time is equal to sunrise time plus
hours of daylight, I control for sunrise time and daylight duration separately.
I show the estimate of the effect of later sunset on sleep remains relatively un-
affected, although it is not statistically significant, presumably because sunset
time, sunrise time, and daylight duration are highly correlated (Table B.8).
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Annual Average Sunset: First, unlike ITUS, CHNS collects data on time allo-
cation for a ‘typical’ day of the year, and not for a particular date. Therefore, I
corroborate the effects of sunset time on time use using a different type of varia-
tion: I examine how time use for cross-section of children in a particular location
(district) on a ‘usual’ day co-varies with annual average sunset time. Second, I
examine the effects of later sunset on stock indicators of education using DHS,
REDS, and YLS data. I evaluate how children’s education outcomes co-vary
with annual average sunset time across the east-west gradient.
Annual average sunset is perfectly correlated with longitude, unless time
zone boundaries break this link. In fact, I exploit this sharp discontinuity in
annual average sunset time at the time zone border in Kalimantan, Indonesia, to
corroborate education estimates from India. Importantly, because all locations
in my analyses experience nearly the same average amount of daylight, daylight
duration is not a confounder for estimates of the effects of annual average sunset
on time use or education outcomes.
Lastly, annual average sunset time is orthogonal to latitude for countries in
my analyses. But the amplitude of the variation in daily sunset time is perfectly
correlated with latitude. If there exist non-linearities in the relationship between
daily sunset time and sleep or sleep and education production, the interaction
between annual average sunset and latitude may help inform policy interven-
tions. In my analyses, however, I fail to find evidence for non-linearities in
the relationship between sunset time and sleep and sunset time and education
outcomes. It is important to note that I observe moderate values of sleep and
sunset time in data from India, China, and Indonesia. It is possible that these
relationships are highly non-linear at more extreme values of sleep and sunset
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time.
Figure B.1: Summary Statistics: Children’s Time Use in India vs. United King-
dom
Notes: This figure compares children’s (age 8 to 16) allocation of time to sleep, study, school, leisure and work between
India and the United Kingdom (U.K.). I use the India Time Use Survey (ITUS) for India, and data from the
Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) for the U.K. Although MTUS provides time use data for a number of other
countries, I include only the U.K. since the data for the U.K. was collected in 2000, which is only a year after ITUS, and
because the U.K. wave includes data on children’s time use.
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Figure B.2: Districts in the India Time Use Survey (ITUS)
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Figure B.3: Summary Statistics: Distribution of Daily Sunset Time in ITUS Dis-
tricts
(a) Daily sunset time in ITUS districts
(b) Daily sunset time for sampled dates in ITUS dis-
tricts
Notes: This figure presents distribution of daily sunset time in ITUS districts. Panel (a) presents daily sunset time for
every day in a year for all districts in ITUS. Panel (b) presents daily sunset time for dates for which time use data was
collected in ITUS districts.
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Figure B.4: Summary Statistics: Children’s Time Use
Notes: This figure presents the average time allocated by children between 6 and 16 years of age to sleep, study, school,
leisure and work on weekdays and weekends in India. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.5: Summary Statistics: Children’s Sleep Patterns
Notes: This figure presents the average time spent on sleep by children between 6 and 16 years of age for each hour of
the 24-hour day cycle on a weekday in India. Source: ITUS.
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Figure B.6: Summary Statistics: Children’s Bedtimes and Wake-up Times
Notes: This figure presents the average bedtimes and wake-up times for children between 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays and weekends. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.7: Summary Statistics: Children’s Time Use Patterns
Notes: This figure presents the average time spent on study, school, leisure and work by children between 6 and 16
years of age for each hour of the 24-hour day cycle on a weekday in India. Source: ITUS.
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Figure B.8: Summary Statistics: Students’ Time Use
Notes: This figure presents the average time spent on sleep, study, school, leisure and work by students (or children
whose primary activity is school) between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays and weekends. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.9: Summary Statistics: Child Laborers’ Time Use
Notes: This figure presents the average time spent on sleep, study, school, leisure and work by child laborers (or
children whose primary activity is work) between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays and weekends. Source: ITUS.
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Figure B.10: Children’s Sleep Patterns by Early and Later Sunset Time
Notes: This figure compares the average time spent on sleep by children between 6 and 16 years of age for each hour
across the 24-hour day cycle between early and late sunset days on a weekday. Within each district, early sunset
observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were below 25th percentile, while late sunset
observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were above 75th percentile. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.11: Children’s Time Use Patterns by Early and Later Sunset Time
Notes: This figure compares the average time spent on study, school, leisure and work by children between 6 and 16
years of age for each hour across the 24-hour day cycle between early and late sunset days on a weekday. Within each
district, early sunset observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were below 25th percentile,
while late sunset observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were above 75th percentile. Source:
ITUS.
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Figure B.12: Children’s Sleep Patterns by Early and Later Sunset Time by Pri-
mary Activity
Notes: This figure compares the average time spent on sleep by children between 6 and 16 years of age for each hour
across the 24-hour day cycle between early and late sunset days on a weekday. Within each district, early sunset
observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were below 25th percentile, while late sunset
observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were above 75th percentile. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.13: Children’s Time Use Patterns by Early and Later Sunset Time by
Primary Activity
Notes: This figure compares the average time spent on study, leisure and work by children between 6 and 16 years of
age for each hour across the 24-hour day cycle between early and late sunset days on a weekday. Within each district,
early sunset observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were below 25th percentile, while late
sunset observations include children interviewed when seasonal sunsets were above 75th percentile. Source: ITUS.
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Figure B.14: Primary Sampling Units (Villages/City Blocks) in the 2015 Indian
DHS
Figure B.15: Summary Statistics: Distribution of Annual Average Sunset Time
at the Sampling Unit Level (Villages/City Blocks) in the 2015 Indian DHS
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Figure B.16: Provinces in the China Health an Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
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Figure B.17: Villages in Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS)
Figure B.18: Districts in the Young Lives Study (YLS)
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Figure B.19: Summary Statistics: Distribution of Annual Average Sunset Time
and Day-of-Test Sunset Time in YLS Districts
(a) Distribution of Annual Average Sunset Time
(b) Distribution of Day-of-Test Sunset Time
Notes: This figure presents distribution of annual average sunset time and the distribution of day-of-test sunset time
across YLS districts. Panel (a) presents annual average sunset time for all districts in YLS. Panel (b) presents daily
sunset time for dates on which children were tested in math in YLS districts across survey rounds.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics: Monthly Distribution of Interview Dates in ITUS
by State
Haryana Madhya Pradesh Gujarat Orissa Tamil Nadu Meghalaya
January 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.05
(0.33) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.19) (0.22)
Febuary 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.09
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.23) (0.28)
March 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.12
(0.22) (0.30) (0.26) (0.22) (0.36) (0.33)
April 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.12
(0.33) (0.21) (0.24) (0.33) (0.17) (0.32)
May 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.09
(0.28) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.21) (0.29)
June 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.05
(0.12) (0.26) (0.19) (0.07) (0.35) (0.22)
July 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.06
(0.28) (0.26) (0.17) (0.31) (0.10) (0.24)
August 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.13
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.32) (0.18) (0.33)
September 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.04
(0.29) (0.28) (0.35) (0.17) (0.37) (0.19)
October 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.06
(0.29) (0.27) (0.30) (0.33) (0.26) (0.24)
November 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.20
(0.33) (0.26) (0.27) (0.32) (0.25) (0.40)
December 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.00
(0.19) (0.34) (0.29) (0.20) (0.39) (0.00)
Observations 2089 6395 4277 4057 5022 739
Notes: This table presents the monthly distribution (in proportions) of ITUS interview dates of children between 6 and
16 years of age. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.2: Effect of Late Sunset on Interview Date
(1) (2)
Survey Date (0/1) Survey Date (0/1)
β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.005)
Mean 0.12 0.24
Observations 37960 18980
R2 0.000 0.000
Notes: This table presents the relationship between daily sunset time and interview dates. Column 1 includes all
months in years 1998 and 1999, however, because ITUS was mainly conducted between July 1998 and June 1999,
Column 2 only includes July 1998 - June 1999. Homoskedastic standard errors presented in parentheses. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics: ITUS Sample Description by Type of Day
Entire Sample (Age 6-16) Normal Day Sample Weekly Variant Sample
Age 11.19 11.33 10.97
(2.95) (2.97) (2.89)
Years of Education 4.38 4.27 4.57
(3.42) (3.46) (3.35)
Sex (0/1) 0.55 0.54 0.56
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Rural (0/1) 0.69 0.70 0.68
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47)
Homestead (0/1) 0.65 0.65 0.64
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Land Owned (0/1) 0.46 0.47 0.45
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Land Possessed (0/1) 0.46 0.46 0.45
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Monthly HH Exp (INR) 2731.22 2700.74 2780.62
(1634.11) (1624.54) (1648.40)
Temporary House (0/1) 0.38 0.38 0.37
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Semi-Temporary House (0/1) 0.23 0.23 0.22
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Permanent House (0/1) 0.39 0.38 0.41
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Primary Activity: Not a Student (0/1) 0.19 0.25 0.09
(0.39) (0.43) (0.29)
Normal Days/Week 6.10 6.25 5.84
(0.60) (0.63) (0.44)
Weekly Variant Days/Week 0.88 0.72 1.13
(0.57) (0.60) (0.40)
Abnormal Days/Week 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Household Size 5.52 5.54 5.48
(1.98) (1.96) (2.00)
Hinduism (0/1) 0.88 0.88 0.88
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Sunday (0/1) 0.28 0.04 0.66
(0.45) (0.19) (0.47)
Observations 22579 13964 8615
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on both individual and household characteristics for children between 6
and 16 years of age on weekdays and weekends. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics: Non-Linear Metrics of Sleep by Age Group
Age 6-13 Age 14-16
Sleep>7h 0.98 0.94
(0.13) (0.23)
Sleep>8h 0.93 0.80
(0.25) (0.40)
Sleep>9h 0.70 0.44
(0.46) (0.50)
Sleep>10h 0.34 0.13
(0.47) (0.33)
Sleep>11h 0.09 0.02
(0.28) (0.14)
Observations 9894 4070
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on the percentage of children who sleep at least 7, 8, 9, 10 or 11 hours/day
on a weekday, by age group. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: ITUS.
Table B.5: Summary Statistics: Educational Outcomes
2015 India 2003 Indonesia
Years of Schooling 4.44 4.10
(3.16) (3.00)
[638682] [32985]
Primary (0/1) 0.48 0.34
(0.50) (0.47)
[638682] [32985]
Middle (0/1) 0.21 0.10
(0.41) (0.29)
[638682] [32985]
Age 10.99 10.79
(3.15) (3.18)
[638682] [32985]
Rural (0/1) 0.74 0.60
(0.44) (0.49)
[638682] [32985]
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on years of schooling, educational attainment, age, and rural-urban
status for children between 6 and 16 years of age across India (2015) and Indonesia (2003). Standard deviations in
parentheses, and number of observations in brackets. Source: DHS.
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Table B.6: Summary Statistics: Educational Outcomes
Entire Sample
Years of Schooling 4.79
(3.10)
[10006]
Primary (0/1) 0.52
(0.50)
[10006]
Middle (0/1) 0.23
(0.42)
[10006]
Secondary (0/1) 0.08
(0.27)
[10006]
Enrolled (0/1) 0.91
(0.28)
[9192]
Age 11.20
(3.11)
[10080]
Male (0/1) 0.54
(0.50)
[10080]
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on years of schooling, educational attainment, enrollment status, age and
sex for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Standard deviations in parentheses, and number of observations in
brackets. Source: REDS.
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Table B.7: Summary Statistics: Village Characteristics
Entire Sample
Number of Households 436.18
(368.78)
No. Times In-Migration 50 yrs 7.27
(19.16)
No. Times Out-Migration 50 yrs 2.01
(4.44)
In-Migration for Work in 10 years (0/1) 0.71
(0.46)
Permanent Road (0/1) 0.45
(0.40)
Brick Houses (Prop.) 0.40
(0.28)
Huts (Prop.) 0.08
(0.12)
Mud Houses (Prop.) 0.27
(0.26)
Multi-Storeyed Houses (Prop.) 0.07
(0.12)
Public Tap (0/1) 0.45
(0.44)
Wells (0/1) 0.34
(0.41)
HHs Running Water (Prop.) 0.18
(0.25)
Street Lights (0/1) 0.43
(0.47)
HHs Electricity (Prop.) 0.42
(0.36)
Public Toilet (0/1) 0.10
(0.23)
HHs Indoor Toilet (Prop.) 0.23
(0.25)
HHs Landline (Prop.) 0.09
(0.14)
HHs Large Livestock (Prop.) 0.79
(1.19)
HHs Bicycle (Prop.) 0.83
(0.84)
HHs Mobile (Prop.) 0.18
(0.30)
HHs Motorcycle (Prop.) 0.20
(0.31)
HHs Car (Prop.) 0.02
(0.04)
Observations 221
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on village characteristics for all REDS villages. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: REDS.
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Table B.8: Controls for Sunrise Time and Daylight Duration: Effect of Late Sun-
set on Sleep (Hours)
(1) (2)
Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.63 -0.75
(0.55) (1.10)
District FE Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Sunrise Time Yes No
Daylight Duration No Yes
Mean 8.33 8.33
Observations 62768 62768
R2 0.064 0.064
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep by individuals over 6 years of age
on weekdays in India. Column 1 controls for sunrise time and Column 2 controls for daylight duration. All regressions
includes district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level.
Source: ITUS.
ITUS Activity Classification
• Primary Production Activities
– Crop farming, kitchen gardening, etc.
∗ Ploughing, preparing land, cleaning of land
∗ Sowing, planting, transplanting
∗ Application of manure, fertilizer, pesticides and watering,
preparing organic/manure, harvesting, threshing, picking, and
winnowing
∗ Weeding
∗ Supervision of work.
∗ Kitchen gardening - backyard cultivation
∗ Stocking, transporting to home, guarding or protection of crops.
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∗ Sale and purchase related activities
∗ Travel to the work
– Animal husbandry
∗ Grazing animals outside
∗ Tending animals - cleaning, washing shed, feeding, watering,
preparation of feed.
∗ Caring for animals: breeding, shearing, medical treatment,
grooming, shoeing etc.
∗ Milking and processing of milk; collecting, storing of poultry
products.
∗ Making dung cakes
∗ Poultry rearing - feeding, cleaning.
∗ Other related activities.
∗ Sale and purchase related activities
∗ Travel to the work.
– Fishing, Forestry, Horticulture, Gardening
∗ Nursery - seedlings
∗ Planting, tending, processing of trees.
∗ Collecting, storing & stocking of fruits etc.
∗ Wood cutting, chopping & stocking firewood
∗ Fish farming, cleaning sea-bed, feeding fish, catching fish, gath-
ering other aquatic life
∗ Care of house plants, indoor and outdoor garden work.
∗ Flower gardening -landscaping, maintenance, cutting, collecting,
storing
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∗ Sale and purchase related activities.
∗ Traveling to the work.
– Collection of fruit, water, plants etc., storing and hunting.
∗ Fetching of water
∗ Collection of fruits, vegetables, berries, mushrooms etc. edible
goods
∗ Collection of minor forest produce, leaves, bamboo, etc.
∗ Collection of fuel/fuel wood/twigs.
∗ Collection of raw material for crafts.
∗ Collection of building materials
∗ Collection of fodder
∗ Sale and purchase related activities
∗ Collection of other items
∗ Travel to work.
– Processing & Storage
∗ Milling, husking, pounding
∗ Parboiling
∗ Sorting, grading
∗ Grinding, crushing
∗ Any other related activity
∗ Sales and purchase related activities
∗ Travel for the work
– Mining, quarrying, digging, cutting, etc.
∗ Mining/extraction of salt,
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∗ Mining/digging/quarrying of stone, slabs, breaking of stones for
construction of building road, bridges etc.
∗ Digging out clay, gravel and sand
∗ Digging out minerals - major and minor
∗ Transporting in vehicles
∗ Storing, stocking
∗ Any other related activity
∗ Sale and purchase related activity
∗ Travel for the work
• Secondary Activities
– Construction Activities
∗ Building & construction of dwelling (laying bricks, plastering,
thatching, bamboo work, roofing) and maintenance and repair-
ing of dwelling.
∗ Construction and repair of animal shed, shelter for poultry etc.
∗ Construction of wall. storage facility, fencing etc; for farms, irri-
gation work.
∗ Construction of public works/common infrastructure - roads,
buildings, bridges, etc.
∗ Any other activity related.
∗ Sales and purchase related activity
∗ Travel to the work.
– Manufacturing Activities
∗ Food processing and cooking for sale - making pickles, spices and
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other products; canning fruits, jams & jellies; baking; beverage
preparation, selling readymade food etc.
∗ Butchering, curing, processing, drying storing etc. of meat, fish
etc.
∗ Manufacturing of textiles - spinning, weaving, processing of tex-
tiles; knitting, sewing, garment making of cotton, wool and other
material.
∗ Making handicrafts, pottery, printing and other crafts made pri-
marily with hands. (wood based leather based crafts, embroidery
work etc.)
∗ Fitting, installing, tool setting, tool and machinery - moulding,
welding, tool making,
∗ Assembling machines, equipment and other products,
∗ Production related work in large and small factories in different
industries - as production workers, maintenance workers paid
trainees and apprentices, sales, administration and management
activities.
∗ Sale and purchase related activity
∗ Travel for the work.
• Trade, Business and Services
– Trade and Business
∗ Buying and selling goods - such as capital goods, intermediate
goods, consumer durables, consumer goods - in the organised
and formal sectors.
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∗ Petty trading, street and door to door vending, hawking, shoe
cleaning etc.
∗ Transporting goods in trucks, tempos and motor vehicles.
∗ Transporting in hand carts, animal carts, cycle rickshaws etc. or
manually
∗ Transport of passenger by motorized and non-motorised trans-
ports
∗ Any other activity.
∗ Travel to work.
– Services
∗ Service in government and semi-government organisations
(salaried)
∗ Service in-private organisations (salaried)
∗ Petty service: domestic servants, sweepers, washers, pujari, bar-
ber, cobbler, mali massaging, prostitution, watching and guard-
ing
∗ Professional services: medical and educational services (private
tuition, non-formal teaching etc.), financial services and manage-
ment and technical consultancy services
∗ Professional services: computer services, photocopying services,
beauty parlors, hair cutting saloons etc.
∗ Technical services: plumbing, electrical and electronic repair and
maintenance and other related services
∗ Others
∗ Travel to work.
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• Household Maintenance, Management and Shopping for Own Household
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ Cleaning food items, beverages and serving.
∗ Cleaning and upkeep of dwelling and surroundings
∗ Cleaning of utensils
∗ Care of textiles: sorting, mending, washing, ironing and ordering
clothes and linen
∗ Shopping for goods and non-personal services: capital goods,
household appliances, equipment, food and various household
supplies.
∗ Household management: planning, supervising, paying bills,
etc.
∗ Do-it-yourself home improvements and maintenance, installa-
tion, servicing and repair of personal and household goods.
∗ Pet care
∗ Travel related to household maintenance, management and
shopping; household maintenance, management and shopping
not elsewhere classified.
• Care for Children, the Sick, Elderly, and Disabled for Own Household
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ Physical care of children: washing, dressing, feeding
∗ Teaching, training and instruction of own children
∗ Accompanying children to places: school, sports, lessons, etc.
∗ Physical care of the sick, disabled, elderly household members:
washing, dressing, feeding, helping.
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∗ Accompanying adults to receive personal care services: such as
hairdresser’s therapy sessions, temple, religious places etc.
∗ Supervising children needing care - with or without other activi-
ties
∗ Supervising adults needing care - with or without other activities.
∗ Travel related to care of children
∗ Travel related to care of adults and others.
∗ Taking care of guests/visitors
∗ Any other activity not mentioned above
• Community Services and Help to Other Households
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ Community organised construction and repairs: buildings,
roads, dams, wells, ponds etc. community assets.
∗ Community organised work: cooking for collective celebrations,
etc.
∗ Volunteering with for an organisation (which does not involve
working directly for individuals)
∗ Volunteer work through organisations extended directly to indi-
viduals and groups
∗ Participation in meetings of local and informal groups/caste,
tribes, professional associations, union, fratemal and political or-
ganisations
∗ Involvement in civic and related responsibilities: voting, rallies,
attending meetings, panchayat
∗ Informal help to other households
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∗ Community services not elsewhere classified
∗ Travel related to community services
• Learning
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ General Education: School/university/other educational institu-
tions attendance
∗ Studies, homework and course review related to general educa-
tion
∗ Additional study, non-formal education under adult education
programmes.
∗ Non formal education by children
∗ Work-related training
∗ Training under government programmes such as TRYSEM,
DWCRA and others.
∗ Other training/education
∗ Learning not elsewhere classified
∗ Travel related to learning
• Social and Cultural Activities, Mass Media, etc.
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ Participating in social events: wedding, funerals, births, and
other celebrations ’
∗ Participating in religious activities: Church services, religious
ceremonies, practices, kirtans, singing, etc.
∗ Participating in community functions in music, dance etc.
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∗ Socializing at home and outside the home.
∗ Arts, making music, hobbies and related courses:
∗ Indoor and outdoor sports participation and related courses
∗ Games and other past-time activities
∗ Spectator to sports, exhibitions/museums, cinema/theatre/concerts
and other performances and events
∗ Other related activities.
∗ Reading, other than newspaper and magazines.
∗ Watching television and video
∗ Listening to music/radio
∗ Accessing information by computing
∗ Visiting library
∗ Reading newspaper, magazines
∗ Mass media use and entertainment not classified elsewhere
∗ Travel related to social, cultural and recreational activities, so-
cial, cultural and recreational activities, social, cultural and recre-
ational activities not elsewhere classified, mass media use and
entertainment.
∗ Travel relating to search of jobs.
• Personal Care and Self-Maintenance
– (Single Sub-Category)
∗ Sleep and related activities
∗ Eating and drinking
∗ Smoking, drinking alcohol and other intoxicants.
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∗ Personal Hygiene and health
∗ Walking, exercise mining, jogging, yoga, etc.
∗ Receiving medical and personal care from professional
∗ Receiving medical and personal care from household members.
∗ Talking, gossiping and quarreling
∗ Doing nothing, rest and relaxation
∗ Individual religious practices and meditation
∗ Other activities
∗ Resting/convalescing due to physical illness and physically un-
well persons.
∗ Travel related to personal care and self-maintenance
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B.2 Appendix: Children’s Time Use
Figure B.20: Effect of Later Sunset on Sleep
(a) Children Weekdays Only (b) Children Including Weekends
(c) Adults Weekdays Only (d) Adults Including Weekends
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between daily sunset time and sleep for children
and adults on weekdays and weekends in India. Residuals for both sleep and sunset time are plotted after absorbing
district and week-of-year fixed effects. Source: ITUS.
302
Table B.9: Balance Table I: Daily Sunset Time and Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years of Education Worker (0/1) Sex (0/1) Rural (0/1) Household Size
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07
(0.32) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.19)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.27 0.25 0.54 0.70 5.54
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.139 0.076 0.013 0.228 0.106
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on individual- and household-level observables for children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.10: Balance Table II: Daily Sunset Time and Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hinduism (0/1) Age (Years) Homestead (0/1) Land Owned (0/1) Log Mnth HH Exp
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.04 -0.27 -0.08 -0.05 0.01
(0.05) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.88 11.33 0.65 0.47 7.74
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.255 0.023 0.448 0.159 0.217
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on individual- and household-level observables for children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.11: Balance Table III: Daily Sunset Time and Observables
(1) (2) (3)
Temporary House (0/1) Semi-Temporary House (0/1) Permanent House (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.06 0.01 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.38 0.23 0.38
Observations 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.325 0.115 0.286
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on individual- and household-level observables for children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.12: Tobit: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.47*** -1.31*** 1.65*** -0.15
(0.14) (0.42) (0.41) (0.69)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate tobit regression estimating Equation
(8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.13: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Study Effort (0/1)
(1) (2)
Study (0/1) Study (0/1)
β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.10 -0.14**
(0.06) (0.06)
Sunset Time*Worker 0.19***
(0.02)
District FE Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean 0.57 0.57
Observations 13964 13964
R2 0.177 0.497
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on study effort (0/1) for children 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable.
Column 2 also includes an interaction term that captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for child
laborers compared to students. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.14: Weather Controls: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.48*** -0.70*** 1.99*** 0.12
(0.17) (0.26) (0.44) (0.38)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.091 0.169 0.295 0.071
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8)
on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects, and controls for rainfall and
temperature. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
305
Table B.15: Controlling for Observables: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.48*** -0.64*** 1.54*** 0.05
(0.13) (0.23) (0.40) (0.26)
Years of Education -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.17***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Primary Activity: Not a Student (0/1) 0.23*** -1.56*** 1.51*** 3.83***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11)
Sex (0/1) 0.09*** 0.04* 0.37*** -0.57***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Rural (0/1) 0.22*** -0.32*** -0.33*** 0.42***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07)
Homestead (0/1) 0.00 0.04 0.23** -0.25***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Land Owned (0/1) -0.03 0.08 -0.12 -0.01
(0.07) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12)
Land Possessed (0/1) 0.04 -0.05 -0.13 0.12
(0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.12)
Log Mnth HH Exp -0.14*** 0.12*** -0.03 -0.15**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Semi-Temporary House (0/1) -0.04 0.11** -0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07)
Permanent House (0/1) -0.11** 0.12** 0.16* -0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
Household Size 0.03*** -0.02 0.03* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Hinduism (0/1) -0.13** 0.11 -0.09 0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age-by-DayofWeek FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.247 0.365 0.348 0.554
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and age-by-day-of-week fixed effects, and controls
for education, sex, rural-urban status, wealth, income, household size and religion. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.16: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use on Weekends (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.57*** -0.27 1.00** -0.33
(0.20) (0.29) (0.44) (0.38)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.46 1.73 11.28 1.36
Observations 8615 8615 8615 8615
R2 0.123 0.284 0.116 0.126
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekends. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.17: State-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.53* -0.53 0.82 -0.06
(0.27) (0.49) (0.60) (0.60)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.095 0.181 0.313 0.076
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and state-by-season fixed effects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.18: Latitude-by-Week-of-Year FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.64*** -0.69** 1.92*** 0.19
(0.20) (0.29) (0.55) (0.50)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude-by-Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.101 0.179 0.309 0.078
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8)
on the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and latitude-by-week-of-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.19: District-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.62** -0.76 1.09* -0.13
(0.29) (0.50) (0.60) (0.63)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.140 0.221 0.347 0.106
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8)
on the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and district-by-season fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.20: Remove Summer (Vacations): Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.33* -1.03*** 0.70* -1.40***
(0.19) (0.36) (0.39) (0.47)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.09 1.70 6.85 1.95
Observations 10620 10620 10620 10620
R2 0.101 0.130 0.103 0.080
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays after removing the months of April, May, and June from the sample. Each
column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source:
ITUS.
Table B.21: Remove Winter: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.36 -0.42 1.99*** 0.70
(0.22) (0.32) (0.60) (0.50)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.05 1.37 8.04 2.17
Observations 8951 8951 8951 8951
R2 0.091 0.205 0.332 0.077
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays after removing the months of December, January, February, and March
from the sample. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable.
All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.22: Remove Monsoon: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.50*** -0.50** 1.79*** 0.46
(0.15) (0.24) (0.47) (0.34)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.09 1.47 7.81 2.02
Observations 10700 10700 10700 10700
R2 0.092 0.189 0.332 0.068
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays after removing the months of July, August, and September from the
sample. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions
include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level.
Source: ITUS.
Table B.23: Remove Autumn: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.57*** -0.73*** 1.76*** 0.27
(0.15) (0.27) (0.43) (0.35)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.06 1.45 7.78 2.09
Observations 11621 11621 11621 11621
R2 0.100 0.171 0.310 0.073
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays after removing the months of October and November from the sample.
Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source:
ITUS.
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Table B.24: District-Age-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.53* -0.71 1.04* -0.35
(0.29) (0.53) (0.61) (0.62)
District-Age-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.368 0.328 0.465 0.379
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-age-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.25: District-Day-of-Week-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.61* -0.90 1.54** -0.42
(0.32) (0.55) (0.71) (0.68)
District-DayofWeek-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.251 0.333 0.426 0.220
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8)
on the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-day-of-week-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.26: District-Sex-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.63** -0.76 1.21** -0.17
(0.29) (0.50) (0.60) (0.62)
District-Sex-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.155 0.238 0.368 0.144
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-sex-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.27: District-Rural-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time
Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.62** -0.78 0.89 -0.29
(0.30) (0.52) (0.59) (0.64)
District-Rural-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.196 0.285 0.387 0.142
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8)
on the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-rural-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.28: District-Wealth-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time
Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.51* -0.66 0.68 0.06
(0.28) (0.49) (0.58) (0.62)
District-Rich-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.175 0.265 0.373 0.138
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-wealth-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.29: Conley Standard Errors: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time
Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.47*** -0.67** 1.65*** 0.10
(0.13) (0.26) (0.53) (0.35)
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modeled in (103). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to
a cutoff of 500 km. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.30: Standard Errors Clustered at the District Level: Effect of Late Sunset
on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.47*** -0.67** 1.65** 0.10
(0.17) (0.33) (0.65) (0.35)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.50 7.60 2.05
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.091 0.169 0.294 0.070
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation
(8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.31: Dropping ‘Nappers’: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.39*** -0.97*** 2.08*** 0.23
(0.14) (0.28) (0.39) (0.40)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 1.66 6.93 2.04
Observations 11350 11350 11350 11350
R2 0.098 0.190 0.234 0.099
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. I only include children who did
not take naps. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Non-Linear Metrics of Sleep Duration
Unfortunately, medical experts do not agree on how much sleep children need
(see (264) and (296) for a systematic review). The National Sleep Foundation
(NSF) recommends 8.5 to 9.25 hours of sleep. While the National Heart, Lung
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and Blood Institute (NHLBI) and the Harvard Medical School recommend 10
hours and 9 hours of sleep for children between 5-18 years of age, respectively.
Recently, a NSF assembled multidisciplinary expert panel recommended that
children between 6 and 13 years of age sleep 9 to 11 hours while those between
14 and 17 years of age were recommended to sleep 8 to 10 hours (199). The
American Academy of Sleep Medicine issued a similar recommendation (309).
In light of these recommendations, I estimate the effects of later sunset on
non-linear metrics of sleep duration for children by two age-groups: 6-13 and
14-17 year olds (Table B.32). I find that an hour delay in sunset decreases the
likelihood of getting 8 hours of sleep by 1 and 4 percentage points for children
who are 6-13 and 14-16 year old, respectively. Although these point estimates
are not statistically significant. However, I show an hour delay in sunset de-
creases the likelihood of getting 9 hours of sleep by roughly 15 percentage points
for both age-groups.
Table B.32: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep for School-Age Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 6-13 Age 14-16 Age 6-13 Age 14-16
Sleep>8h (0/1) Sleep>8h (0/1) Sleep>9h (0/1) Sleep>9h (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.01 -0.04 -0.14** -0.17**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.93 0.80 0.70 0.44
Observations 9894 4070 9894 4070
R2 0.043 0.086 0.120 0.121
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on non-linear metrics of sleep duration for children between 6
and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome
variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at
the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.33: China: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sleep Leisure-SS Leisure-MF Homework-MF Homework-SS
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.43** 0.37 0.81 -0.27 -0.44
(0.21) (0.68) (0.56) (0.27) (0.29)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.03 3.95 2.41 1.09 1.41
Observations 5794 5794 5794 5794 5794
R2 0.029 0.046 0.015 0.050 0.058
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on time allocated to sleep, leisure and homework
by children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (9) on
the outcome variable. ‘MF’ denotes Monday-Friday and ‘SS’ denotes Saturday and Sunday. All regressions include
province and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the county-year level. Source: CHNS.
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Table B.34: Controlling for Observables: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sleep Leisure-SS Leisure-MF Homework-MF Homework-SS
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.44** 0.19 0.97* -0.21 -0.39
(0.21) (0.73) (0.54) (0.23) (0.29)
Age -0.15*** 0.04** -0.03** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rural 0.16*** -0.40** -0.22** -0.10* -0.00
(0.05) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)
Log HH Income -0.00 0.05 0.03* 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Log HH Expense 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH Size -0.01 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.04***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Energy(kcal) -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Carbohydrates(g) 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Fat(g) 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.06** 0.06*
(0.02) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Protein(g) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Urbanization Index -0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Communications Component Score 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Community Population Density Category 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Diversity Score 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Economic Component Score 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Quality of Health Score 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Housing Component Score 0.02 -0.13* -0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Market Component Score 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Social Services Score 0.01 -0.08** -0.03 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Transportation Component Score -0.00 -0.09** -0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Community Education Category 0.00 -0.08 -0.12*** 0.02 0.07**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Modern Markets Component Score 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.04 3.96 2.43 1.10 1.41
Observations 5471 5471 5471 5471 5471
R2 0.231 0.079 0.025 0.105 0.136
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on time allocated to sleep, leisure and homework by children between 6 and 16 years of age.
‘MF’ denotes Monday-Friday and SS denotes Saturday and Sunday. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (9) on the outcome
variable. All regressions include province and year fixed effects, and controls for weather, age, rural-urban status, income, household size, food consumption,
and village infrastructure. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the county-year level. Source: CHNS.
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Table B.35: China: Effect of Late Sunset on Outdoor vs. Indoor Leisure (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outdoor Leisure-SS Outdoor Leisure-MF Indoor Leisure-SS Indoor Leisure-MF
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.62
(0.17) (0.19) (0.59) (0.45)
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.34 0.30 3.61 2.11
Observations 5794 5794 5794 5794
R2 0.015 0.017 0.046 0.015
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on time allocated to indoor and outdoor leisure by children between 6 and 16 years of age.
‘MF’ denotes Monday-Friday and SS denotes Saturday and Sunday. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (9) on the outcome
variable. All regressions include province and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the county-year level. Source: CHNS.
Outdoor Leisure and Later Sunset Times
If outdoor activities enjoy increasing returns to scale during daylight, later sun-
set may induce children to engage in longer outdoor recreational activities in
the evening, which would be less satisfying if performed separately over the
same duration but broken between morning and evening. For instance, (421)
find that reallocation of available daylight from the morning to the evening and
back due to daylight saving time causes a reallocation of time from indoor to
outdoor recreational activities and back again.
To test this hypothesis, I disaggregate time allocated to leisure by outdoor
and indoor activities.6 First, I show that the increase in leisure is largely driven
by indoor and not outdoor recreation (Table B.36), consistent with studies that
show that sleep deprivation increases daytime sleepiness and sedentary leisure
activities. Second, I examine the effects of later sunset on children’s time use
by hour of day. Although there is some evidence for substitution between in-
door leisure and outdoor leisure in the evening (6 pm), children do not directly
6I define outdoor leisure as any recreational activity performed outside the house, or any
indoor activity for which one has to initially leave the house and go to another indoor or outdoor
location (e.g., relatives’ house).
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substitute sleep with outdoor leisure (Figure B.21).
Table B.36: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Outdoor vs. Indoor Leisure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leisure - Indoor Leisure - Indoor Leisure - Outdoor Leisure - Outdoor
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 1.18*** 0.79 0.47** 0.30
(0.32) (0.55) (0.21) (0.32)
District FE Yes No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-by-Season FE No Yes No Yes
Mean 5.74 5.74 1.86 1.86
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.223 0.268 0.174 0.233
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to indoor and outdoor leisure by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable; columns 1 and 3 includes district and week-of-year fixed effects, while columns 2 and 4 include
district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week
level. Source: ITUS.
Figure B.21: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use by Hour of Day
Notes: This figure presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure and work by
children between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each line on the graph represents 24 separate regressions
estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable – one for each hour in the day. All regressions in the left figure include
district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week
level. Source: ITUS.
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Effect of Later Sunset on Specific Leisure Activities
In this section, I examine the effects of later sunset on indoor and outdoor
leisure, disaggregated by type of leisure activity. I present estimates generated
after absorbing both district fixed effects and district-by-season fixed effects be-
cause the effect of later sunset on the type of leisure activity is sensitive to district-
specific seasonal confounders.
Indoor Leisure: Tables B.37 and B.38 present impacts on specific indoor leisure
activities. I find that the effect on indoor leisure is largely driven by ‘Doing
Nothing’, ‘Nap’, and ‘Talking, Gossiping’. The category ‘Doing Nothing’ in-
cludes time spent doing nothing, resting and relaxing. The category ‘Talking,
Gossiping’ includes time allocated to talking, gossiping or quarreling. I find
no change in time allocated to mass media or eating and hygiene. Since after-
noon naps are responsible for a significant proportion of the increase in indoor
leisure, these results are precisely what one would expect if children’s need for
sleep and likely sleep deprivation increases compensatory (sedentary) leisure
activities as documented by several medical studies (87; 88; 153; 217; 301; 338).
Daytime Naps: What does the point estimate on daytime naps mean for
the effect of later sunset on children’s total sleep (‘Sleep and Nap’)? Table B.37
shows that an hour delay in sunset increases daytime sleep by over 15 minutes.
Thus, the negative effect on total sleep is roughly 15 minutes (Tables B.39 and
B.40), although the point estimate is underpowered.7 In addition, Tables B.41
7I also find virtually identical estimates for adults (Table B.76). Furthermore, the coefficient
on ‘Sleep and Nap’ is statistically significant, presumably because the adults’ sample includes
almost four times as many observations as the children’s sample.
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and B.42 examine the effects of later sunset on non-linear metrics of total sleep
duration and finds that among 6-13 year olds an hour delay in sunset reduces
the likelihood of getting 9 hours of total sleep by 11 percentage points. This
effect size is identical to that observed in Table B.32 for non-linear metrics of
nighttime sleep duration.
This discussion should not distract from the fact that naps may not provide
the same biochemical therapeutic effects on the brain as longer periods of noc-
turnal sleep, and do not make up for inadequate nighttime sleep (The National
Sleep Foundation).89 Naps may momentarily increase basic concentration un-
der conditions of sleep deprivation, as caffeine can up to a certain dose. But,
naps cannot salvage more complex functions of the brain, including learning,
memory, emotional stability, complex reasoning, or decision-making (417). In
addition, daytime naps take place after school hours. Thus, any short-term ben-
efits of napping on cognition will not mitigate the negative effect of (nighttime)
sleep deprivation on learning in school. That is, while post-learning sleep (naps)
may help consolidate memories, pre-learning sleep (nighttime sleep) is crucial
for the encoding of new memories (22; 410; 416; 424). In fact, the effect of pre-
learning sleep is precisely what is observed by studies investigating the impact
of later school start times on test scores (86; 147; 195; 414)
Outdoor Leisure: Tables B.43 and B.44 presents impacts on specific outdoor
leisure activities. I find that the effect on outdoor leisure is driven by ‘Games,
Pastime’. An hour delay in sunset time increases time spent on games and other
8See https://www.sleepfoundation.org/sleep-topics/napping.
9In fact, studies conducted among preschool-aged children show that daytime naps are neg-
ative correlated with performance on cognitive tasks, while nighttime sleep is positive corre-
lated. One interpretation of these results is that children who receive inadequate sleep at night
are more likely to take daytime naps (239; 240), which is consistent with my findings.
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pastime by roughly 20 minutes. It is important to note that although coded
as outdoor leisure, ‘Games, Pastime’ may include indoor activities like board
games. I fail to find a significant effect of later sunset on travel for leisure or
running and exercise.
Table B.37: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Indoor Leisure Activities (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nap Mass Media Eating, Hygiene Doing Nothing Talking, Gossiping Other Indoor
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.27** 0.03 -0.12 0.79*** 0.19* 0.03
(0.11) (0.22) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.36 1.06 2.40 1.03 0.69 0.19
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.246 0.157 0.237 0.185 0.176 0.057
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to indoor leisure activities by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.38: District-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Indoor
Leisure Activities (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nap Mass Media Eating, Hygiene Doing Nothing Talking, Gossiping Other Indoor
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.34** 0.14 -0.09 0.02 0.37* 0.02
(0.15) (0.38) (0.20) (0.27) (0.22) (0.16)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.36 1.06 2.40 1.03 0.69 0.19
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.336 0.214 0.283 0.260 0.226 0.100
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to indoor leisure activities by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.39: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep and Nap for School-Age Children
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Nap Sleep and Nap
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.47*** 0.27** -0.20
(0.14) (0.11) (0.20)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 0.36 9.44
Observations 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.091 0.246 0.099
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for children between 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All
regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.40: District-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep and Nap for
School-Age Children
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Nap Sleep and Nap
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.62** 0.34** -0.28
(0.29) (0.15) (0.33)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.07 0.36 9.44
Observations 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.140 0.336 0.168
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for children between 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All
regressions include district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at
the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.41: Non-Linear Metrics of Sleep: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep and Nap
for School-Age Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 6-13 Age 14-16 Age 6-13 Age 14-16
Sleep and Nap>8h Sleep and Nap>8h Sleep and Nap>9h Sleep and Nap>9h
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.01 -0.02 -0.11** -0.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.95 0.83 0.76 0.52
Observations 9894 4070 9894 4070
R2 0.043 0.081 0.081 0.095
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for children between 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All
regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.42: District-by-Season FE: Non-Linear Metrics of Sleep: Effect of Late
Sunset on Sleep and Nap for School-Age Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 6-13 Age 14-16 Age 6-13 Age 14-16
Sleep and Nap>8h Sleep and Nap>8h Sleep and Nap>9h Sleep and Nap>9h
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.00 -0.28** -0.14 -0.22
(0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.16)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.95 0.83 0.76 0.52
Observations 9894 4070 9894 4070
R2 0.084 0.143 0.146 0.177
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for children between 6 and 16 years of age on
weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All
regressions include district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at
the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
324
Table B.43: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Outdoor Leisure Activities
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Running, Exercise Travel for Leisure Games, Pastime Other Outdoor
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.10 0.04 0.32 0.01
(0.07) (0.04) (0.20) (0.05)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.21 0.12 1.46 0.08
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.100 0.175 0.154 0.063
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to outdoor leisure activities by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.44: District-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Outdoor
Leisure Activities (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Running, Exercise Travel for Leisure Games, Pastime Other Outdoor
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.14 -0.04 0.51 -0.31***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.31) (0.08)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.21 0.12 1.46 0.08
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.157 0.297 0.219 0.128
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to outdoor leisure activities by children
between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on
the outcome variable. All regressions include district-by-season and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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B.3 Appendix: Children’s Academic Outcomes
Figure B.22: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attain-
ment, and Enrollment Status
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Primary School (0/1)
(c) Middle School (0/1) (d) Enrolled (0/1)
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between academic outcomes and annual average
sunset time (24-hour clock) for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Residuals for both academic outcomes
and annual average sunset are plotted after absorbing district and age fixed effects. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.23: Within-District Variation in Annual Average Sunset Time
Notes: This figure presents within-district variation in annual average sunset time or the distribution of difference in
annual average sunset time between the easternmost and westernmost PSUs within a district. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.24: DHS Clusters in Indonesia and Time Zone Boundary on the Kalimantan Island
328
Figure B.25: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Discontinuity in Av-
erage Annual Sunset Time at Time Zone Border
Notes: This figure presents the sharp one-hour discontinuity in annual average sunset time for DHS PSUs on either
side of the time zone border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan, Indonesia. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.26: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Effects of Later Sun-
set on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment (Polynomial
Fit of Order 1)
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Primary School (0/1)
(c) Middle School (0/1) (d) Enrollment Status (0/1)
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age in Indonesia. I leverage discontinuity in annual average sunset
time (Figure B.25) for DHS PSUs on either side of the time zone border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan,
Indonesia. All regressions include controls for age. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.27: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Effects of Later Sun-
set on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment (Polynomial
Fit of Order 2)
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Primary School (0/1)
(c) Middle School (0/1) (d) Enrollment Status (0/1)
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age. I leverage discontinuity in annual average sunset time (Figure
B.25) for DHS PSUs on either side of the time zone border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan, Indonesia. All
regressions include controls for age. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.28: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Effects of Later Sun-
set on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment (Polynomial
Fit of Order 3)
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Primary School (0/1)
(c) Middle School (0/1) (d) Enrollment Status (0/1)
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age. I leverage discontinuity in annual average sunset time (Figure
B.25) for DHS PSUs on either side of the time zone border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan, Indonesia. All
regressions include controls for age. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.29: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Effects of Later Sun-
set on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment (Polynomial
Fit of Order 4)
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Primary School (0/1)
(c) Middle School (0/1) (d) Enrollment Status (0/1)
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age. I leverage discontinuity in annual average sunset time (Figure
B.25) for DHS PSUs on either side of the time zone border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan, Indonesia. All
regressions include controls for age. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.30: Placebo Test: Effects of Later Sunset on Years of Schooling for Indi-
viduals Over 40 Years of Age (Polynomial Fit of Order 1)
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling for adults over 40 years of
age. I leverage discontinuity in annual average sunset time (Figure B.25) for DHS PSUs on either side of the time zone
border (as depicted in Figure B.24) on Kalimantan, Indonesia. All regressions include controls for age. Source: DHS.
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Figure B.31: Long-Run Effects of Late Sunset on Math Scores
(a) Math Test Scores (Table B.59, Column 2)
(b) Math Test Scores (Table B.59, Column 3)
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between annual average sunset time (24-hour clock)
and children’s math test scores in India. Figure (a) plots residuals for annual average sunset and math scores after
absorbing week-of-year, day-of-week, and age fixed effects. Figure (b) plots residuals for annual average sunset and
math scores after absorbing week-of-year, day-of-week, and age fixed effects as well as controlling for latitude and
weather. Source: YLS.
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Figure B.32: Short-Run Effects of Late Sunset on Math Scores
(a) Math Test Scores (Table B.60, Column 2)
(b) Math Test Scores (Table B.60, Column 3)
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between annual sunset time on the day of the test
(24-hour clock) and children’s math test scores in India. Figure (a) plots residuals for daily sunset time and math scores
after absorbing week-of-year and age fixed effects and controlling for lagged test scores. Figure (b) plots residuals for
annual average sunset and math scores after absorbing week-of-year, age, and child fixed effects. Source: YLS.
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Table B.45: 45 Developing Countries: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Years of Schooling Years of Schooling Years of Schooling
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.82*** -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.54***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age FE No Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Indicators No No No Yes
Mean 3.16 3.16 3.16 3.22
Observations 2944329 2944329 2930533 2559105
R2 0.012 0.506 0.507 0.592
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling for children between 6 and 16 years of age across 45 countries in the developing world.
Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on years of schooling. Column 1 includes no controls, formally presenting the point estimate from Figure 3.1.
Column 2 includes age fixed effects, Column 3 also includes controls for latitude and elevation at the PSU level, while Column 4 includes an additional control for household asset
index and rural-urban status in addition to all the previous controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: DHS.
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Table B.46: Other Controls: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.93*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12**
(0.29) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.44 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 638682 638682 638682 638682
R2 0.738 0.647 0.565 0.113
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children
between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include age and district fixed
effects, as well as controls for latitude, elevation at the PSU level and household asset index. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table B.47: Age-Appropriate Sample: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling and Educational Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Years of Schooling Middle (0/1)
Age>8 Age>8 Age>11 Age>11
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -1.10*** -0.17*** -1.38*** -0.15**
(0.39) (0.06) (0.49) (0.07)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 5.72 0.66 6.94 0.46
Observations 461850 461850 294088 294088
R2 0.546 0.463 0.308 0.384
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling and likelihood of completing primary and middle school for children between 6 and 16
years of age in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. Columns 1 and 2 include children over 8 years of age.
Columns 3 and 4 include children over 11 years of age. All regressions include district and age fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source:
2015 India DHS.
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Table B.48: Alternative Measure of Educational Attainment: Effect of Late Sunset on Educational Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In/Completed Primary (0/1) In/Completed Secondary (0/1) In/Completed Primary (0/1) In/Completed Secondary (0/1)
Age>5 Age>5 Age>8 Age>11
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.11** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.95 0.38 0.96 0.77
Observations 638682 638682 461850 294088
R2 0.063 0.622 0.045 0.178
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on the likelihood that a child is in primary (secondary or post-primary) school or has completed primary
(secondary or post-primary) school for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome
variable. Columns 3 and 4 include children over 8 and 11 years of age, respectively. All regressions include district and age fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table B.49: Dropping Wider Districts: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of School-
ing, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.80** -0.13*** -0.05 -0.10*
(0.38) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.42 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 568519 568519 568519 568519
R2 0.731 0.642 0.560 0.093
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and
age fixed effects. I drop wider districts or districts where the difference in annual average sunset time between the
easternmost and westernmost PSUs within a district is over the 90th percentile of the distribution presented in Figure
B.23. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
Table B.50: Only Wider Districts: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling,
Educational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.96* -0.11 -0.13** -0.11
(0.53) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.57 0.50 0.22 0.90
Observations 70163 70163 70163 70163
R2 0.735 0.658 0.573 0.093
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and
age fixed effects. I only include wider districts or districts where the difference in annual average sunset time between
the easternmost and westernmost PSUs within a district is over the 90th percentile of the distribution presented in
Figure B.23. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table B.51: Standard Errors Clustered at the District Level: Effect of Late Sunset
on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.86* -0.13** -0.08* -0.11
(0.45) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.44 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 638682 638682 638682 638682
R2 0.732 0.643 0.561 0.093
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include age and
district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
Table B.52: State Fixed Effects: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Edu-
cational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.25*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.13***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.44 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 638682 638682 638682 638682
R2 0.719 0.636 0.555 0.065
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include age and
state fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table B.53: State Fixed Effects (Other Controls): Effect of Late Sunset on Years
of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.50*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.17***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.44 0.48 0.21 0.90
Observations 638682 638682 638682 638682
R2 0.727 0.640 0.560 0.092
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, likelihood of completing
primary and middle school, and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include age and
state fixed effects, as well as controls for latitude, elevation at the PSU level, rural-urban status and household asset
index. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level. Source: 2015 India DHS.
Table B.54: Did Surveyors Sample Younger Children in Places with Later An-
nual Average Sunset Times?
(1)
Age
β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 0.34
(0.33)
District FE Yes
Mean 10.99
Observations 638682
R2 0.004
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on age for children between 6 and 16 years of age in
India. The regression includes district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the PSU level.
Source: 2015 India DHS.
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Table B.55: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Effects of Later Sun-
set on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
Conventional -0.654 -0.0392 -0.0727 -0.0527
Bias-corrected -0.728 -0.0347 -0.0778 -0.0485
Robust -0.728 -0.0347 -0.0778 -0.0485
Robust 95% CI [-1.114 -.342] [-.114 .045] [-.151 -.005] [-.145 .048]
Observations 3722 3722 3722 3722
Conventional p-value 0.000 0.284 0.031 0.225
Robust p-value 0.000 0.391 0.037 0.323
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Order Bias (q) 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions
include controls for age. The RD estimates are constructed using the epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth choice
mserd is an upgraded version of both the IK and the CCT implementations of the MSE-optimal bandwidth selectors
discussed in (210) and (78), respectively. I use the code written by (77) for robust bias-corrected inference. Source: 2003
Indonesia DHS.
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Table B.56: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates (Other Controls): Ef-
fects of Later Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enroll-
ment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
Conventional -0.674 -0.0533 -0.0824 -0.0900
Bias-corrected -0.716 -0.0515 -0.0916 -0.101
Robust -0.716 -0.0515 -0.0916 -0.101
Robust 95% CI [-1.052 -.381] [-.134 .031] [-.163 -.004] [-.198 -.021]
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3722 3722 3722 3722
Conventional p-value 0.000 0.148 0.012 0.043
Robust p-value 0.000 0.220 0.011 0.040
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Order Bias (q) 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions
include controls for age as well as socioeconomic and geographic indicators: latitude, altitude, electricity (0/1), radio
(0/1), television (0/1), refrigerator (0/1), bicycle (0/1), motorcycle (0/1), car (0/1) and wealth index (1-5). The RD
estimates are constructed using the epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth choice mserd is an upgraded version of both
the IK and the CCT implementations of the MSE-optimal bandwidth selectors discussed in (210) and (78), respectively.
I use the code written by (77) for robust bias-corrected inference. Source: 2003 Indonesia DHS.
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Table B.57: Indonesia Regression Discontinuity Estimates (Falsification Test):
Effects of Later Sunset on Age and Sex
(1) (2) (3)
Household Head Age Child Sex Child Age
Conventional 0.417 -0.0219 0.338
Bias-corrected 0.0601 -0.0398 0.308
Robust 0.0601 -0.0398 0.308
Robust 95% CI [-2.468 2.588] [-.183 .104] [-.570 1.186]
Observations 3722 3722 3722
Conventional p-value 0.720 0.739 0.396
Robust p-value 0.963 0.587 0.491
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1.000 1.000 1.000
Order Bias (q) 2.000 2.000 2.000
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on age of household head, child sex and child
age for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression. The RD estimates are
constructed using the epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth choice mserd is an upgraded version of both the IK and
the CCT implementations of the MSE-optimal bandwidth selectors discussed in (210) and (78), respectively. I use the
code written by (77) for robust bias-corrected inference. Source: 2003 Indonesia DHS.
Table B.58: Placebo Test: Effects of Later Sunset on Years of Schooling for Indi-
viduals Over 40 Years of Age
(1)
Years of Schooling
Conventional 0.0107
Bias-corrected -0.1220
Robust -0.1220
Robust 95% CI [-.899 .655]
Observations 3266
Conventional p-value 0.977
Robust p-value 0.758
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1.000
Order Bias (q) 2.000
Notes: This figure presents the effects of annual average sunset time on years of schoolingfor adults over 40 years of
age. All regressions include controls for age. The RD estimates are constructed using the epanechnikov kernel. The
bandwidth choice mserd is an upgraded version of both the IK and the CCT implementations of the MSE-optimal
bandwidth selectors discussed in (210) and (78), respectively. I use the code written by (77) for robust bias-corrected
inference. Source: 2003 Indonesia DHS.
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Table B.59: Long-Run Effects of Late Sunset on Math Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Math (SD) Math (SD) Math (SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.812*** -0.769*** -1.565***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.217)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE No Yes Yes
Day of Week FE No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes
Weather Controls No No Yes
Observations 7511 7511 7511
R2 0.018 0.048 0.080
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on math scores for school-age children. Each
column represents a separate regression. All regressions include age (year/round) fixed effects. Column 2 includes
week-of-year and day-of-week fixed effects. Column 3 includes week-of-year and day-of-week fixed effects as well as
controls for latitude and weather. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the child level. Source: YLS.
Table B.60: Short-Run Effects of Late Sunset on Math Test Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math (SD) Math (SD) Math (SD) Math (SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Daily Sunset Time (Hours) -0.627*** -0.570*** -0.539 -0.468
(0.088) (0.062) (0.413) (0.423)
L.Math 0.645***
(0.011)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child FE No No Yes Yes
Day of Week FE No No No Yes
Weather Controls No No No Yes
Observations 7511 4589 7511 7511
R2 0.045 0.439 0.778 0.782
Notes: This table presents the effect of day-of-test sunset time on math scores for school-age children. Each column
represents a separate regression. All regressions include age (year/round) and week-of-year fixed effects. Column
2 includes controls for lagged test scores. Column 3 includes child fixed effects. Column 4 includes child and
day-of-week fixed effects as well as controls for weather. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the child level.
Source: YLS.
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Table B.61: Falsification Test: Short-Run Effects of Past and Future Day-of-Test
Sunset Time on Current Survey Round Math Test Scores
(1)
Math (SD)
β / SE
Daily Sunset Time (Hours) -0.692***
(0.136)
L.Daily Sunset Time (Hours) 0.134
(0.098)
F.Daily Sunset Time (Hours) 0.010
(0.090)
L.Math 0.637***
(0.018)
Age Dummies Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes
Observations 1834
R2 0.412
Notes: This table presents the effect of sunset time on the previous survey round test date and sunset time on the next
survey round test date on math scores in the current survey round for school-age children. The regression include age
(year/round) and week-of-year fixed effects as well as controls for lagged test scores. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the child level. Source: YLS.
REDS: Effect of Later Sunset on Academic Outcomes
Here, I use a nationally representative survey of rural households in India,
the 2006 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey or REDS, to investigate the
associated effects of later sunset on educational outcomes for school-age chil-
dren. Analogous to the 2015 Indian DHS specification, I exploit plausibly exoge-
nous cross-sectional variation in annual average sunset time at the village level
within districts. As before, I find that an hour delay in annual average sunset
time reduces schooling among school-age children, translating into lower ed-
ucational attainment at the primary and middle school level (Table B.62). Fur-
thermore, an hour delay in annual average sunset time reduces the likelihood of
current school enrollment by 17 percentage points, or equivalently, a one stan-
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dard deviation delay in annual average sunset time reduces the likelihood of
current school enrollment by 10%.
If wealthier households sort themselves into villages with earlier annual av-
erage sunset, my baseline estimates may be confounded by residential sorting.
However, if sorting were occurring, one might expect villages that observe later
sunset to have low in-migration and more out-migration. I examine the relation-
ship between later sunset and episodes of in- and out-migration at the village
level (Table B.63). I fail to find evidence that villages that observe later sunset
have more episodes of out-migration or fewer episodes of in-migration. More-
over, I fail to find evidence for a negative relationship between sunset time and
instances of non-residents migrating to work to villages.
In Tables B.64 and B.65, I control for village level geographic characteristics
like elevation, latitude, temperature and rainfall as well as child level biologi-
cal characteristics like height, weight and sex. I also control for episodes of in-
and out-migration experienced at the village level in the last 50 years, access to
water and electricity as well as other street level attributes such as availability
of street lighting or proportion of households with an indoor toilet. My base-
line estimates remain relatively unaffected. In Tables B.66 - B.69, I examine the
relationship between annual average sunset and household and village level
observables. I find a statistically significant relationship for 2 out of 21 charac-
teristics.10
These tests imply that any unobservable omitted variable that generates bias
in my estimates must be orthogonal to these observables, but co-vary system-
10In Table B.70 I adjust standard errors to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in (103), and
implemented by (202). I allow errors to be spatially auto-correlated within a distance of 500 km.
The point estimates remain precisely estimated.
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atically with both annual average sunset time and educational outcomes across
the east-west gradient within a district. Given the richness of the observables,
the existence of such unobservable omitted variables seems implausible.
Children’s Wages
As a complement to the effects on educational outcomes and a robustness check
on the underlying conceptual framework, I examine the relationship between
sunset times and wages paid to child laborers. My time use results suggest that
sleep is productivity-enhancing, increasing the marginal returns to study effort
for students, and the marginal product of work effort for child laborers. Thus,
if children are paid their marginal product, by reducing labor productivity later
sunset must decrease marginal wages to disincentivize work effort from child
laborers.
I test this prediction using village-by-industry level REDS data on daily
wage rate paid to child laborers. Indeed, I find that an hour delay in annual
average sunset time reduces the wage rate for children by roughly INR 24 (Ta-
ble B.71).11
11Alternatively, by increasing dropouts, later sunset may increase the supply of child labor at
the village level, in turn reducing children’s wage rate. Because the estimates are at the village
level I cannot rule such a general equilibrium effect.
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Table B.62: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment,
and Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -1.06 -0.13 -0.17** -0.17**
(0.71) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.79 0.52 0.23 0.91
Observations 10006 10006 10006 9192
R2 0.663 0.650 0.574 0.117
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age in India. Each column represents a separate regression
estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and age fixed effects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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Table B.63: Effect of Late Sunset on Migration
(1) (2) (3)
No. Times In-Migration: 50 yrs No. Times Out-Migration: 50 yrs Non-Residents In-Migrate for Work 10 years: (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 10.93 -5.00 0.06
(13.23) (3.54) (0.67)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 7.27 2.01 0.71
Observations 190 158 204
R2 0.813 0.912 0.709
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on episodes of in-migration and out-migration in the last 50 years as well as on the likelihood of in-migration
for work in the last 10 years, both at the village level. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include district fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Source: REDS.
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Table B.64: Controlling for Geographic and Individual Level Observables: Effect
of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment and Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.87 -0.13 -0.14* -0.14*
(0.78) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Latitude -0.10 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elevation -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Temperature -0.15** -0.01 -0.01** -0.02***
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Height 0.29** 0.03* 0.02 -0.04**
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log Weight 0.20* 0.00 0.02 0.04**
(0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Male (0/1) 0.30*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.79 0.52 0.23 0.91
Observations 10006 10006 10006 9192
R2 0.666 0.651 0.575 0.122
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment and
enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression estimating
Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and age fixed effects, and controls for latitude,
elevation, rain, temperature, height, weight and sex. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level.
Source: REDS.
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Table B.65: Controlling for Household and Village Level Observables: Effect of
Late Sunset on Years of Schooling, Educational Attainment, and Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -1.44** -0.18** -0.25*** -0.32***
(0.69) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
No. Times In-Migration 50 yrs -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. Times Out-Migration 50 yrs 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
In-Migration for Work in 10 years (0/1) 0.55*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.03**
(0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Permanent Road (0/1) -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brick Houses (Prop.) -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.07
(0.47) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Huts (Prop.) -1.69* -0.16 -0.09 -0.11
(0.95) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12)
Mud Houses (Prop.) -0.29 -0.03 -0.03 0.01
(0.36) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Multi-Storeyed Houses (Prop.) 0.02 -0.07 0.16 0.09
(0.92) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14)
Public Tap (0/1) 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Wells (0/1) -0.27** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.02
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HHs Running Water (Prop.) 0.50 0.04 0.01 0.03
(0.54) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
Street Lights (0/1) 0.27* 0.04** -0.00 -0.02
(0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HHs Electricity (Prop.) 0.09 0.05 0.02 -0.04
(0.46) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Public Toilet (0/1) -0.22 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.00
(0.17) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
HHs Indoor Toilet (Prop.) -0.15 0.02 -0.12** -0.10*
(0.52) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
HHs Landline (Prop.) 0.56 0.04 0.01 -0.03
(1.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13)
HHs Large Livestock (Prop.) -0.58*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.04
(0.19) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
HHs Bicycle (Prop.) 1.04*** 0.12*** 0.06** -0.01
(0.29) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
HHs Mobile (Prop.) 0.12 -0.04 -0.12** 0.00
(0.44) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
HHs Motorcycle (Prop.) -0.20 -0.02 0.11* 0.09
(0.55) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
HHs Car (Prop.) 2.48** 0.21 0.32* 0.33***
(1.07) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 4.63 0.50 0.22 0.91
Observations 7601 7601 7601 6914
R2 0.650 0.641 0.555 0.111
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents
a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and age fixed effects, and controls for migration and
village infrastructure. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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Table B.66: Effect of Late Sunset on Observables I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Height Log Weight Male (0/1) Permanent Road (0/1) Brick Houses (Prop.) Huts (Prop.)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 -0.37 -0.09 -0.00
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.93) (0.11) (0.03)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 1.26 3.35 0.54 0.43 0.14 0.03
Observations 10080 10080 10080 9491 9244 9244
R2 0.059 0.088 0.020 0.520 0.755 0.643
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on household and village level observables. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
Table B.67: Effect of Late Sunset on Observables II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mud Houses (Prop.) Multi-Storeyed Houses (Prop.) Public Tap (0/1) Wells (0/1) HHs Running Water (Prop.)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.37* 0.06 -0.80** -0.77 0.08
(0.20) (0.07) (0.37) (0.71) (0.07)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.12 0.02 0.41 0.40 0.05
Observations 9244 9244 9491 9491 9244
R2 0.702 0.576 0.748 0.660 0.598
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on household and village level observables. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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Table B.68: Effect of Late Sunset on Observables III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Street Lights (0/1) HHs Electricity (Prop.) Public Toilet (0/1) HHs Indoor Toilet (Prop.) HHs Landline (Prop.)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 0.07 -0.01 -0.16 -0.03 0.06
(0.25) (0.14) (0.19) (0.09) (0.06)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.36 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.03
Observations 9491 9244 9491 9244 9244
R2 0.877 0.656 0.575 0.545 0.817
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on household and village level observables. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
Table B.69: Effect of Late Sunset on Observables IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HHs Large Livestock (Prop.) HHs Bicycle (Prop.) HHs Mobile (Prop.) HHs Motorcycle (Prop.) HHs Car (Prop.)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) 0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
(0.14) (0.22) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.05 0.01
Observations 9244 9244 9244 9244 9244
R2 0.663 0.740 0.606 0.594 0.396
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on household and village level observables. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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Table B.70: Conley Standard Errors: Effect of Late Sunset on Years of Schooling,
Educational Attainment, and Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling Primary (0/1) Middle (0/1) Enrolled (0/1)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -1.06* -0.13* -0.17** -0.17**
(0.55) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10006 10006 10006 9192
R2 0.634 0.629 0.554 0.085
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on years of schooling, educational attainment
and enrollment status for children between 6 and 16 years of age. Each column represents a separate regression esti-
mating Equation (10) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district and age fixed effects. Standard errors are
adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in (103). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in
distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. Source: REDS.
Table B.71: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Daily Wage Rate
(1)
Child Wage (INR)
β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -24.38***
(9.02)
District FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Place FE Yes
Geographic Controls Yes
Mean 36.05
Observations 2434
R2 0.544
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on children’s daily wage rate by industry at the
village level. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include district, industry, and place (inside
or outside the village) fixed effects, and geographic controls: latitude, rainfall, temperature and elevation. Daily wage
rates are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the village level. Source: REDS.
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B.4 Appendix: Adults’ Time Use
Table B.72: Effect of Late Sunset on Adults’ Time Investment in Children
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Children 6-16 Children 6-10 Children 11-16 Multiple Children
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.09 0.05 0.11* 0.08
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.41 0.56 0.22 0.42
Observations 21745 12035 9710 17274
R2 0.026 0.038 0.033 0.028
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to children (in hours) by individuals over
16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on adults’
time investment in children. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.73: State-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sleep Study Leisure Work HH Chores Time With Kids
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.66*** 0.04 0.79* 0.01 -0.13 -0.03
(0.19) (0.07) (0.43) (0.45) (0.24) (0.09)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.11 0.11 7.06 5.40 2.72 0.43
Observations 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.081 0.014 0.046 0.028 0.019 0.023
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure, work, home
production and time spent with children by adults on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression
estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and state-by-season
fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.74: Latitude-by-Week-of-Year FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s
Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sleep Study Leisure Work HH Chores Time With Kids
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.91*** -0.05 0.78** 0.08 0.06 0.15*
(0.18) (0.05) (0.33) (0.35) (0.18) (0.08)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude-by-Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.11 0.11 7.06 5.40 2.72 0.43
Observations 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.085 0.014 0.047 0.028 0.020 0.024
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure, work, home
production and time spent with children by adults on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression
estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and latitude-by-week-
of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.75: District-by-Season FE: Effect of Late Sunset on Children’s Time Use
(Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sleep Study Leisure Work HH Chores Time With Kids
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.44** 0.05 0.35 0.23 -0.18 -0.05
(0.19) (0.08) (0.48) (0.49) (0.25) (0.10)
District-by-Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.11 0.11 7.06 5.40 2.72 0.43
Observations 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.111 0.019 0.061 0.037 0.025 0.031
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure, work, home
production and time spent with children by adults on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regression
estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions include district, week-of-year and district-by-season
fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.76: Effect of Late Sunset on Sleep and Nap for Adults
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Nap Sleep and Nap
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.50*** 0.26*** -0.24**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.12)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.11 0.45 8.57
Observations 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.078 0.138 0.072
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for individuals over 16 years of age on weekdays in
India. Each column represents a separate regression estimating Equation (8) on the outcome variable. All regressions
include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level.
Source: ITUS.
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B.5 Appendix: Can Poverty Help Explain Why
Households Fail to Adjust?
Figure B.33: Crop Cultivator Households: Relationship Between the Pre- and
Post-Harvest Period, Sleep, and Time Allocated to Crop Sale (and Purchase)
Related Activities
Notes: This figure presents the relationship between the pre- and post-harvest period, sleep, and time allocated to crop
sale (and purchase) related activities on weekdays for crop cultivator households. H-28, H-21, H-14, and H-7 denote
dates in the pre-harvest month (approximately) 28, 21, 14, and 7 days away from the harvest date H, respectively.
While H+7, H+14, H+21, and H+28 denote dates in post-harvest month (approximately) 7, 14, 21, and 28 days after the
harvest date H. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.77: Heterogeneity by Correlates of Poverty: Effect of Late Sunset on
Sleep (Hours), Disaggregated by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.44*** -0.38*** -0.44*** -0.41***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Sunset Time*Temporary House Structure (0/1) -0.10**
(0.04)
Sunset Time*Rural (0/1) -0.19***
(0.05)
Sunset Time*No Primary Education (0/1) -0.09***
(0.03)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(50p,75p) -0.11**
(0.05)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(25p,50p) -0.07
(0.04)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(0p,25p) -0.14***
(0.04)
Mean 8.11 8.11 8.11 8.11
Observations 48804 48804 48804 48804
R2 0.086 0.089 0.089 0.090
Children
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.39*** -0.37** -0.37*** -0.42***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Sunset Time*Temporary House Structure (0/1) -0.13**
(0.05)
Sunset Time*Rural (0/1) -0.15**
(0.07)
Sunset Time*No Primary Education (0/1) -0.14***
(0.04)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(50p,75p) -0.04
(0.06)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(25p,50p) -0.04
(0.07)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure∈(0p,25p) -0.19***
(0.07)
Mean 9.07 9.07 9.07 9.07
Observations 13964 13964 13964 13964
R2 0.104 0.107 0.141 0.108
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the heterogeneous effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep by correlates of socioeconomic status on weekdays for all
individuals over the age of 6 in India. Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of 16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals between 6 and 16
years of age. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. Column 1 shows the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for households that
live in a temporary house structure compared to households that live in a permanent house structure. Column 2 shows the effect of daily sunset time on sleep
for households living in rural areas compared to households living in urban areas. Column 3 shows the effect of daily sunset time on sleep for individuals that
have completed primary education compared to individuals that have not completed primary education. Column 4 shows the effect of daily sunset time on
sleep for households with average monthly expenditure below the 25th percentile, between 25th and 50th percentile, and between 50th and 75th percentile,
compared to households with average monthly expenditure above the 75th percentile. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.78: Heterogeneity by Electrification (Night Lights): Effect of Late Sunset
on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sleep Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.38** -0.53** 1.64*** 0.04
(0.15) (0.23) (0.40) (0.33)
Sunset Time*Night Lights∈(0p,50p) -0.16** -0.23** -0.01 0.09
(0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 9.08 1.50 7.61 2.05
Observations 13851 13851 13851 13851
R2 0.092 0.170 0.296 0.071
Notes: This table presents the heterogeneous effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure
and work (in hours) by electrification status at the district level (as proxied by nighttime lights intensity in 2001) on
weekdays for children between 6 and 16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column represents a separate regres-
sion. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Unfortunately, I do not have nighttime lights data
for one district in the ITUS sample. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.79: Crop Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Children vs.
Adults’ Bedtimes and Wake-up Times (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bedtime Bedtime Wake-up Time Wake-up Time
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Cultivator Households: Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.40** 0.23 0.54*** 0.59***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest 0.19 0.27* -0.24** -0.11
(0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Mean 21.54 21.54 5.77 5.77
Observations 8390 8390 8416 8416
R2 0.224 0.238 0.220 0.234
Cultivator Households: Children
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.47* 0.35 -0.01 -0.00
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest 0.07 0.02 -0.17 -0.06
(0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15)
Mean 21.18 21.18 6.40 6.40
Observations 2354 2354 2362 2362
R2 0.211 0.234 0.326 0.349
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on bedtimes and wake-up times before harvest compared to af-
ter harvest on weekdays for crop cultivator households in India. Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of
16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals between 6 and 16 years of age. Each panel-column combination represents
a separate regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an
hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest
month. All regressions include district fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 include month fixed effects while Columns 2 and 4
include week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.80: Crop Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Adults’ Sleep
(Hours) for Households with No School-Age Children vs. Households with
School-Age Children in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2)
Sleep Sleep
No School-Age Child School-Age Child
β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.34 -0.20
(0.32) (0.37)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.53*** -0.30
(0.19) (0.25)
District FE Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Mean 8.24 8.16
Observations 4666 3794
R2 0.141 0.216
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for crop cultivators over 16 years of age with no school-age children vs. crop cultivator adults
with school-age children on weekdays in India. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset
time for crop cultivator households in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. All regressions
include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level.
Source: ITUS.
365
Table B.81: Crop Cultivator Households (Controlling for Work Hours): Effect of
Late Sunset on Individuals’ Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
All
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.70*** -0.12 -0.08
(0.14) (0.23) (0.26)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.24*** -0.40** -0.31*
(0.09) (0.19) (0.18)
Mean 8.42 8.42 8.42
Observations 10827 10827 10827
R2 0.145 0.149 0.159
Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.66*** -0.03 0.14
(0.15) (0.25) (0.29)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.25** -0.42** -0.38**
(0.10) (0.21) (0.18)
Mean 8.20 8.20 8.20
Observations 8460 8460 8460
R2 0.142 0.147 0.159
Children
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.70*** -0.48 -0.55
(0.19) (0.36) (0.43)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.19 -0.31 -0.15
(0.12) (0.29) (0.27)
Mean 9.19 9.19 9.19
Observations 2367 2367 2367
R2 0.146 0.157 0.173
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes No No
Month FE No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for crop cultivator households in India. Panel ‘All’ includes all individuals over the age of 6.
Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of 16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals between 6 and 16
years of age. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome
variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households
in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. All regressions include district fixed effects and control
for work hours. Column 1 includes season fixed effects, while Column 2 includes month fixed effects and Columns
3 includes week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source:
ITUS.
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Table B.82: Crop Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Individuals’
Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month, Controlling for Sunrise Time and
Daylight Duration
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.35* -0.27 -0.47**
(0.18) (0.21) (0.22)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sunrise Time No Yes No
Daylight Duration No No Yes
Mean 8.42 8.42 8.42
Observations 10827 10827 10827
R2 0.117 0.117 0.117
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for all individuals over the age of 6 from crop cultivator households in India. Each column
represents a separate regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome variable. The interaction term Sunset
Time*Pre-Harvest captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households in the
pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. Column 2 controls for sunrise time. Column 3 controls for
daylight duration. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.83: Non-Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Individuals’
Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
All
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.35*** -0.63** -0.64**
(0.11) (0.28) (0.29)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.06 0.21 0.09
(0.10) (0.20) (0.19)
Mean 8.21 8.21 8.21
Observations 10363 10363 10363
R2 0.069 0.072 0.081
Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.38*** -0.78*** -0.70**
(0.11) (0.26) (0.27)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.05 0.05 0.01
(0.10) (0.20) (0.18)
Mean 7.96 7.96 7.96
Observations 7980 7980 7980
R2 0.092 0.095 0.107
Children
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.33* -0.46 -0.49
(0.20) (0.44) (0.49)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.03 0.61** 0.28
(0.15) (0.30) (0.30)
Mean 9.06 9.06 9.06
Observations 2383 2383 2383
R2 0.120 0.131 0.156
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes No No
Month FE No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for non-crop cultivator households in India. Panel ‘All’ includes all individuals over the age of 6.
Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of 16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals between 6 and 16
years of age. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome
variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households
in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. All regressions include district fixed effects. Column 1
includes season fixed effects, while Column 2 includes month fixed effects and Columns 3 includes week-of-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.84: Non-Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Adults’ Bed-
times and Wake-up Times (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bedtime Bedtime Wake-up Time Wake-up Time
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.46** 0.43** -0.17 -0.11
(0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.29** -0.18 -0.11 -0.02
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Mean 21.94 21.94 5.97 5.97
Observations 7878 7878 7891 7891
R2 0.236 0.247 0.164 0.170
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on bedtimes and wake-up times before harvest compared
to after harvest on weekdays for non-crop cultivators over the age of 16 in India. Each column represents a separate
regression estimating Equation (11) on the outcome variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay
in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month.
All regressions include district fixed effects. Columns 1 and 3 include month fixed effects while Columns 2 and 4
include week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.85: Summary Statistics: Work Hours in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
Crop Cultivators Non-Crop Cultivators Agricultural Laborers
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
All
Any Work (Hours) 4.82 4.63 4.30 4.18 5.56 5.15
(4.03) (3.91) (4.43) (4.37) (4.14) (3.93)
Agricultural Work (Hours) 3.06 2.88 0.65 0.41 3.96 2.87
(3.84) (3.67) (2.19) (1.68) (4.20) (3.78)
Other Work (Hours) 1.76 1.75 3.65 3.77 1.60 2.28
(2.65) (2.70) (4.33) (4.33) (2.89) (3.36)
Observations 4986 5841 3901 6462 460 571
Adults
Any Work (Hours) 5.78 5.46 5.29 5.15 6.76 6.16
(3.80) (3.73) (4.40) (4.36) (3.61) (3.63)
Agricultural Work (Hours) 3.78 3.51 0.79 0.51 4.89 3.65
(3.95) (3.78) (2.39) (1.85) (4.15) (3.93)
Other Work (Hours) 1.99 1.95 4.50 4.64 1.87 2.52
(2.70) (2.78) (4.43) (4.41) (3.03) (3.53)
Observations 3845 4615 3022 4958 357 429
Children
Any Work (Hours) 1.59 1.50 0.89 0.98 1.43 2.08
(2.97) (2.81) (2.39) (2.47) (3.09) (3.10)
Agricultural Work (Hours) 0.63 0.51 0.17 0.11 0.74 0.53
(2.02) (1.80) (1.14) (0.86) (2.38) (1.90)
Other Work (Hours) 0.96 0.99 0.72 0.87 0.69 1.55
(2.27) (2.23) (2.13) (2.33) (2.15) (2.65)
Observations 1141 1226 879 1504 103 142
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on work hours for crop cultivator households, non-crop cultivator
households, and agricultural laborer households disaggregated by the pre- and post-harvest month for children and
adults on weekdays. Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: ITUS.
370
Table B.86: Agricultural Labor and Other Non-Cultivator Households: Effect of
Late Sunset on Individuals’ Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Agricultural Laborers
Sunset Time (Hours) -2.24*** -2.53* -1.41
(0.66) (1.30) (1.47)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest 0.32 0.16 0.10
(0.76) (0.74) (0.914)
Mean 8.43 8.43 8.43
Observations 1031 1031 1031
R2 0.212 0.223 0.263
All Non-Cultivator Households
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.28** -0.58** -0.60**
(0.12) (0.28) (0.29)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.06 0.23 0.10
(0.10) (0.21) (0.20)
Mean 8.19 8.19 8.19
Observations 9332 9332 9332
R2 0.061 0.064 0.073
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes No No
Month FE No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for non-cultivator households in India. Panel ‘Agricultural Laborers’ includes all individuals
over the age of 6 from agricultural laborer households. Panel ‘Non-Cultivator Households’ includes all individuals
over the age of 6 from all non-cultivator households. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression
estimating Equation (11) on the outcome variable. The interaction term captures the effect of an hour delay in
daily sunset time for crop cultivator households in the pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. All
regressions include district fixed effects. Column 1 includes season fixed effects, while Column 2 includes month
fixed effects and Columns 3 includes week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.87: Crop Cultivator Households: Effect of Late Sunset on Individuals’
Sleep (Hours) in Pre- vs. Post-Harvest Month for Richer vs. Poorer Households
(1) (2) (3)
Sleep Sleep Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
All
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.70*** -0.06 0.04
(0.15) (0.23) (0.27)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.39*** -0.60*** -0.50***
(0.12) (0.20) (0.19)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure>50p*Pre-Harvest 0.16 0.19 0.21*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Mean 8.42 8.42 8.42
Observations 10827 10827 10827
R2 0.104 0.109 0.119
Adults
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.64*** 0.01 0.20
(0.16) (0.26) (0.29)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.39*** -0.60*** -0.57***
(0.12) (0.21) (0.19)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure>50p*Pre-Harvest 0.23* 0.23* 0.26**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Mean 8.20 8.20 8.20
Observations 8460 8460 8460
R2 0.145 0.151 0.162
Children
Sunset Time (Hours) -0.79*** -0.56 -0.61
(0.20) (0.36) (0.43)
Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest -0.34** -0.49* -0.35
(0.17) (0.29) (0.27)
Sunset Time*HH Expenditure>50p*Pre-Harvest 0.12 0.18 0.20
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Mean 9.19 9.19 9.19
Observations 2367 2367 2367
R2 0.134 0.144 0.160
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes No No
Month FE No Yes No
Week-of-Year FE No No Yes
Notes: This table presents the effect of daily sunset time on time allocated to sleep before harvest compared to after
harvest on weekdays for richer vs. poorer crop cultivator households in India. Panel ‘All’ includes all individuals
over the age of 6. Panel ‘Adults’ includes all individuals over the age of 16. Panel ‘Children’ includes all individuals
between 6 and 16 years of age. Each panel-column combination represents a separate regression. The interaction term
‘Sunset Time*Pre-Harvest’ captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for crop cultivator households in the
pre-harvest month compared to the post-harvest month. The interaction term ‘Sunset Time*HH Expenditure>50p*Pre-
Harvest’ captures the effect of an hour delay in daily sunset time for richer crop cultivator households in the pre-harvest
month compared to richer crop cultivator households in the post-harvest month. All regressions include district fixed
effects. Column 1 includes season fixed effects, while Column 2 includes month fixed effects and Columns 3 includes
week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Pre- and Post-Harvest Period
The 6 states included in ITUS are Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa,
Tamil Nadu, and Meghalaya. The major kharif crop across these states is rice.
Rice harvest in Haryana ends in October. Therefore, October is denoted as the
kharif pre-harvest month for Haryana, while November is denoted as the kharif
post-harvest month. Similarly, the kharif pre-harvest (post-harvest) month for
Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Meghalaya is denoted as
November (December), November (December), October (November), January
(February), December (January), respectively.
The major rabi crop for Haryana is wheat. Wheat harvest in Haryana ends
in April. Therefore, April is denoted as the rabi pre-harvest month for Haryana,
while May is denoted as the rabi post-harvest month. The major rabi crops
for Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Meghalaya are Wheat,
Wheat, Pulses, Rice, and Rice, respectively. Correspondingly, the rabi pre-
harvest (post-harvest) month is denoted as April (May), April (May), February
(March), May (June), and June (July), respectively.
As a robustness check, I examine how crop cultivator households allocate
time to various agricultural activities during the pre- and post-harvest months
as defined above. Unfortunately, ITUS groups time allocated to harvest with
time allocated to application of manure, fertilizer, pesticides and watering,
preparing organic manure, threshing, picking, and winnowing. Similarly, time
allocated to land cleaning is grouped with ploughing and land preparation,
while sowing is grouped with planting, and transplanting. Nevertheless, as
one might expect, I notice sharp decline in time allocated to ‘harvesting’ in the
post-harvest month compared to the pre-harvest month, while time allocated
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to ‘land cleaning’ increases as farmers prepare for the next agricultural season
(Figure B.34).
Figure B.34: Crop Cultivator Households: Relationship Between the Pre- and
Post-Harvest Period and Time Allocated to Agricultural Activities
(a) Time Allocated to Harvesting* (b) Time Allocated to Land Cleaning*
(c) Time Allocated to Sowing* (d) Time Allocated to Weeding
Notes: This figure presents the relationship between the pre- and post-harvest period and time allocated to agricultural
activities on weekdays. Unfortunately, ITUS groups time use as follows: ‘Harvest’ includes application of manure,
fertilizer, pesticides and watering, preparing organic manure, harvesting, threshing, picking, and winnowing;
‘Land Cleaning’ includes ploughing, preparing land, and cleaning of land; ‘Sowing’ includes sowing, planting, and
transplanting. H-28, H-21, H-14, and H-7 denote dates in the pre-harvest month (approximately) 28, 21, 14, and 7 days
away from the harvest date H, respectively. While H+7, H+14, H+21, and H+28 denote dates in post-harvest month 7,
14, 21, and 28 (approximately) days after the harvest date H. Source: ITUS.
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B.6 Appendix: India-Wide Human Capital Costs
Figure B.35: Spatial Variation in Annual Average Sunset Time in India
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Figure B.36: Human Capital Costs Associated with Differences Between Mean Solar Time and Clock Time Across India
Under the Existing Time Zone Policy – UTC+5.5
(a) Differences Between Mean Solar Time and Clock Time (b) Human Capital Costs Associated with Sunset Times
Notes: This figure presents the human capital costs associated with the existing time zone policy in India – UTC+5.5 – compared to the counterfactual of continuous time zones. Panel
(a) present the differences between mean solar time and clock time associated with the existing time zone policy. Panel (b) presents human capital effects associated with sunset-
induced reductions in sleep under the existing time zone policy. I compute the following equation for each district i: HumanCapitalCostsi = −8 ∗ 312 ∗ Populationi ∗ (MeanS olarT imei −
IS T ), where INR 8 is the point estimate for the effect of an hour delay in sunset on adults’ wages and 312 are the number of work days in a year. While Populationi is the population of
adults at the district level and MeanS olarT imei − IS T is difference between the district-specific annual average sunset time and the annual average sunset time at 82.5◦ E, the central
meridian of India.
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Figure B.37: Human Capital Costs Associated with Differences Between Mean Solar Time and Clock Time Across India
Under a Hypothetical Time Zone Policy – UTC+5 in Western India and UTC+6 in Eastern India
(a) Differences Between Mean Solar Time and Clock Time (b) Human Capital Costs Associated with Sunset Times
Notes: This figure presents the human capital costs associated with a hypothetical time zone policy in India – UTC +5 in Western India and UTC+6 in Eastern India – compared
to the counterfactual of continuous time zones. Panel (a) present the differences between mean solar time and clock time associated with the hypothetical time zone policy. Panel
(b) presents human capital effects associated with sunset-induced reductions in sleep under the hypothetical time zone policy. I compute the following equation for each district i:
HumanCapitalCostsi = −8 ∗ 312 ∗ Populationi ∗ (MeanS olarT imei − IS T ), where INR 8 is the point estimate for the effect of an hour delay in sunset on adults’ wages and 312 are the
number of work days in a year. While Populationi is the population of adults at the district level and MeanS olarT imei − IS T is difference between the district-specific annual average
sunset time and the annual average sunset time at 75◦ E for western India and 90 ◦ E for eastern India, where western (eastern) India is defined as districts to the left (right) of 82.5◦ E.
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Figure B.38: Human Capital Costs Associated with Differences in Sunset Time Between the Existing Time Zone Policy –
UTC+5.5 and a Hypothetical Time Zone Policy – UTC+5 in Western India and UTC+6 in Eastern India
(a) Differences Between Mean Solar Time and Clock Time:
UTC+5.5 - UTC+5/UTC+6
(b) Human Capital Costs Associated with Differences Be-
tween UTC+5.5 and UTC+5/UTC+6
Notes: This figure presents the human capital costs associated with the existing time zone policy – UTC+5.5 – compared to the counterfactual of a hypothetical time zone policy
– UTC+5 in western India and UTC+6 in eastern India. Panel (a) present the differences between mean solar time and clock time across the two time zone policies. Panel (b)
presents the differences in human capital effects associated with sunset-induced reductions in sleep across the two time zone policies. I compute the following equation for each
district i: HumanCapitalCostsi = −8 ∗ 312 ∗ Populationi ∗ (MeanS olarT ime : UTC + 5.5i − IS T ) − (MeanS olarT ime : UTC + 5/UTC + 6 − UTC + 5/UTC + 6)), where INR 8 is the point
estimate for the effect of an hour delay in sunset on adults’ wages and 312 are the number of days in a year. While Populationi is the population of adults at the district level and
(MeanS olarT ime : UTC + 5.5i − IS T ) − (MeanS olarT ime : UTC + 5/UTC + 6 − UTC + 5/UTC + 6) is difference between the district-specific differences in mean solar time and clock
time according to the existing time zone policy – UTC+5.5 and a hypothetical time zone policy – UTC+5/UTC+6.
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Table B.88: Effect of Late Sunset on School-Start Time Across the East-West Gra-
dient
(1)
School Start Time
β / SE
Sunset Time (Hours) 0.16
(0.12)
Week-of-Year FE Yes
Mean 9.20
Observations 8576
R2 0.101
Notes: This table presents the effect of sunset time on school-start time across the east-west gradient. The regression
includes week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the week-of-year level. Source:
ITUS.
B.7 Appendix: Policy Options
B.7.1 Later School Start Times
Recent evidence indicates that school start times are positively associated with
test scores, presumably through the relationship between later school start times
and children’s sleep (86; 147; 195; 198; 414). Later school start times may allow
children to compensate for later bedtimes associated with later sunset by wak-
ing up later and mitigate the negative effects of sleep deprivation on children’s
learning outcomes.
To test this hypothesis, I regress children’s sleep on school start times. Using
ITUS I generate an indicator for children who attend a school that starts its day
after 8.30 am as a proxy for ‘late school start time’ (Table B.89).12 Indeed, chil-
12The (16) recommends that schools delay the start of class to 8.30 am following medical
research on children’s sleep, school start times and learning.
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dren attending schools with start times after 8.30 am are able to sleep an extra
30 minutes. Delaying the start of class to 8.30 am does not affect bedtimes, and
the increase in sleep duration is solely driven by a delay in wake-up times.1314
Next, I use YLS to examine if children attending schools that start after 8.30
am have better educational outcomes. The 2011 YLS School Survey collects
Class 5 test scores for math, Hindi, science, social studies, Telugu and English
for each school in the sample. I evaluate the interaction effects between later
school start times and annual average sunset times and find suggestive evidence
that delaying the start of class to 8.30 am attenuates the negative effect of later
sunset on children’s test scores (Tables B.92 and B.93). While the point estimates
are underpowered across subjects (except science) they are positive. The coef-
ficient capturing the interaction effects for science indicates that delaying the
start of first period to 8.30 am attenuates the effects of an hour delay in annual
average sunset time by over 60%. Such a large attenuation effect is precisely
what one would expect as an hour delay in sunset decreases children’s sleep by
30 minutes, all of which may be recouped by delaying the start of school to 8.30
am.15
Note that these results are only suggestive as the decision to attend schools
with later start times may be endogenous to, amongst other factors, later sun-
13Moreover, I find that later school start times increase time allocated to study effort and
decrease time allocated to leisure (Table B.90). These results are precisely what one would expect
if sleep increases the marginal returns of an additional hour of study effort.
14Later school start times may also increase parents’ sleep duration. In turn, if sleep is
productivity-enhancing, time allocated to work effort may increase as well. On the other hand,
if parents typically begin work before 8.30 am, then starting school after 8.30 am might reduce
time allocated to work. Thus, the net effect on work time is ambiguous. I estimate this relation-
ship empirically using parents’ time use data. Later school start time increases parents’ sleep
and time allocated to work, while decreasing time spent on leisure (Table B.91). This result
suggests that later school start times may have a positive effect on parents’ productivity.
15Figures B.39 and B.40 present binned scatterplots of the reduced form relationship between
school start time and sleep, and of the mitigative effect of later school start time on the sunset-
test score relationship, respectively.
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set. For instance, wealthier households may be aware of the negative effects
of later sunset on children’s educational output. Therefore, the modest effects
on test scores in schools with later sunset times could be a proxy for underly-
ing socioeconomic characteristics of children attending these schools. I evaluate
such omitted variables by controlling for observable school-level features like
type of school (public vs. private), medium of instruction, number of students
and teachers etc. The addition of these controls explains meaningful variation
in the outcomes of interest, but my point estimates only get larger (Tables B.94
and B.95). However, the interaction effects are still underpowered and should
be interpreted with caution.
B.7.2 Social Protection Programs
Social protection programs can lead to large improvements in financial and psy-
chological well-being among the poor (30; 32; 156; 192; 368; 369; 408). Specifi-
cally, a vast literature has shown that conditional cash transfer programs can
have positive welfare effects among low-income households.16
Social protection programs like conditional cash transfer schemes may help
the poor adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later, mitigating the ef-
fects on children’s human capital production. This may happen in two ways.
First, welfare programs may reduce children’s sleep deficit when the sun sets
later if families are able to afford financial (e.g., indoor beds, dark curtains)
and psychological (e.g., attention) sleep-inducing goods. Second, if adults sleep
16For instance, (29) find that a conditional cash transfer program in Malawi reduced psy-
chological distress among school-age girls. (7) and (164) show that conditional cash transfer
programs attenuate the negative effects of environmental stressors on children’s human capital
accumulation. See (160) and (307) for an exhaustive review.
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more due to access to social protection, welfare programs may attenuate the
effects of later sunset on adults’ wages and households’ education expenditure.
To test this hypothesis, I examine a workfare program in India, the Na-
tional Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), that was enacted in 2005,
and guarantees 100 days of paid employment on rural infrastructure projects
each year to every rural household. Workers can apply for work at any time,
and if they are not given a job, they are eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion. Importantly, the program hires workers at a fixed daily wage set exoge-
nously by every state government. Thus, income from NREGA may have an
income-stabilizing effect as wages are less susceptible to sleep-induced produc-
tivity losses. In addition, NREGA may also increase local labor demand and
wages.17
I use the individual level longitudinal panel from Andhra Pradesh, India,
the 2002-2013 Young Lives Survey (YLS), and restrict the sample to rural house-
holds. I estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, exploiting the staggered rollout of
NREGA across Indian districts as a source of variation in access to a social pro-
tection program.18 In 2006, the scheme was first rolled out in 200 districts. In
2007, another 130 districts were added while the program became available in
the remaining 270 districts in 2008. I use individual-level math test score data
and examine the coefficient of the interaction term between number of years
of NREGA exposure and day-of-test (daily) sunset time at the district-test-date
level. As expected, NREGA attenuates the effects of later sunset on test scores
(Table B.96). Specifically, each additional year of exposure to NREGA mitigates
17Number of studies have shown that NREGA increased agricultural wages by roughly 5%
(27; 52; 211).
18NREGA rollout wasn’t random as poorer districts experienced rollout first. Therefore, the
level effect of NREGA on children’s outcomes is likely biased.
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the effect of short-term sunset-induced sleep deficits on math test scores by
roughly 5%.
Figure B.39: Effect of School Start Time on Bedtime, Wake-up Time, and Sleep
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots for the relationship between school start time and sleep schedules for
children between 6 and 16 years of age. Residuals for both children’s sleep and school start time are plotted after
absorbing district and week-of-year fixed effects. Source: ITUS.
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Figure B.40: Do Later School Start Times Attenuate the Sunset-Test Score Rela-
tionship?
Notes: This figure presents binned scatterplots of the mitigative effects of later school start times on the sunset-test
score relationship. Controls include school start time, annual average sunset time and school shift (morning or
evening). Source: YLS.
Table B.89: Effect of School Start Times on Bedtime and Wakeup Time (Hours)
(1) (2) (3)
Bedtime Wake-up Time Sleep
β / SE β / SE β / SE
School Start>8.30am -0.01 0.50*** 0.51***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 21.32 6.39 9.04
Observations 8525 8547 8576
R2 0.192 0.337 0.152
Notes: This table presents the effect of school start time on bedtime and wakeup time for children between 6 and
16 years of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include district and
week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.90: Effect of School Start Times on Children’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3)
Study Leisure Work
β / SE β / SE β / SE
School Start>8.30am 0.34*** -0.75*** -0.03
(0.06) (0.08) (0.03)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean 2.08 6.39 0.42
Observations 8576 8576 8576
R2 0.234 0.276 0.134
Notes: This table presents the effect of school start time on study, leisure and work for children between 6 and 16 years
of age on weekdays. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include district and week-of-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
Table B.91: Effect of School Start Times on Parent’s Time Use (Hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sleep Study Leisure Work HH Chores Time With Kids
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
School Start>8.30am 0.12*** -0.01 -0.29*** 0.24*** -0.06 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 8.04 0.15 6.84 5.39 2.88 0.44
Observations 14428 14428 14428 14428 14428 14428
R2 0.097 0.014 0.050 0.029 0.022 0.028
Notes: This table presents the effect of school start time on time allocated to sleep, study, leisure, work, home
production and time spent with children by individuals over 16 years of age on weekdays in India. Each column
represents a separate regression. All regressions include district and week-of-year fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district-week level. Source: ITUS.
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Table B.92: Math, Hindi and Science: Do Later School Start Times Attenuate the
Sunset-Test Score Relationship?
(1) (2) (3)
Log Math Log Hindi Log Science
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.24 -0.52** -0.62***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.20)
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours)*School Start>8.30am 0.11 0.28 0.42*
(0.25) (0.26) (0.23)
Observations 225 106 114
R2 0.027 0.115 0.113
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on the average scores for children in Class 5
at the school level as well as the mitigative effects of later school start times on the sunset-test score relationship.
Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include controls for school shift (morning or evening).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: YLS.
Table B.93: Social Studies, Telugu and English: Do Later School Start Times
Attenuate the Sunset-Test Score Relationship?
(1) (2) (3)
Log Social Studies Log Telugu Log English
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.26 -0.25 -0.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours)*School Start>8.30am 0.12 0.08 0.02
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
Observations 221 225 225
R2 0.025 0.032 0.034
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on the average scores for children in Class 5
at the school level as well as the mitigative effects of later school start times on the sunset-test score relationship.
Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include controls for school shift (morning or evening).
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: YLS.
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Table B.94: Math, Hindi and Science (Other Controls): Do Later School Start
Times Attenuate the Sunset-Test Score Relationship?
(1) (2) (3)
Log Math Log Hindi Log Science
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.70*** -0.99*** -0.79***
(0.22) (0.35) (0.27)
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours)*School Start>8.30am 0.30 0.44 0.36
(0.25) (0.35) (0.28)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 199 102 107
R2 0.358 0.366 0.440
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on the average scores for children in Class 5 at the
school level as well as the mitigative effects of later school start times on the sunset-test score relationship. Each column
represents a separate regression. All regressions include controls for latitude, school shift (morning or evening), type
of school (public vs. private), medium of instruction, number of students, number of teachers, school location, if school
receives textbooks from government, if the school teaches English, if the school offers boarding facilities, highest grade
taught at school, medium of instruction, if the school offers pre-primary education, if the school is a branch school.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: YLS.
Table B.95: Social Studies, Telugu and English (Other Controls): Do Later School
Start Times Attenuate the Sunset-Test Score Relationship?
(1) (2) (3)
Log Social Studies Log Telugu Log English
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours) -0.53** -0.49** -0.38
(0.22) (0.21) (0.25)
Annual Average Sunset Time (Hours)*School Start>8.30am 0.16 0.23 0.19
(0.24) (0.23) (0.26)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 196 199 199
R2 0.352 0.292 0.409
Notes: This table presents the effect of annual average sunset time on the average scores for children in Class 5 at the
school level as well as the mitigative effects of later school start times on the sunset-test score relationship. Each column
represents a separate regression. All regressions include controls for latitude, school shift (morning or evening), type
of school (public vs. private), medium of instruction, number of students, number of teachers, school location, if school
receives textbooks from government, if the school teaches English, if the school offers boarding facilities, highest grade
taught at school, medium of instruction, if the school offers pre-primary education, if the school is a branch school.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Source: YLS.
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Table B.96: Does NREGA Attenuate the Sunset-Test Score Relationship?
(1) (2)
Math (SD) Math (SD)
β / SE β / SE
Daily Sunset Time (Hours) -0.728** -0.682*
(0.370) (0.385)
Daily Sunset Time (Hours)*NREGA (# of Years) 0.022* 0.049***
(0.012) (0.013)
NREGA (# of Years) 0.483* -0.020
(0.252) (0.276)
Age Dummies Yes Yes
Week-of-Year FE Yes Yes
Child FE Yes Yes
Weather Controls No Yes
Observations 5612 5612
R2 0.777 0.781
Notes: This table presents the impact of short-run exposure to later sunsets on math test scores and the mitigative
effects of NREGA on the sunset-test score relationship. ‘NREGA (# of Years)’ denotes the number of years the district
had access to NREGA in the year the math test was conducted. All regressions include age, week-of-year, and child
fixed effects. Column 2 also include day-of-week fixed effects as well as controls for weather. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the child level. Source: YLS.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 of appendix
C.1 Climate Change Projections
To estimate the predicted impact of future climate change, we use climate pro-
jection data from a business-as-usual scenario from the National Center for At-
mospheric Research’s (NCAR) Community Climate System Model 4 (CCSM4)
Global Circulation Model (283). Details of the model are described in (167).1 An
earlier version of this model was used in the fourth IPCC Assessment Report
(213).
CCSM4 model output predictions are available for several Representative
Concentration Pathways (RCPs), each of which is a greenhouse gas concentra-
tion (not emissions) trajectory adopted by the IPCC for its fifth Assessment Re-
port. We focus on RCP 8.5, which is a high-concentration pathway or “business-
1Information about the model and other related models can also be found at
http://www.cesm.ucar.edu/experiments/.
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as-usual” scenario that is appropriate to consider when judging future impacts
in the absence of policies to restrict greenhouse gas emissions.
We accessed daily average temperature predictions for grid points spanning
India for the CCSM4 model for the years 2075-2099.2 The model output is based
on a single run of the model and is available for 1 degree by 1.25 degree latitude–
longitude grid. To convert from the gridded projection data to our districts, we
calculate the inverse-distance weighted average among all grid points within
100 km of each district centroid.
To compute the impact of projected climate change on future test scores,
we calculated the average number of days in each temperature bin under the
current climate for our sample (2004-2014) and compared that to the average
number of of days in each temperature bin under the projected climate for end
of century (2075-2099). Panel (a) of Figure C.1 shows these two bin distributions.
We then calculated the change in number of days for each bin and multiplied
that by the appropriate coefficient from our temperature–test score regression
to estimate the impact of projected climate change on test scores. Panel (c) of
Figure C.1 shows these impacts. As can be seen from the figure, for bins 6, 7,
and 8 there will be small gains for test scores, as the coefficients for these bins
are negative, and there will be reductions in the number of days in these bins
under climate change. However, these is more than offset by the large increase
in number of bin 10 days, which leads to an overall net decrease in scores.
Panel (e) presents the bin-by-bin impacts on test scores, but weights the cal-
culations by the rural population in each district (instead of weighting each dis-
trict equally). Panels (b), (d), and (f), present results analogous to panels (a), (c),
2The CCSM4 output data can be accessed from https://www.earthsystemgrid.org.
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and (e), but focus on growing season temperature bins. Focusing on panel (d),
which gives growing season impacts with equally weighted districts, we find
an he overall impact that we find on test scores is a reduction of 0.04 standard
deviations for math and 0.03 standard deviations for reading, for each year that
a child is in school.
C.2 Converting Test Score Gains into Schooling
Years and Wages
In order to convert these reductions in test score standard deviations to more
concrete measures, we follow the methodology and parameter estimates from
(150). These estimates are based on the World Bank’s STEP Skills Measurement
Program, which is a test designed to test proficiency in literacy with respect to
word meaning, sentence processing and basic passage comprehension, in the
language of the resident country (422).3 (150) find a one standard deviation
gain in literacy skill is associated with between 4.7 and 6.8 additional years of
schooling. In other words, it takes about 4.7 to 6.8 years of schooling to increase
literacy skills by one standard deviation. Using this metric, our result that read-
ing scores decrease by 0.06 standard deviations if a child experiences 10 hot days
during the growing season in the previous year, means that this is equivalent to
reducing the effective years of schooling the child has received by 0.35 years
[5.75*0.06 SD] (using 5.75 years of equivalent schooling as the conversion factor,
3Like the World Bank’s STEP Skills Measurement Program, the ASER reading test is designed
to capture basic literacy skills (35). Therefore, in this exercise, we focus only on the impacts of
extra hot days on reading test scores. In addition, since our growing season specification is our
preferred specification, we focus specifically on the impact of additional hot days during the
growing season.
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which is the midpoint of the range of the estimates of 4.7 to 6.8).
We can also convert this reduction of equivalent schooling into a wage loss,
using the methodology and assumptions in (150). Assume that students enter
the labor market at age 20 and work for 40 years. Furthermore, use a social
discount rate of 3%, as is common in the literature in public finance (64; 184;
188). Following (150) and (25), we use the estimate that a one standard deviation
increase in literacy skills is associated with a 51% increase in wages. Hence, 10
additional hot days will lead to a 3% decrease in wages [0.51*0.06 SD].
Turning to our CCSM projections, we can do some similar calculations. Here,
we examine how the distribution of daily temperatures in the growing season
will look in India by the end of the century (under a business-as-usual emissions
scenario), and we estimate the impact that this will have on a child’s test scores,
assuming that the impacts will accrue over all 12 years of a child’s schooling
(ages 5 to 16). Using this approach, we find that the higher temperatures will
lead to a reduction of the equivalent years of schooling of -2.07 years (-0.03 SD *
5.75 * 12).
In addition, we can use the methodology and assumptions in (150), to con-
vert this reduction of equivalent years of schooling into a wage impact and into
a net present value. Using the estimates from (150) and (25), we find that the
reduction in schooling due to higher temperatures at the end of the century,
accrued over a student’s 12 years of schooling, will lead to a 18.36% decrease
in wages [-0.03 SD *12*0.51]. We further convert this into a net present value;
in 2015 the GNI per capita in India (2015 USD PPP) was $6,020, with a 0.29
labor share of income (422), demonstrating that the average labor income of a
worker was $1,769. Hence a 18.36% decrease in wages is worth $325/year. Over
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a 40-year work life, this fixed additional income has a present value of roughly
$7,500, if discounted at 3 percent.
C.3 Other Alternative Explanations
C.3.1 School Closures and Teacher Attendance
Quality of instruction is a central component of virtually all proposals to raise
school quality (186). Teaching quality has been linked to student test scores, as
well as to later-life outcomes (96; 97). High temperatures can increase the cost
of effort required to attend school and lead to teacher absenteeism, and con-
sequently impact human capital production.4 Furthermore, it is possible that
schools are closed in response to very hot days (9), thereby affecting learning
and test performance. We find two pieces of evidence that are inconsistent with
such a hypothesis. First, if heat-induced school closures or teacher absenteeism
were driving our results, we would see the effects on performance of only hot
days during the school year (Figure C.12). The near-identical effects of heat dur-
ing the school and non-school parts of the year suggest that teacher attendance
or school closures are not the sole mechanism driving our results. However,
we cannot fully rule out the possibility that, in addition to agricultural mecha-
nisms, teacher attendance and school closures might be contributing to part of
the relationship that we find.
4This problem is notable in India. Using unannounced visits to measure attendance, a nation-
ally representative survey found that 24% of teachers in India were absent during school hours
(93). (141) use a randomized control trial in India that incentivized teachers’ attendance and
find that teacher absenteeism fell and test scores of children in the treatment group increased.
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Second, we explicitly test the effect of hot days on teacher attendance using
the teacher attendance module of the ASER data. We find that hot days in the
previous year and the current year do not affect teacher attendance (Table C.12).
Thus, we fail to find evidence that teacher attendance is the key factor linking
hotter days to reduced test score performance. Again however, we cannot fully
rule out this possibility.
C.3.2 Disease Prevalence
An alternative explanation to the temperature-test score relationship could be
through increased disease incidence (313). To the extent that health affects per-
formance, temperature could affect test scores through an increase in the popu-
lation of disease-carrying pathogens, particularly those carrying malaria. Some
of the rainiest months of the year are during the growing season, and since
rainfall and humidity favor Anopheles growth, our growing season versus non-
growing season estimates cannot rule out the malaria channel. We consider this
disease-prevalence mechanism to be distinct from the disease susceptibility ef-
fects that may occur via the agricultural income channel (the latter occurring
when reduced household income affects health status, including disease vul-
nerability, through channels such as nutrition). Although we control for rainfall
and humidity in our main specification, and our results remain robust to the
inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects, insofar as higher temperatures indepen-
dently increase the incidence of disease variably within a given state-year, our
results might be a function of such a mechanism.
However, because of the life cycle of disease pathogens we would expect
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more recent higher temperatures to have a larger effect on health, and there-
fore performance, than similar days in the previous calendar year. Malaria, for
example, is transferred through the Anopheles mosquito, which typically has a
life cycle of two to four weeks, so if malarial incidence were driving our result,
we should see an impact of hot days in the current year as well. In Table 4.2,
we show that temperature in the current year has no effect on test score per-
formance.5 Prima facie, this suggests that the disease ecology of malaria is not
driving the temperature-test score relationship. Additionally, we follow (356)
and exploit the geographic differences in prevalence of malaria across India
and show that the effects of temperature don’t vary with malaria prevalence.
In Figure C.13 we compare all other states against these malaria-prone states.
Importantly, we show that during the growing season, there is no meaningful
difference in the effects of temperature on test scores across malaria-prone and
other states, suggesting that malaria is unlikely to be the driving factor behind
the negative relationship between higher temperatures and test scores.6
5Hotter days in the current year have been associated with higher prevalence of malaria
(313).
6The malaria-prone states are Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Karnataka, and West Bengal.
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C.4 Figures
Figure C.1: CCSM Projections
(a) Number of Hot Days (b) Number of Hot Days in Growing
Season
(c) Number of Hot Days*Effect of Hot
Days
(d) Number of Hot Days in Growing
Season*Effect of Hot Days
(e) Number of Hot Days*Effect of Hot
Days (Weighted by Rural Population)
(f) Number of Hot Days in Growing
Season*Effect of Hot Days (Weighted
by Rural Population)
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Figure C.2: Previous Year Temperature and Test Scores (ASER)
(a) Math Scores (ASER) (b) Reading Scores (ASER)
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year raw math and reading scores using the ASER data set. The effect of days between
15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include
district, year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure C.3: Previous Year Temperature and Reading Ability (ASER)
(a) Letter (b) Word
(c) Paragraph (d) Story
Notes: Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous
calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on reading ability using the ASER data set. The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is
normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district, year
and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
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Figure C.4: Previous Year Temperature and Math Ability (ASER)
(a) Single Digit Number Recognition (b) Double Digit Number Recognition
(c) Subtraction (d) Division
Notes: Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous
calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math ability using the ASER data set. The effect of days between
15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include
district, year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure C.5: Wet Bulb Global Temperatures (WBGT): Previous Year Temperature
and Test Scores (ASER)
(a) Math Scores (b) Reading Scores
(c) Math Scores (d) Reading Scores
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the effect of longer-run WBGT temperature (defined as number of days in the previous
calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance. In panel (c) and (d) the figure shows
the effect of longer-run WBGT temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure
4.3) on current year math and reading performance divided amongst the growing season (June—Dec) and the
non-growing season (March—May). In all panels, the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all
other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We
control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at district level. GS: Growing Season;
NGS: Non-Growing Season.
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Figure C.6: Standard Errors Clustered at the State Level: Previous Year Temper-
ature and Test Scores (ASER)
(a) Math Scores (b) Reading Scores
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance divided amongst the growing season (June—Dec)
and the non-growing season (March—May). In all panels, the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero
and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district, year and age fixed
effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at state level. GS: Growing
Season; NGS: Non-Growing Season.
Figure C.7: Previous Year Temperature and Agricultural Wages
Notes: This figure shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on previous year agricultural wages from 1980—2014. In all panels, the effect of days be-
tween 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions
include district and year fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
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Figure C.8: Growing Season v. Non-Growing Season: Previous Year Tempera-
ture and Raw Agricultural Yields
(a) Top 6 Crops (b) Top 5 Monsoon Crops
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on previous year raw agricultural yields from 1979—2014 divided amongst the growing season
(June—Dec) and the non-growing season (March—May). In all panels, the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is
normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district and
year fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered at district level. GS: Growing
Season; NGS: Non-Growing Season.
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Figure C.9: Historical (Average) Take-Up of Heat Resistant Crops by District
Figure C.10: Leads and Lags in Days: Day-of-Test Temperature and Math Scores
Notes: The figure presents the impact of short-run temperature from four weeks before test day to four weeks after the
test. Temperature is captured as 1 if temperature is > 23 on the day of the test for “Test Day”, 0 otherwise. Includes
individual, day of week, month, and survey round fixed effects. We control for precipitation and humidity in all
periods. Standard errors are clustered at the district-week level. 95% confidence intervals are presented in the figure.
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Figure C.11: Leads and Lags in Weeks: Day-of-Test Temperature and Math
Scores
Notes: The figure presents the impact of short-run temperature from four weeks before test day to four weeks after the
test. Temperature is captured as the number of days when the temperature is >23◦C during a week for “No. Week”, and
if temperature is > 23 on the day of the test for “Test Day”. Includes individual, day of week, month, and survey round
fixed effects. We control for precipitation and humidity in all periods. Standard errors are clustered at the district-week
level. 95% confidence intervals are presented in the figure.
Figure C.12: School Year v. Non-School Year: Previous Year Temperature and
Test Scores (ASER)
(a) Math Scores (b) Reading Scores
Notes: The figure shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see figure 4.4(a)) on math and reading performance divided amongst the school year (July—November) and the
non-school year (June, December) within the growing season (June—December). The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C
is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district,
year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. SY: School year; NSY: Non-School Year.
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Figure C.13: Previous Year Temperature and Test Scores (ASER) by Malaria
Prone States
(a) Malaria-Prone States (b) Other States
(c) Malaria-Prone States (d) Other States
Notes: This figure shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.4(a)) on current year math and reading performance by malaria prone states. The malaria prone
states are Orissa, Chattisgarh, West Bengal, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is
normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district, year
and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level. GS: Growing Season; NGS: Non-Growing Season.
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C.5 Tables
Table C.1: On-Track Children: Previous Year Temperature and Test Scores
(ASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0027*** -0.0021***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
PY Days >21C -0.0016*** -0.0007*
(0.0005) (0.0004)
PY Days <13C -0.0041*** -0.0031***
(0.0009) (0.0007)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0029*** -0.0018**
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0017** -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0007)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0010 -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0027*** -0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0030*** -0.0014**
(0.0008) (0.0006)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0022*** -0.0011*
(0.0008) (0.0006)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0025*** -0.0013*
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days >29C -0.0028*** -0.0018**
(0.0009) (0.0007)
Observations 3501428 3501428 3501428 3501428
R2 0.088 0.089 0.065 0.065
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance for on-track students using the ASER data set. In
Columns (2) and (4) (Columns (1) and (3)), the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is normalized to zero and
all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). The regressions include district, year and age
fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
district level. PY: Previous Year
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.2: Adding Lags: Previous Year Temperature and Test Scores (ASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0025*** -0.0021***
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days >21C -0.0022*** -0.0014***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
PY Days <13C -0.0031*** -0.0030***
(0.0010) (0.0008)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0027*** -0.0020**
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0025*** -0.0018**
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0027*** -0.0016*
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0033*** -0.0024***
(0.0010) (0.0008)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0032*** -0.0024***
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0034*** -0.0023**
(0.0011) (0.0009)
PY Days >29C -0.0035*** -0.0029***
(0.0010) (0.0009)
L.2-L.5 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.085 0.086 0.069 0.070
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance using the ASER data set. In Columns (2) and (4)
(Columns (1) and (3)), the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is normalized to zero and all other coefficients
are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control
flexibly for precipitation and humidity. We also control for lagged temperature, precipitation and humidity. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.3: Adding State-Specific Time Trends: Previous Year Temperature and
Test Scores (ASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0032*** -0.0026***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
PY Days >21C -0.0025*** -0.0013***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
PY Days <13C -0.0036*** -0.0029***
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0023*** -0.0018***
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 17-19C 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008)
PY Days 19-21C 0.0001 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0018** -0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0007)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0024*** -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0031*** -0.0017**
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0030*** -0.0014*
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days >29C -0.0032*** -0.0019**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.097 0.097 0.076 0.076
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—
see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance using the ASER data set. In Columns (2) and (4) (Columns
(1) and (3)), the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are inter-
preted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and state-specific
linear and quadratic trends. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.4: Adding State-Year FE: Longer-Run Temperature and Test Scores
(ASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C -0.0015** -0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0007)
PY Days >21C -0.0021*** -0.0014**
(0.0006) (0.0006)
PY Days <13C -0.0027*** -0.0021**
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0013 -0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0008 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0008 -0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0028*** -0.0022**
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0031*** -0.0025***
(0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0032*** -0.0026**
(0.0011) (0.0010)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0029** -0.0023**
(0.0013) (0.0011)
PY Days >29C -0.0031** -0.0026**
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.102 0.102 0.079 0.079
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar
year—see Figure 4.3) on current year math and reading performance using the ASER data set. In Columns (2) and (4)
(Columns (1) and (3)), the effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C) is normalized to zero and all other coefficients
are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C (15◦C-21◦C). The regressions include district, age and state-by-year fixed effects.
We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY:
Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.5: Nearest (N) Weather Gridpoint and Maximum (M) Daily Tempera-
ture: ASER
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <13C N -0.0023*** -0.0015**
(0.0009) (0.0007)
PY Days 13-15C N -0.0027*** -0.0017**
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 17-19C N -0.0008 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 19-21C N -0.0006 0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0006)
PY Days 21-23C N -0.0016* -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 23-25C N -0.0023*** -0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 25-27C N -0.0016** -0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0006)
PY Days 27-29C N -0.0015* -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days >29C N -0.0024*** -0.0014*
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days <17C M -0.0026*** -0.0016*
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 17-19C M -0.0033*** -0.0025***
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days 21-23C M -0.0016** -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 23-25C M -0.0019*** -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0007)
PY Days 25-27C M -0.0016* -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 27-29C M -0.0012 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 29-31C M -0.0011 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0007)
PY Days 31-33C M -0.0017* -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0008)
PY Days >33C M -0.0018** -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.084 0.084 0.068 0.068
Notes: This table shows the effects of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year)
on current year math and reading performance. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control
flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous
Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.6: Controlling for ASER Weekend Test Month (WTM) Temperature and
ASER Weekday Test Month (NWTM) Temperature
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <13C -0.0035*** -0.0024*** -0.0023** -0.0019**
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0028*** -0.0019** -0.0012 -0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0032*** -0.0020** -0.0011 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0022*** -0.0008 -0.0022** -0.0017*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009)
PY Days 23-25C -0.0031*** -0.0018** -0.0028** -0.0021**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010)
PY Days 25-27C -0.0022*** -0.0014* -0.0029** -0.0022**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010)
PY Days 27-29C -0.0024** -0.0014 -0.0025* -0.0017
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0011)
PY Days >29C -0.0033*** -0.0023*** -0.0027* -0.0021*
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0012)
CY WTM Days <13C -0.0076 -0.0042 -0.0196** -0.0141
(0.0095) (0.0088) (0.0097) (0.0093)
CY WTM Days 13-15C -0.0145** -0.0097* -0.0101* -0.0081
(0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0055)
CY WTM Days 17-19C -0.0198*** -0.0158*** -0.0052 -0.0077*
(0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0044)
CY WTM Days 19-21C -0.0327*** -0.0252*** -0.0111* -0.0124**
(0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0060)
CY WTM Days 21-23C -0.0362*** -0.0272*** -0.0085 -0.0092
(0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0063)
CY WTM Days 23-25C -0.0381*** -0.0294*** -0.0067 -0.0074
(0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0069)
CY WTM Days 25-27C -0.0350*** -0.0274*** -0.0040 -0.0039
(0.0077) (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0072)
CY WTM Days 27-29C -0.0304*** -0.0254*** -0.0026 -0.0025
(0.0084) (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0080)
CY WTM Days >29C -0.0201 -0.0192* -0.0009 0.0022
(0.0136) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0126)
CY NWTM Days <13C -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0074* 0.0031
(0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0040)
CY NWTM Days 13-15C -0.0055* -0.0054** -0.0003 -0.0012
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0027)
CY NWTM Days 17-19C -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0020
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0022)
CY NWTM Days 19-21C 0.0005 0.0045* 0.0038 0.0073***
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0027)
CY NWTM Days 21-23C 0.0053* 0.0074*** 0.0013 0.0055*
(0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0031)
CY NWTM Days 23-25C 0.0064** 0.0074*** -0.0017 0.0036
(0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0033)
CY NWTM Days 25-27C 0.0071** 0.0070** -0.0034 0.0019
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0035)
CY NWTM Days 27-29C 0.0039 0.0067** -0.0027 0.0031
(0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0041)
CY NWTM Days >29C -0.0027 0.0016 -0.0061 0.0007
(0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0071) (0.0063)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No No
State-by-Year FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 4581616 4581616 4581616 4581616
R2 0.087 0.070 0.103 0.079
Notes: This table shows the effects of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year) on current year math and reading
performance. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation, humidity, and current year temperature in the
months before the ASER test months (NTM: January-August). Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.7: Combined (Older and Younger Cohort) Sample: Longer-Run Tem-
perature and Test Scores (YLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Days Between Two Tests >23C -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Day-of-Test >23C -0.070** 0.054
(0.030) (0.040)
Days Between Two Tests 23-25C -0.002*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Days Between Two Tests 25-27C -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Days Between Two Tests >27C -0.005*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Day-of-Test 23-25C -0.061** 0.038
(0.030) (0.039)
Day-of-Test 25-27C -0.110*** 0.156***
(0.036) (0.056)
Day-of-Test >27C -0.078 0.320***
(0.052) (0.071)
Observations 5869 5869 6257 6257
R2 0.050 0.058 0.074 0.079
Notes: This table shows the effect of temperature (defined as number of days in a given bin between successive tests)
on math and reading performance using the YLS data set. The effect of days below 23◦C is normalized to zero and
all other coefficients are interpreted relative to below 23◦C. The regressions include individual, day of week, month,
cohort, and survey round (age) fixed effects. We control for day-of-test temperatures, and both cumulative and day-
of-test precipitation as well as cumulative and day-of-test humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by
district-week.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.8: Cluster-Bootstrapped Standard Errors: Longer-Run Temperature and
Test Scores (YLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD)
β / p-value β / p-value β / p-value β / p-value
Days Between Two Tests >23C -0.003 -0.004
(0.41) (0.38)
Days Between Two Tests 23-25C -0.007 0.000
(0.09) (0.93)
Days Between Two Tests 25-27C -0.002 -0.007
(0.01) (0.25)
Days Between Two Tests >27C -0.008 -0.007
(0.01) (0.12)
Observations 2604 2604 2541 2541
R2 0.766 0.770 0.542 0.547
Notes: This tables shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in a given bin between
successive tests) on math and reading performance using the YLS data set. The effect of days below 23◦C is normalized
to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to below 23◦C. The regressions include individual, day of
week, month, and survey round (age) fixed effects. We control for day-of-test temperatures, and both cumulative and
day-of-test precipitation as well as cumulative and day-of-test humidity. P-values are in parentheses, obtained from
cluster-bootstrapping our standard errors at the district level (200 iterations).
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table C.9: Longer-Run Temperature and Test Scores (YLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Score (in SD) Math Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD) PPVT Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
Days Between Two Tests >23C -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Day-of-Test >23C -0.114*** 0.042
(0.043) (0.057)
Observations 2604 2604 2541 2541
R2 0.052 0.058 0.073 0.077
Notes: This tables shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in a given bin between
successive tests) on math and reading performance using the YLS data set. The effect of days below 23◦C is normalized
to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to below 23◦C. The regressions include individual, day of
week, month, and survey round (age) fixed effects. In Columns (1) and (2), we control for cumulative precipitation
and humidity. In Columns (2) and (4), we control for day-of-test temperatures, and both cumulative and day-of-test
precipitation as well as cumulative and day-of-test humidity. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by district-
week.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.10: Previous and Current Year Temperature, and Student Attendance
(ASER)
(1) (2)
Student Attendance Proportion Student Attendance Proportion
β / SE β / SE
PY NGS Days <15C 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0005)
PY NGS Days >21C 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
PY GS Days <15C -0.0005** -0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
PY GS Days >21C -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
CY NGS Days <15C -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0006)
CY NGS Days >21C 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
CY GS Days <15C 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003)
CY GS Days >21C -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 93432 93432
R2 0.429
Notes: This table shows show the effect of previous and current year temperature (defined as number of days in the
calendar year—see Figure 4.3) on current year student attendance in public schools divided amongst the growing season
(June—Dec) and the non-growing season (March—May). The effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero
and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-21◦C. The regressions include district and year fixed effects.
We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Column (1) presents results from an OLS regression, while Column
(2) presents results from a tobit specification censored at 1 (100%). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. GS:
Growing Season; NGS: Non-Growing Season; PY: Previous Year; CY: Current Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.11: Previous Year Temperature and Body Mass Index (BMI) (YLS)
(1) (2)
BMI BMI-for-Age Z-Score
β / SE β / SE
PY Days 23-25C -0.015*** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.002)
PY Days 25-27C -0.023*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.003)
PY Days >27C -0.025*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 3460 3460
R2 0.342 0.080
Notes: This table shows the effect of longer-run temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year)
on BMI using the YLS data set. The effect of days below 23◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are
interpreted relative to below 23◦C. The regressions include individual, day of week, month, and survey round (age)
fixed effects. We control for cumulative precipitation and humidity. Sample only includes only a balanced panel of
school-age children. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table C.12: Previous and Current Year Temperature, and Teacher Attendance
(ASER)
(1) (2)
Teacher Attendance Proportion Teacher Attendance Proportion
β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0005)
PY Days >21C 0.0001 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0004)
CY Days <15C 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0005)
CY Days >21C 0.0000 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0004)
Observations 75328 75328
R2 0.052
Notes: This tables shows the effect of previous and current year temperature (defined as number of days in a given bin
between successive tests) on teacher attendance at public schools using the ASER data set. The effect of days between
15◦C-21◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-21◦C. The regressions include
district and year fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Column (1) presents results from an
OLS regression, while Column (2) presents results from a tobit specification censored at 1 (100%). Standard errors are
clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.13: Falsification Test: Future Temperature Doesn’t Negatively Impact
Prior Yields
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 6 Crops Top 6 Crops Top 5 Monsoon Crops Top 5 Monsoon Crops
Log(Yield) Lag Log (Yield) Log (Yield) Lag Log (Yield)
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
GS Days <13C -0.0018 -0.0000 -0.0023 0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0009)
GS Days 13-15C 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0029*** -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012)
GS Days 17-19C -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0026 0.0029
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0020)
GS Days 19-21C -0.0032*** 0.0023 -0.0033** 0.0053
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0033)
GS Days 21-23C -0.0027** 0.0031* -0.0033* 0.0062
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0037)
GS Days 23-25C -0.0033** 0.0035* -0.0040** 0.0067*
(0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0035)
GS Days 25-27C -0.0042*** 0.0026* -0.0038** 0.0054*
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0031)
GS Days 27-29C -0.0055*** 0.0023 -0.0042*** 0.0053
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0032)
GS Days >29C -0.0096*** 0.0017 -0.0116*** 0.0044
(0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0033)
NGS Days <13C 0.0021 0.0034 0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0013)
NGS Days 13-15C -0.0023* -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0058
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0039)
NGS Days 17-19C -0.0035** -0.0012 -0.0042 0.0004
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0020)
NGS Days 19-21C -0.0029* 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0008
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0021)
NGS Days 21-23C -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0019)
NGS Days 23-25C -0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0012 -0.0037
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0023)
NGS Days 25-27C -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0029
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0026)
NGS Days 27-29C -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0006
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0028)
NGS Days >29C -0.0018 -0.0030 -0.0028 -0.0030
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Observations 9479 9479 9475 9475
R2 0.885 0.878 0.877 0.870
Notes: This table examines the effect of hot days on contemporaneous (columns (1) and (3)) and past (columns (2) and
(4)) yields. The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative
to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade status. We also
control flexibly for precipitation. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. GS: Growing Season,
NGS: Non-Growing Season
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.14: Future Temperature Shocks Are Uncorrelated With Baseline Heat
Resistant Crop Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C (Residualized) 0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0014 0.0030 0.0021
(0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0021)
PY Days >21C (Residualized) -0.0018 0.0027 0.0051** -0.0062*** -0.0003
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0027)
Observations 525 536 539 541 538
R2 0.010 0.049 0.036 0.038 0.020
(6) (7) (8) (9)
2011 2012 2013 2014
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
PY Days <15C (Residualized) -0.0083*** -0.0022 0.0019 0.0023
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0031)
PY Days >21C (Residualized) 0.0050** 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0011
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0030)
Observations 525 528 515 537
R2 0.055 0.012 0.023 0.011
Notes: This table examines if residualized adoption of heat-resistant crops (binary indicator for above median adoption
as used in main-analysis) co-varies with number of hot days in the previous year. The effect of days between 15◦C-17◦C
is normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-17◦C. The regressions include district,
year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade status. We also control flexibly for precipitation and humidity.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.15: Does NREGA rollout co-vary with hot days in the previous year?
(1)
NREGA (0/1)
β / SE
PY Days <13C 0.0005
(0.0034)
PY Days 13-15C -0.0029
(0.0042)
PY Days 17-19C -0.0022
(0.0037)
PY Days 19-21C -0.0059*
(0.0032)
PY Days 21-23C -0.0004
(0.0032)
PY Days 23-25C 0.0003
(0.0033)
PY Days 25-27C 0.0029
(0.0035)
PY Days 27-29C 0.0061
(0.0038)
PY Days >29C 0.0030
(0.0039)
Observations 1306
R2 0.698
Notes: This table examines if NREGA rollout co-varies with number of hot days in the previous year. Regression
includes districts and year fixed effects. We control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district level.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.16: Triple Difference: Previous Year Temperature, NREGA, and Test
Scores
(1) (2)
Math Score (in SD) Read Score (in SD)
β / SE β / SE
PY Days >21C -0.0011 -0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0007)
NREGA PY -0.1965*** -0.1363**
(0.0596) (0.0573)
NREGA PY * PY Days >21C 0.0006*** 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 1866623 1866623
R2 0.177 0.167
Notes: This table shows the influence of NREGA in attenuating the effects of longer-run
temperature (defined as number of days in the previous calendar year—see Figure 4.3)
on current year math and reading performance. The effect of days between 15◦C-21◦C is
normalized to zero and all other coefficients are interpreted relative to 15◦C-21◦C. The
regressions include district, year and age fixed effects, and control for age-for-grade
status. We also control flexibly for precipitation and humidity. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the district level. PY: Previous Year.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Appendix D
Chapter 4 of appendix
D.1 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we rule out some alternative channels that could potentially
explain the observed relationship between temperature and agricultural input
use. Specifically, we consider two alternative explanations: (1) influence of hu-
midity on the incidence of pests and crop disease, and (2) higher than normal
temperatures affecting soil moisture, in turn reducing fertilizer uptake.
Humidity
Grey leaf spot is a major maize disease in Kenya. Empirical results suggest that
moderate to high temperatures and prolonged periods of high relative humidity
are both favorable for the development of gray leaf spot (241; 336). Similarly,
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relative humidity is also a main factor affecting the distribution of stem borers,
the main insect pest affecting maize in Kenya (282). Thus, given the correlation
between heat and humidity, it is possible that our estimates actually capture
the influence of relative humidity on pests and crop diseases. To rule out this
explanation, we control for relative humidity at the village level, and find that
our estimates are relatively unchanged (Table D.30). Even holding humidity
constant, temperature exerts an independent effect on agricultural input use.
Soil Moisture
Higher than normal temperatures could reduce the stock of water in the soil,
and thereby reduce fertilizer effectiveness, inducing lower farmer uptake. Wa-
ter and soil nutrients (such as nitrogen and phosphorus) are essential for crop
growth. Fertilizer use adds to soil nutrients. In rain-fed agriculture, where soil
moisture depends on rainfall, temperature, and soil quality, the effectiveness of
fertilizer can be seriously affected by inadequate soil moisture. When moisture
deficiency is the primary factor limiting crop growth, yield is less responsive to
fertilizer use, in line with von Liebig’s law of the minimum which states that
yield is determined by the amount of the most limiting nutrient (262; 304). In
addition, soil nutrients are taken up by plant roots in a water solution, so water
availability affects how efficiently applied fertilizer can be used by crops. Farm-
ers are less likely to adopt fertilizer in zones where soil moisture supply is defi-
cient (at least partially) due to low yield response to fertilizer (223; 244; 263; 404).
Moreover, both air temperature and soil temperature affect soil moisture
through the evapotranspiration process, the predominant water cycle in the
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absence of precipitation (251). Temperature plays a critical role in evapotran-
spiration. Higher temperature increases transpiration of water in the surface
soil, just like in the plants. (234) assess the implications of climate change for
soil moisture availability in southeast Turkey, finding substantial reductions in
availability during summer. Local effects of heat stress on soil moisture will also
vary with soil characteristics. (63), for example, show that the infiltration and
the water-holding capacity of soils on limestone are greater with increased frost
activity and infer that increased temperatures could lead to increased surface or
shallow runoff.
Since we include village fixed effects in our model, we control for time in-
variant qualities of the soil. We also control for time varying attributes of soil
at province level via province-round fixed effects. However, if changes in heat
across years are correlated with changes in soil moisture within a province, the
estimated relationship between temperature and fertilizer use may be suscep-
tible to the soil moisture channel. To rule out this explanation, we control for
daily soil moisture at the village level. Our findings remain unchanged when
we hold soil moisture constant (Table D.31).1
D.2 The Effects of Rainfall on Pesticides and Fertil-
izer Use
In Table D.32 and D.33 we report the coefficients on the upper and lower rain-
fall terciles for each period within the agricultural growing season. The effects
1Unfortunately, daily soil moisture data could not be obtained for the entire sample.
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are as one would expect. High rainfall (upper tercile) is commonly associated
with greater leaching and lowered effectiveness of pesticide applications once
plants have emerged (in GS2), so farmers predictably reduce pesticide applica-
tion in the wettest years. Conversely, in the driest years, the risk of top dressing
fertilizer damaging maize increases, to farmers optimally respond by reducing
fertilizer application in the driest (lowest rainfall tercile) seasons.2 The weed-
ing labor effect in GS1 likely reflects farmers’ efforts to reduce weed competi-
tion with newly planted seed and emergent seedlings when they face moisture
stress. The yield effects of rainfall are likewise as one would predict. And the
core results on which we focus are unchanged by including the upper and lower
rainfall terciles. We now include these results in the appendix and briefly dis-
cuss them in the revised manuscript.
D.3 Protective Effects of Adaptation
In Table D.22, we estimate a reduced form relationship between temperatures
in the growing season and maize yields; that is, we observe the net effect of at
least the following channels of impact: an increase in incidence of pests, weeds
and crop diseases, consequent increase in pesticide use and manual weeding,
decrease in fertilizer use, and an unlikely direct effect of higher temperatures
2The GS1 rain top tercile point estimate on fertilizer may reflect that early in what seems
like a good season (solid rainfall) farmers might try going without fertilizer. Indeed, the qual-
itative evidence from the TAMPA data set supports such an explanation: almost 40% of all
non-adopters of fertilizer claimed they had no need to use fertilizer. Alternatively, it could be
that fertilizer response is pretty sensitive to soil conditions and anything outside of the regular
rainfall zone causes farmers to worry that they will either waste the fertilizer (if it leaches away
with too much rainfall) or burn the crop (if there is too little rainfall).
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on maize yields.3 We find an extra degree day over 8C in the initial growth
stage (GS1) reduces maize yields by 0.38%. At baseline (round 1), the average
maize output was roughly 292 kg/acre. Therefore, 0.38% corresponds to 1.1
kg/acre decrease in output. We find an extra degree day over 8C in the initial
growth stage (GS1) increases pesticide use by 2.14% and reduces fertilizer use
by 1.31% (Table 5.1).4
Existing evidence strongly suggests that fertilizer and pesticide applications
are associated with large productivity gains for maize farmers in Kenya. (262)
estimate the mean marginal physical product of 17.64 kg maize/kg nitrogen
fertilizer. (142) show 1 teaspoon fertilizer applied to each plant increases maize
yield by 63%. Tests in Zambia indicate maize yield differences in sprayed and
unsprayed fungicide treatments range from 27 to 54% (171). In Zimbabwe, re-
search with herbicides resulted in yield increases of up to 50% in maize. Use
of herbicides in Kenyan weed trials resulted in 33% higher maize yields than
with the farmer practice of hand weeding on account of better weed control
(172). Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there exist no studies that examine the
intensive margin effects of pesticide use on agricultural yields in developing
countries.
Therefore, we present back-of-the-envelope calculations using agricultural
input productivity estimates from the TAMPA data. We estimate the intensive-
margin effects of pesticide and fertilizer applications on maize yields after ab-
sorbing household-specific time invariant unobservables via household fixed
3Average daily temperatures in the data are less than 30C. In fact, the 99th percentile of the
distribution of daily maximum temperatures for villages in our sample is 32C. This is significant
since optimum maize growth occurs at temperatures of 24-30C (319). Relatedly, (345) and (249)
find that maize yields only decline physiologically due to heat stress above 29-30C.
4At baseline, the average maize farmer used 0.24 kg/acre of pesticides and 46.07 kg/acre
of fertilizer. Therefore, an extra degree day over 8C in the initial growth stage (GS1) increased
pesticide use by 0.005 kg/acre and reduced fertilizer use by 0.6 kg/acre.
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effects and village-specific time varying confounders via village-by-round fixed
effects (Table D.34). We find a 1% increase in pesticide (fertilizer) application is
associated with a 2.7% (3.5%) increase in maize yields. It is important to note
these estimates may be biased upwards due to household-specific time varying
unobservables correlated with maize yields and adoption of modern agricul-
tural technologies (e.g., household-specific transitory income shocks).
A 1.31% decrease in fertilizer use decreases maize yields by 4.56% or 13.39
kg/acre and a 2.14% increase in pesticide use increases maize yields by 5.78%
or 16.87 kg/acre. The decrease in maize yields in presence of an extra DD over
8C, and the consequent agricultural adaptation, is 1.1 kg/acre (Qn. C). If the
average maize farmer did not adjust production decisions in response to an
extra DD increase in temperature over 8C, maize yields would decline by 4.58
kg/acre (-1.1 - 16.87 + 13.39) (Qn. B). Lastly, maize yield would increase by
13.39 kg/acre if the average maize farmer did not experience an extra DD over
8C (Qn. A).
Therefore, defensive investments undertaken by the average maize farmer in
response to an extra DD over 8C protected 3.48 kg of maize yield/acre, roughly
75% of expected loss.
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D.4 Figures
Figure D.1: Location of Sample Villages
Figure D.2: Maize Calendar in Sample Villages
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Figure D.3: Spatial Variation in Altitude and Agro-Ecological Zones across
TAMPA Villages
(a) Altitude (b) Agro-Ecological Zones
Notes: This figure shows spatial variation in altitude and agro-ecological zones across
TAMPA villages.
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Figure D.4: Daily Average Temperature by Phases in the Agricultural Cycle
(1990-2012)
Notes: Distribution of average daily temperatures from 1990-2012 for three
phases of the agricultural cycle. Phase 1: pre-planting or land preparation -
onset of planting; Phase 2: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; Phase 3: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest.
We calculate cumulative growing degree days from a lower bound of 8C (rep-
resented by red vertical line)
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Figure D.5: Historical Temperature Trends in Kenya (1901-2012)
Notes: This figure presents average yearly temperatures as well as the linear
fit for villages in the TAMPA sample generated using monthly average tem-
peratures from the Climate Research Unit Time Series Grid Version 3.23 at the
University of East Anglia.
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Figure D.6: Temperature Bins | Household FE: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pes-
ticide Use
(a) Pesticides 0/1 (b) Ln Pesticide/Acre
(c) Fertilizer 0/1 (d) Ln Fertilizer/Acre
(e) Own Weeding Days/Acre
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The figure
presents the effects of temperature (captured via number of days in each temperature bin) on agricultural input use.
CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application
- onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. All figures include household
and province-by-year fixed effects as well as controls for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered by village.
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Figure D.7: Temperature Bins | Province-Specific Time Trends: Temperature,
Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(a) Pesticides 0/1 (b) Ln Pesticide/Acre
(c) Fertilizer 0/1 (d) Ln Fertilizer/Acre
(e) Own Weeding Days/Acre
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The figure
presents the effects of temperature (captured via number of days in each temperature bin) on agricultural input use.
CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application -
onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. All figures include village fixed
effects and province-specific (linear, quadratic, and cubic) time trends as well as controls for precipitation. Standard
errors are clustered by village.
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Figure D.8: Temperature Bins |District*Year FE: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pes-
ticide Use
(a) Pesticides 0/1 (b) Ln Pesticide/Acre
(c) Fertilizer 0/1 (d) Ln Fertilizer/Acre
(e) Own Weeding Days/Acre
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The figure
presents the effects of temperature (captured via number of days in each temperature bin) on agricultural input use.
CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application
- onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. All figures include village and
district-by-year fixed effects as well as controls for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered by village.
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Figure D.9: Temperature Bins: Log Total Maize Output and Temperature
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The figure presents the effects of temperature (captured via number of days in each temperature bin) on on total
maize output. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer
application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. All figures include
village and province-by-year fixed effects as well as controls for precipitation. Standard errors are clustered by village.
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D.5 Tables
Table D.1: Summary Statistics
1997 2000 2004 2007 2010
Pesticides 0/1 0.27 0.65 0.53
(0.45) (0.48) (0.50)
Pesticide/Acre(kgs) 0.24 0.50 0.56
(1.68) (1.01) (3.96)
Total Weeding Days/Acre 9.59 4.67 4.56
(11.64) (6.94) (6.43)
Own Weeding Labor 0/1 0.92 0.80 0.77
(0.27) (0.40) (0.42)
Own Weeding Days/Acre 7.86 3.64 3.16
(11.11) (6.13) (5.35)
Hired Weeding Labor 0/1 0.25 0.21 0.20
(0.43) (0.41) (0.40)
Hired Weeding Days/Acre 1.73 1.04 1.41
(4.80) (3.75) (4.08)
Fertilizer 0/1 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.75 0.75
(0.48) (0.46) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44)
Fertilizer/Acre(kgs) 46.07 57.48 51.37 54.53 51.25
(76.02) (91.09) (70.20) (63.80) (57.05)
Maize Output/Acre(kgs) 292.33 355.18 406.68 489.37 394.87
(333.03) (908.16) (424.91) (445.54) (353.66)
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds
(1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). Detailed data on pesticides and weeding labor days was only collected
in 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10.
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Table D.2: Pesticide Use Transitions
Fraction of Households
NNN 0.22
(0.42)
NYY 0.26
(0.44)
NNY 0.08
(0.27)
NYN 0.16
(0.37)
YNY 0.02
(0.15)
YNN 0.02
(0.15)
YYN 0.07
(0.25)
YYY 0.17
(0.37)
Observations 1242
Notes: This table shows all possible three transitions in our sample of farmers and the fraction of our sample that
experiences each of these transitions. The three periods correspond to the 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10 survey rounds.
In the first column, the three letters represent the transition history with respect to pesticide adoption, where “Y”
represents the use of pesticides and “N” represents non-adoption of pesticides. These are ordered by survey round. For
example, the transition “YYY” stands for farmers who used pesticides in all three periods; they make up about 17% of
our sample. “YYN” represents the 7% of the sample that use pesticides in 2003-04 and 2006-07 but not in 2009-10.
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Table D.3: Fertilizer Use Transitions
Fraction of Households
NNNNN 0.16
(0.37)
NYYYY 0.06
(0.23)
NNYYY 0.03
(0.17)
NNNYY 0.02
(0.12)
NNNNY 0.03
(0.16)
NYN/YNY 0.14
(0.35)
YNNNN 0.00
(0.07)
YYNNN 0.01
(0.07)
YYYNN 0.00
(0.04)
YYYYN 0.02
(0.12)
YYYYY 0.54
(0.50)
Observations 1242
Notes: This table shows all possible five transitions in our sample of farmers and the fraction of our sample that experi-
ences each of these transitions. The three periods correspond to the 1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10 sur-
vey rounds. In the first column, the five letters represent the transition history with respect to fertilizer adoption, where
“Y” represents the use of pesticides and “N” represents non-adoption of fertilizer. For example, the transition “YYYYY”
stands for farmers who used fertilizer in all five periods; they make up about 54% of our sample. “NYN/YNY” stands
for farmers who transitioned both in and out of fertilizer use within these five rounds of data. All other sequences are
unidirectional.
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Table D.4: Maize Crop Calendar Across Provinces
Eastern Western Coast Central Nyanza Rift Valley
1st Jun/1st Aug 1st Jan/15th Jan 15th Jan 1st Jan/15th Jan 1st Jan 1st Jan/15th Jan Pre-Planting
PP
1st Aug/1st Oct 15th Feb/1st Mar/15th Mar 15th Mar 15th Feb/1st Mar/15th Mar 15th Feb/1st Mar 1st Mar/15th Mar Planting
GS1
16th Oct/22nd Oct/1st Nov 1st Apr/16th Apr 1st May 1st Apr/16th Apr 1st Apr 1st Apr/6th Apr/16th Apr Post-Planting
GS2
15th Dec/31st Dec 1st Aug 15th Jul 1st Aug/1st Sep 1st Jul/1st Aug 15th Jul/1st Aug/1st Sep Harvest
Notes: The table presents maize crop calendars across provinces in Kenya. PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application
- onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest.
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Table D.5: Growing Degree Days: Mean and Standard Deviations – Rounds 1-5
All 1997 2000 2004 2007 2010
CY PP DD >8C 746.57 743.48 744.48 732.39 778.31 734.17
(127.74) (125.46) (125.84) (129.89) (127.41) (124.80)
CY GS1 DD >8C 489.06 480.81 474.85 504.17 481.38 504.07
(220.00) (214.76) (221.84) (223.81) (213.96) (223.96)
CY GS2 DD >8C 1143.27 1157.08 1136.57 1130.27 1142.41 1150.01
(278.22) (282.89) (280.64) (272.49) (283.07) (271.42)
Observations 6210 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). Temperature data was generated at the village level, so the table reports mean and standard deviations for degree
days (DD) over 8C for each survey round. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting;
GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table D.6: Climate Change in Kenya?
(1) (2)
Farmer Noticed Change in Temperature? Famer Affected by Changes in Temperature?
2009
No 53.14 17.70
Yes 46.86 82.30
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households, balanced over 5 survey rounds, in the 2009-10 TAMPA survey.
Table D.7: How was farming affected by this change in temperature?
(1)
Affected by Changes in Temperature, How?
2009
Decline in Yields 44.68
Decrease in Land Quality 4.38
Difficult to Time Seasons 6.89
Increase in Yields 5.43
Other 1.88
Weeds/Pests/Diseases 36.74
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households in the 2009-10 TAMPA survey.
438
Table D.8: Why Didn’t You Use Fertilizer?
(1)
Why No Fertilizer?
2009
Fertilizer Not Available 0.92
Lack of Advice 3.06
No Money/Too Expensive 57.80
No Need To Use Fertilizer 38.23
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households in the 2009-10 TAMPA survey.
Table D.9: Temperature and Log Hired Weeding Labor KES/acre
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Tobit Honore´’s Tobit
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0013 0.0065 0.0045
(0.0030) (0.0064) (0.0059)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0119** 0.0255** 0.0204*
(0.0055) (0.0112) (0.0105)
CY GS2 DD >8C 0.0018 0.0037 0.0036
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0035)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.154
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07. The table
presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on hired weeding labor. Columns 2 and
3 present Standard Tobit and Honore´ Fixed Effects Tobit estimates, respectively. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or
land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2:
top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.10: Temperature and Log Total Agricultural Input Expenditures
(1)
Ln Total Input Expenditures/Acre
β / SE
CY PP DD >8C -0.0027
(0.0019)
CY GS1 DD >8C -0.0091***
(0.0028)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0004
(0.0010)
Village FE Yes
Province-by-Year FE Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes
Observations 3726
R2 0.428
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for agricultural
input expenditures. The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on total
agricultural input expenditures/acre. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1:
planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset
harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table D.11: Household FE: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0171
(0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0005) (0.0046) (0.0104)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027** 0.0214*** -0.0013** -0.0131** -0.0068
(0.0011) (0.0070) (0.0006) (0.0056) (0.0142)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0005) (0.0035) (0.0002) (0.0022) (0.0075)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.586 0.586 0.740 0.789 0.478
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.12: Observed temperature variation: proportion of households with degree-days below/above average (degrees)
after removing province-specific time trends, province*year effects and district*year effects
Removed Prov-Specific Time Trends Removed Prov*Round FE Removed Dist*Round FE
% HHs % HHs % HHs
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.76
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.50
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.65
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.49
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.78
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.60
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.69
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.38
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.50
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.21
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.57
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.34
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.33
CY PP DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.15
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.23
CY GS1 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.07
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 5 degrees 0.33
CY GS2 DD >8C: DD below/above 10 degrees 0.17
Notes: Sample include 1242 balanced households over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10). The table presents the leftover variation in growing degree days (DD) after removing province-specific time
trends, province-by-round, and district-by-round fixed effects. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer
application - onset harvest.
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Table D.13: Province-Specific Time Trends: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0171**
(0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0086)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027*** 0.0214*** -0.0010*** -0.0118*** -0.0068
(0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0117)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0015 0.0049
(0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0062)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.336 0.353 0.593 0.656 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07
and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.14: District*Year FE: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0007 0.0089 -0.0019*** -0.0220*** 0.0326*
(0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0005) (0.0058) (0.0187)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0021 0.0047 -0.0014* -0.0150* 0.0865**
(0.0021) (0.0124) (0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0349)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0008* -0.0070** -0.0004* -0.0034 0.0041
(0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0002) (0.0022) (0.0080)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.371 0.389 0.607 0.667 0.174
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07
and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.15: Honore´ Fixed Effects Tobit: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide
Use
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0142 -0.0052 0.0466*
(0.0106) (0.0057) (0.0263)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0277*** -0.0231*** -0.0239
(0.0076) (0.0063) (0.0255)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0055 0.0031 0.0220
(0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0143)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table D.16: Standard Tobit Estimates: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0179 -0.0048 0.0199**
(0.0120) (0.0055) (0.0098)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0381*** -0.0216*** -0.0189
(0.0108) (0.0066) (0.0124)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0057 0.0019 0.0092
(0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0062)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on weeding labor. CY: current year;
PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.17: Uniform Maize Crop Calendar: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesti-
cide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0021** 0.0148** -0.0003 -0.0051 -0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0073) (0.0005) (0.0051) (0.0125)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0043** 0.0283** -0.0013 -0.0106 0.0262
(0.0017) (0.0119) (0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0262)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0012* -0.0078* -0.0000 0.0002 0.0020
(0.0006) (0.0046) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0110)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.341 0.357 0.594 0.657 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table D.18: Uniform Maize Crop Calendar, Drop Eastern Province: Tempera-
ture, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0021 0.0124 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0037
(0.0014) (0.0097) (0.0005) (0.0054) (0.0167)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0039** 0.0225* -0.0015 -0.0135* 0.0306
(0.0017) (0.0122) (0.0009) (0.0081) (0.0290)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0011 -0.0074 0.0001 0.0031 -0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0050) (0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0121)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3093 3093 5155 5155 3093
R2 0.307 0.332 0.611 0.662 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1031 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.19: Conley Standard Errors: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044* 0.0171***
(0.0008) (0.0053) (0.0002) (0.0025) (0.0032)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027*** 0.0214*** -0.0013** -0.0131** -0.0068
(0.0008) (0.0055) (0.0006) (0.0053) (0.0106)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0045)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.044 0.047 0.018 0.023 0.011
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The table
presents the effects of temperature on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation
- onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing
fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modeled in (103).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table D.20: Standard Errors Clustered at Grid Point Level: Temperature, Fertil-
izer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0171**
(0.0014) (0.0095) (0.0005) (0.0046) (0.0066)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027** 0.0214** -0.0013** -0.0131** -0.0068
(0.0011) (0.0076) (0.0005) (0.0056) (0.0151)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0050)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.336 0.353 0.594 0.657 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered by grid point.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.21: Cluster-Bootstrap P-Values at Grid Point Level: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0171
(0.49) (0.66) (0.45) (0.44) (0.03)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027 0.0214 -0.0013 -0.0131 -0.0068
(0.09) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.69)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.04) (0.55) (0.95) (0.85) (0.37)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.336 0.353 0.594 0.657 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07
and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard errors are clustered by grid point (200 replications). P-values are in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.22: Log Total Maize Output and Temperature
(1)
Log Maize Yield/Acre (Kg.)
β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0018
(0.0033)
CY GS1 DD >8C -0.0038*
(0.0023)
CY GS2 DD >8C 0.0006
(0.0015)
Village FE Yes
Province-by-Year FE Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes
Observations 6210
R2 0.374
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on total maize output. CY:
current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset
of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
448
Table D.23: Accounting for Within-Day Temperature Variation: Log Total Maize
Output and Temperature
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Yield/Acre Log Yield/Acre Log Yield/Acre Log Yield/Acre Log Yield/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >21C II 0.0021
(0.0043)
CY GS1 DD >21C II -0.0083**
(0.0033)
CY GS2 DD >21C II 0.0002
(0.0029)
CY PP DD >22C II 0.0034
(0.0044)
CY GS1 DD >22C II -0.0089***
(0.0030)
CY GS2 DD >22C II 0.0010
(0.0037)
CY PP DD >23C II 0.0043
(0.0058)
CY GS1 DD >23C II -0.0063
(0.0048)
CY GS2 DD >23C II 0.0027
(0.0050)
CY PP DD >24C II 0.0058
(0.0064)
CY GS1 DD >24C II -0.0094
(0.0076)
CY GS2 DD >24C II 0.0066
(0.0068)
CY PP DD >25C II 0.0077
(0.0076)
CY GS1 DD >25C II -0.0095
(0.0109)
CY GS2 DD >25C II 0.0132
(0.0092)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6210 6210 6210 6210 6210
R2 0.375 0.375 0.374 0.375 0.376
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD)) on total maize output. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.24: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer Use, by Wealth (Round 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0015 0.0104 -0.0003 -0.0043 0.0188
(0.0010) (0.0071) (0.0004) (0.0046) (0.0115)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0031*** 0.0238*** -0.0009 -0.0111* 0.0121
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0060) (0.0163)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0061
(0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0022) (0.0077)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0009** -0.0075*** -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0057
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0097)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0008** -0.0041 -0.0405*
(0.0009) (0.0054) (0.0004) (0.0037) (0.0214)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0004 -0.0025 0.0002 0.0013 -0.0051
(0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0116)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.587 0.588 0.740 0.789 0.479
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07
and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.25: Standard Tobit Estimates: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer
Use, by Wealth (Round 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0208* -0.0047 0.0188
(0.0125) (0.0057) (0.0116)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0410*** -0.0192** 0.0078
(0.0119) (0.0076) (0.0154)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0057 0.0022 0.0095
(0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0070)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0071 -0.0022 -0.0036
(0.0058) (0.0034) (0.0091)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0043 -0.0063 -0.0557***
(0.0111) (0.0058) (0.0193)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0028 0.0018 0.0009
(0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0101)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
R2
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous
effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current year;
PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.26: Honore´ Fixed Effects Tobit: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer
Use, by Wealth (Round 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0162** -0.0048 0.0373
(0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0366)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0292*** -0.0201*** 0.0257
(0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0345)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0051 0.0028 0.0192
(0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0204)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0062 -0.0021 0.0013
(0.0047) (0.0027) (0.0205)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0027 -0.0057 -0.0979***
(0.0081) (0.0051) (0.0334)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0014 0.0016 0.0102
(0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0217)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous
effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current year;
PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.27: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer Use, by Wealth (Round 1-5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0015 0.0099 -0.0003 -0.0043 0.0159
(0.0010) (0.0071) (0.0004) (0.0046) (0.0114)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0030*** 0.0230*** -0.0009 -0.0110* 0.0055
(0.0011) (0.0074) (0.0006) (0.0059) (0.0151)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0049
(0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0073)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0010** -0.0069** -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0082)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0007* -0.0040 -0.0286*
(0.0008) (0.0049) (0.0004) (0.0035) (0.0165)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0028 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0002) (0.0025) (0.0112)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.587 0.587 0.740 0.789 0.478
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07
and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application -
onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.28: Standard Tobit Estimates: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer
Use, by Wealth (Round 1-5)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0207* -0.0045 0.0158
(0.0125) (0.0057) (0.0113)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0397*** -0.0192*** 0.0001
(0.0115) (0.0073) (0.0143)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0063 0.0017 0.0088
(0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0066)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0079 -0.0030 0.0037
(0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0079)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0008 -0.0058 -0.0421***
(0.0097) (0.0055) (0.0153)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile 0.0001 0.0037 0.0029
(0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0097)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous
effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current year;
PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.29: Honore´ Fixed Effects Tobit: Temperature, Pesticides and Fertilizer
Use, by Wealth (Round 1-5)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Pesticide/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0158** -0.0049 0.0330
(0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0362)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0293*** -0.0201*** 0.0110
(0.0074) (0.0055) (0.0357)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0055* 0.0024 0.0175
(0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0197)
CY PP DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0060 -0.0021 0.0117
(0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0197)
CY GS1 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile -0.0024 -0.0053 -0.0721**
(0.0081) (0.0051) (0.0344)
CY GS2 DD >8C*Bottom Wealth Tercile 0.0005 0.0033 0.0147
(0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0237)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210 3726
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides. The table presents the heterogeneous
effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use, by wealth. CY: current year;
PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.30: Controls for Daily Humidity: Temperature, Pesticides and Weeding
Labor Days
(1) (2) (3)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0015* 0.0079 0.0053
(0.0008) (0.0054) (0.0111)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027*** 0.0220*** -0.0032
(0.0009) (0.0062) (0.0126)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0030 0.0029
(0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0061)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes
Humidity Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 3726
R2 0.338 0.355 0.165
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current
year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
Table D.31: Controls for Soil Moisture: Temperature and Fertilizer Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fertilizer 0/1 Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Ln Fertilizer/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0044 -0.0034
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0042) (0.0063)
CY GS1 DD >8C -0.0013** -0.0016* -0.0131** -0.0133
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0050) (0.0082)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0032
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rainfall Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soil Moisture Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 6210 2352 6210 2352
R2 0.594 0.589 0.657 0.646
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10)
for fertilizer use. The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural
input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer
application - onset of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are
in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.32: Rainfall Coefficients: Temperature, Fertilizer and Pesticide Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pesticides 0/1 Ln Pesticide/Acre Fertilizer 0/1 Ln Fertilizer/Acre Own Weeding Days/Acre
β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0004 -0.0044 0.0171**
(0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0004) (0.0042) (0.0086)
CY GS1 DD >8C 0.0027*** 0.0214*** -0.0013** -0.0131** -0.0068
(0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0005) (0.0050) (0.0117)
CY GS2 DD >8C -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0049
(0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0062)
CY PP Rain Bottom Tercile 0.0173 0.1992 -0.0055 0.0235 0.5520
(0.0327) (0.2045) (0.0144) (0.1448) (0.4497)
CY PP Rain Top Tercile 0.0001 0.0804 -0.0056 0.0721 0.4659
(0.0391) (0.2197) (0.0215) (0.2092) (0.5053)
CY GS1 Rain Bottom Tercile 0.0716* 0.3051 0.0024 0.0085 0.9740**
(0.0370) (0.2436) (0.0165) (0.1770) (0.3962)
CY GS1 Rain Top Tercile 0.0402 -0.0787 -0.0342** -0.3063* -0.2206
(0.0391) (0.2660) (0.0147) (0.1556) (0.5700)
CY GS2 Rain Bottom Tercile -0.0485 -0.2918 -0.0489** -0.5361*** -0.5438
(0.0373) (0.2565) (0.0204) (0.1877) (0.7960)
CY GS2 Rain Top Tercile -0.0911** -0.7127** -0.0076 -0.0916 -1.0003
(0.0428) (0.2920) (0.0148) (0.1483) (0.7652)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3726 3726 6210 6210 3726
R2 0.336 0.353 0.594 0.657 0.164
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticides and weeding labor days. The
table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on agricultural input use. CY: current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset of top
dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.33: Rainfall Coefficients: Log Total Maize Output and Temperature
(1)
Log Maize Yield/Acre (Kg.)
β / SE
CY PP DD >8C 0.0018
(0.0033)
CY GS1 DD >8C -0.0038*
(0.0023)
CY GS2 DD >8C 0.0006
(0.0015)
CY PP Rain Bottom Tercile -0.2430**
(0.1020)
CY PP Rain Top Tercile 0.1067
(0.0831)
CY GS1 Rain Bottom Tercile 0.0804
(0.0823)
CY GS1 Rain Top Tercile -0.1130
(0.1071)
CY GS2 Rain Bottom Tercile -0.0904
(0.1173)
CY GS2 Rain Top Tercile 0.3880***
(0.1129)
Village FE Yes
Prov-by-Year FE Yes
Observations 6210
R2 0.374
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10). The table presents the effects of temperature (captured via degree days (DD) over 8C) on total maize output. CY:
current year; PP: pre-planting or land preparation - onset of planting; GS1: planting or basal fertilizer application - onset
of top dressing fertilizer; GS2: top dressing fertilizer application - onset harvest. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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Table D.34: Log Total Maize Output and Agricultural Inputs
(1) (2)
Log Yield/Acre Log Yield/Acre
β / SE β / SE
Ln Pesticide/Acre 0.0268**
(0.0118)
Ln Fertilizer/Acre 0.0355***
(0.0112)
Household FE Yes Yes
Village-by-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3726 6210
R2 0.695 0.650
Notes: Sample includes 1242 households balanced over 5 survey rounds (1996-97, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-
10) for fertilizer use and 3 survey rounds (2003-04, 2006-07 and 2009-10) for pesticide use. The table presents the effects
of pesticide and fertilizer use on total maize output. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by village.
*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
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